

Building Civilian Capacity for Conflict Management and Sustainable Peace¹
A discussion paper prepared for the Government of Denmark's Meeting on
Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management''

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(Drawing on reports by James Boyce, William Durch, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, and Susan Woodward,)²

Background and Rationale.

Since the early 1990s, the UN system, the World Bank Group, and bilateral donors have been involved in a broad array of state-support and peace-building functions in the aftermath of conflicts – many of them protracted – that have either severely weakened or largely decimated the institutions of governance. Designated variably as post-conflict reconstruction or peace-building³, these activities have included a wide variety of administrative and public management tasks, ranging from political observation and negotiation in El Salvador, to technical assistance and advisory services in Mozambique, to the “light [but extensive] footprint” in Afghanistan and the full-fledged governing authority assumed by UNTAET in East Timor and UNMIK in Kosovo.

These political and civilian administration tasks take place alongside vital security and humanitarian operations, but have not received the same recognition of their importance. Increasingly over the last decade, the UN System, including the Bretton Woods Institutions, has developed its capacity to deal with a range of crises from conflict prevention to peacebuilding. For the most part, efforts have focused on responding to

¹ The purpose of this paper is to examine and make recommendations to improve the international capacity for planning and implementing the civilian components of conflict management and peacebuilding. It is a collaborative effort of a review team consisting of five policy analysts who capped their understanding of conflict prevention and peacebuilding with a series of interviews with senior officers of the principle intergovernmental organizations engaged in this field. The report is intended as background for in depth discussions to take place at a meeting in Copenhagen, June 8-9, 2004, convened by the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I am grateful to Ciara Knudsen for her research assistance.

² See references. For more in-depth analysis and detailed recommendation, please consult the individual reports.

³ The Utstein report defines peacebuilding as “... the development of the conditions, attitude and behavior that foster and sustain social and economic development that is peaceful, stable and prosperous.” (p5). And, “Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the structural conditions, attitudes and modes of political behavior that may permit peaceful, stable an ultimately prosperous social and economic development.”(19)

acute human suffering and violent conflict, resulting in significantly improved capacity for the planning and implementation of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief in complex emergencies. These improvements reflect the need for international actors to accord primacy to peace implementation and to deal with security challenges to local authorities until such time as the latter are able to establish their own defense and public order capabilities. Failure to perform this vital transition function creates a high risk of relapse into conflict.

It is also the case, however, that failure to build adequate state capacity – to help local authorities put in place or resuscitate effective public institutions for law and order and the provision of social services – can also doom post-conflict peace-building efforts. In response, peacekeeping mandates have become ever more multi-dimensional, and a broader array of UN entities and NGOs has become engaged in post-conflict operations and assistance programs. These have involved *inter alia*: drafting and implementing peace accords; demobilizing and reintegrating combatants; drafting new constitutions; conducting elections; designing and enforcing civil and criminal legal systems; training local police; jump-starting and managing local and national economies; fashioning, staffing and training for civil services; reconstructing and operating public utilities; establishing banking, tax and customs systems; and supervising the reconstruction of education and health systems. In the most developed of these missions, the UN has had a full-array of civil responsibilities.

Far from being mere technical tasks, these undertakings require strong leadership, political and inter-personal skills, as well as knowledge of local languages, politics, culture and norms. Success depends on the skills and talents of the civilian actors in these missions, and on the legitimacy derived from close consultation and involvement of local actors and the breadth and coherence of international participation. Unfortunately, while there is general acceptance of the broad guidelines governing international action in post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building (see, for example, the DAC guidelines), relatively little has been done to create the institutional and human resource capacities necessary to effectively plan and implement the civilian components of multidimensional peace operations. Each peacebuilding mission scrambles anew to design and organize the appropriate administrative structure, assess needs, recruit staff, match skills to tasks, mobilize resources and coordinate effectively. Differential capacities (and cultures) in the civilian peacebuilding, military, humanitarian, and developmental components of multidimensional peace operations also impede integrated planning and mission execution. Moreover, although the UN System has paid increasing rhetorical attention to the need for conflict assessment, early alert, strategic planning, and mission design, the civilian components of crisis management continue to be impeded by lack of shared strategic objectives, authoritative coordination mechanisms, effective human resource strategy and implementation, and adequate financing arrangements.

These institutional and financial shortcomings are compounded by the fact that within the UN system there is no locus for inter-governmental decision-making relating to post-conflict peace-building. In the absence of such a mechanism, the Security Council has extended its writ, both in terms of duration of mandates and the range of economic and

developmental issues tackled within multi-dimensional peace operations. While this has had the net effect of focusing greater attention on mission integration, it is nevertheless characterized by a Security Council that attempts to shape policy for UN agencies, funds and programs that do not report to it, and to provide guidance on political and economic development issues over which it has neither authority nor competence; and vests responsibility with SRSGs for coordinating UN actors over which they have no authority.

The UN's institutional mechanisms to support conflict prevention and good offices are even more constrained. The Department for Political Affairs is widely recognized to be inadequately staffed to provide effective strategic analysis for conflict prevention and political support for good offices. For their part, the inter-agency mechanisms formally tasked with developing conflict prevention strategy are neither appropriately staffed nor do they have the authority to ensure program coherence in the field. Moreover, they have limited policy impact even within the UN let alone among the wider set of bilateral and international actors whose engagement in a conflict prevention strategy would likely be required for success.

It is important to note that the UN System does not suffer these shortcomings alone. The European Union is struggling to build its own rapid-deployment civilian capacity, with appropriate oversight and financing, to provide more timely and effective peacebuilding assistance. A number of Member States are seeking either to ensure greater coordination among their own government agencies in situation monitoring, crisis analysis, intervention assessment, and program planning and implementation, or to adjust their funding procedures to provide more flexibility in addressing the critical needs for early recovery and reconstruction. And, while there is considerable discussion of potential regional contributions to peacebuilding, especially in Africa, there is in fact no capacity in the regional and sub-regional organizations at present to respond in any effective way.

Considering the ad hoc and largely improvisational means by which the international community has undertaken conflict prevention and peacebuilding missions to date, and the debilitating lack of qualified personnel available for rapid deployment, the rate of success --however relative it is deemed to be -- is nothing short of remarkable. It is, however, also tenuous, with little in the way of assurance that the end result will be viable, effective and legitimate states able to govern on their own with the confidence of their people and the likelihood of sustainability. To be more certain of these outcomes, thereby establishing the basis for a secure exit on the part of international actors, it is critical that the UN System's planning and implementation capacity for the civilian components of multidimensional peacebuilding be accorded the same attention as has been devoted to military and humanitarian capacity-building. Given the number of current and looming crises and their risks to international peace and security, both regionally and globally, there is a pressing need to reassess their policies and programs, as well as the institutional and financing mechanisms, that under-gird the civilian components of peace operations.

Reform Efforts to date

A substantial number of reform proposals for improving the UN System's response capabilities in post-conflict situations have followed from the initial promulgation of the Agenda for Peace (1992). These have been undertaken by the UN Secretariat and Specialized Agencies, UNDP, the World Bank, and by Member States.⁴ As a result, over the last decade, a number of internal reforms have been instituted, principally in the areas of military planning and backstopping and in improving standards of conduct, delivery and coordination in humanitarian relief. Further, through a process of self-examination and experimentation, the UN also has achieved some incremental successes in the civilian management of more extensive peacebuilding operations. These include, *inter alia*, improvements: in integrated planning and oversight through the various Executive Committees (ECPS/ECHA/UNDG)); in management of field operations, as through the designations of Humanitarian/Resident Coordinators as Deputy SRSGs; in recruitment and training; in learning and its application through DPKOs Best Practices Unit; and in recent coordination between the UN and the World Bank on needs assessment and poverty reduction programs. There also have been further advances in Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) and demining, in harmonizing administrative and budget procedures, and -- to a degree -- in attention to gender issues.

Yet, as many case studies have now demonstrated, much remains to be done to ensure that the international system is better prepared to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflict and lay the basis for sustainable peace and development. Building on a set of reviews of existing capacities in the principle inter-governmental bodies, this paper outlines a number of alternative approaches to strengthening governing mechanisms, policy approaches, institutional capacity, and coordination and financial arrangements for the civilian dimensions of conflict management, especially post-conflict peace-building.

Recommendations and Options

I. Policy goals. Policies and approaches to conflict management are as diverse as the actors engaged in the field. Throughout the United Nations System and among the major bilateral donors an important debate conditions the international response to local and regional conflicts. This debate, between security and development and between short-term and long-term goals, marks the different approaches taken by departments within the UN and and between the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions. Within the UN itself, DPKO, DPA, OCHA, UNDP and the Specialized Agencies each have competing visions of the purposes and objectives of international interventions. Within the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the special needs of weak and failed states have gained some currency, but "mainstream" concerns with macro-economic

⁴ This report is based largely on a review of five such efforts: The Brahimi report and evaluation of its implementation by Durch, et al; the DfID-King College case studies of post-conflict reconstruction; the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding; the UNDG-ECHA report on Transitions; and the World Bank review of its efforts in Post-conflict reconstruction (see additional references).

stabilization, privatization, low tariffs and taxes and small government dominate institutional policies. Despite their involvement in a number of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, the regional development banks have yet to develop strategic policies and operational capacities specifically oriented to peacebuilding. And, while donor governments are working to coordinate their inter-departmental policies and to harmonize their own relief and development funding streams, the lack of a shared, strategic approach to immediate and longer-term needs results in program duplication and fragmentation and missed opportunities for a lasting, cumulative outcome.

In order to both prevent state failure and ensure a lasting peace after conflict, donor governments and international agencies need to:

1.1 Make “state-building” a central goal of conflict management and peacebuilding, alongside provision of basic security, agreeing that effective and legitimate public and civil society institutions, with adequate accountability safeguards, are essential to meet the on-going public safety and social/economic welfare needs necessary to ensure public confidence in any system of local and national governance.

1.2. Align political and macro-economic stabilization goals to minimize the tensions between budget deficit reduction strategies and “state-building” and public-confidence building requirements; examine and resolve the trade-offs between fiscal austerity and trade liberalization and a range of tax, tariff and other options necessary for state revenue generation; and harmonize World Bank and IMF grant and lending policies, including debt reduction or clearance, with the need for aid conditionality in support of peace accords and the consolidation of peace.

1.3 Ensure that political and economic development strategies are integral parts of a well-focused approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. While disengaging combatants, constraining “spoilers,” and implementing peace accords need to have primacy for the settlement of disputes, immediate attention also needs to be paid to laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development.

1.4 Peace operations mandates should be sufficiently encompassing to include the full range of civilian activities that are essential to effective peacebuilding in order to provide ample scope for mission planning, design and financing; ensure sufficient continuity in international presence and financing until local governing authorities and functioning public institutions are able to assume responsibility for public safety and security.

1.5 Shift the operational focus from “doing” to “enabling.” External capacity-building must be aimed at providing the support and advisory services needed to transfer responsibility to local actors for their own political and economic well-being at the earliest possible moment; capacity-building in international organizations needs to be understood as a means to this end and designed accordingly; exit strategies should be based on the capacity of local institutions to manage effectively.

1.6 Develop the professional public information capabilities needed to explain missions to local populations and counteract hate radio and TV and other destabilizing media activities while supporting the development of a locally-controlled, open and free media in transitional situations.

II. Institutional arrangements. The multidimensional nature of peacebuilding requires a multidisciplinary approach to mission planning and program design, a cross-section of knowledgeable and experienced staff, and evaluation capacity to assess mission effectiveness and make adjustments along the way. Whether the UN finds itself serving in an actual administrative capacity (East Timor/Kosovo) or in a strictly support or technical assistance function, a more considered definition of tasks and identification and deployment of trained personnel are needed. There are too many activities, inevitably under-funded, that are programmed by UN agencies in a peace mission, and the menu of tasks continues to grow. Additional capacity is needed in the System to set priorities within budget and human resource constraints. Moreover, as the UNDG-ECHA Report on Transitions notes, complex missions require "...coherence among the humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms as well as with the political and peacekeeping arms of the UN, DPA and DPKO. While the potential for such coherence at country level is enhanced when the RC/HC is also DSRSG, there is no similar mechanism at the senior working level at HQ to provide coherent support to the RC/HC and the UNCT." Strengthened organizational and human capacity is needed within the UN in order to more effectively plan, implement and evaluate the civilian components of crisis management. To that end, the donor community should consider the following options:

2.1 A concerted effort must be made to strengthen the specific competencies of individual departments, agencies and bureaus at the United Nations. This would require:

2.1a) DPKO – Establishing a multidisciplinary, civilian post-conflict planning division to develop field strategies with other departments and specialized agencies, to support the interdepartmental task forces that elaborate mission plans and staffing tables, and to interface with the Office of Mission Support and of the Military Advisor.

2.1b) DPA – Developing adequate personnel and management capacity for strategic analysis in support of conflict prevention and the conduct of good offices; strengthen regional desk-officer capacity to provide sound advice on political transition issues. As necessary, implement an outside management review like that undertaken for DPKO in 2001.

2.1c) BCPR – Reviewing and strengthening current capacities for early recovery and reconstruction activities in areas such as DDR, rule of law and governance; identify and support areas of comparative advantage in relation to longer-term development strategies of the World Bank.

2.1d) DPI -- Investing in the Department of Public Information's capacity to seriously address the current planning, training and support gaps in public information for peace operations.

2.2. Investments in department and bureau capacity-building should be based on impartial reviews that address comparative advantage and identify the oftentimes counterproductive competition between agencies claiming and seeking resources for doing similar and overlapping functions.

2.3 To ensure that sufficient capacity is in place to undertake successful operations, and to manage complementarity among the multiple departments and agencies, a standing mechanism should be created to develop and maintain the UN's institutional capacity for planning, operational design and backstopping, and evaluation. Its small core staff should be comprised of individuals with substantial headquarters and field experience in a range of peace operations related issues, and it should maintain close liaison with the Bretton Woods Institutions and leading NGOs. Options to be considered include:

2.3a) Merging relevant and competent elements of DPKO, DPA, BCPR and OCHA into a new crisis management office based on the EISAS model recommended in the Brahimi report.

2.3b) Creating an Executive Steering Committee comprised of the chairs of ECHA, ECPS and UNDG and serviced by the ECPS Secretariat to coordinate inter-departmental cooperation in planning and implementing peacebuilding operations.

2.3c) Establishing a strategic coordination capacity in the Office of the Secretary-General or the Deputy Secretary-General to provide authoritative oversight in the planning and implementation of peacebuilding operations.

2.4. Evaluation. Each of these options should include an evaluation and audit unit to undertake both real-time and overall mission assessments for purposes of measuring progress and outcomes as well as institutional and individual performance; evaluate projects and programs as they contribute to mission objectives; and determine who should be doing what within the UN System and what should be left to others outside the System to do. Such assessments should operate independently from the Office of the SRSG or UN Country Offices and be distinguishable from periodic mission reporting to the Security Council.

III. Field operations design and planning. Planning for field operations needs to be based on a targeted intervention strategy that relies on knowledge of local politics and culture, a wide-angle, multidisciplinary approach to conflict management and peacebuilding, clear objectives, and measurable goals. Planning should be undertaken with appropriate local participation and support the early development of a national capacity for aid coordination, policy setting and program delivery. To meet these objectives

3.1 A Deputy to the SRSG, selected in a competitive process, should be appointed as soon as a new field operation is mandated to coordinate the diverse operating agencies, including chairing the planning activities of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs).

3.2 Joint needs assessments, such as those recently undertaken by UNDP and the World Bank, should be routinely undertaken with local participation and integrated into a comprehensive plan of action that is consistent with locally-determined strategic goals.

3.3 A multidisciplinary expert task force should be established to assess the diverse agency data gathering methodologies and data bases currently in use and make recommendations for standardizing base-line data needed for improved planning, tracking and monitoring of progress; data gathering, management, and analytic capacity should be developed within host government at the earliest possible moment.

3.4 The World Bank should further its efforts to develop and utilize its conflict assessment tools in designing policies and projects that help reduce conflict-generating social inequities; to monitor and measure the effects of macro-economic policies on political stabilization; and to evaluate the quality of outcomes as opposed to the quantity of lending.

IV. Personnel management. While some improvements in personnel procedures have been achieved, the UN needs to develop a personnel management system consistent with the complexities of multidimensional peacebuilding, including dramatically improved capacity for rapid recruitment and deployment, pre-mission training, and retention of highly-qualified staff between operations.

International recruitment

4.1 A special task force should be established to examine the pros and cons of using outside recruiters or creating a personnel unit for field missions outside the UN System in order to overcome the lengthy personnel procedures that now impede rapid deployment of civilian staff.

4.2 Current tools, such as rosters and on-line postings (the Galaxy project), need to be substantially upgraded to ensure the rapid recruitment of qualified civilian personnel for upcoming operations.

4.3 The system for the allocation and retention of department posts should be reassessed to facilitate inter-agency and inter-departmental secondments and transfers in order to ensure the availability of broadly experienced staff for field assignments.

4.4 Standby arrangements of experienced personnel with competencies in public administration and management and language skills, preferably regionally-based, need to be established for early deployment.

Training

4.5 Urgent attention is needed to special skill areas such as police supervision and training, community policing, law enforcement, judicial and corrections administration, data management, public administration and finance, public information, and evaluation that are sorely lacking within the System. These cannot be understood simply as technocratic tasks, nor should they be the subject of on-the-job learning. Pre-mission training is essential.

4.6 Regional training institutes, especially in crisis prone areas, should be created and strengthened in public management and administration and other civilian skills both for crisis response and to create a “next generation” cadre of qualified civil servants. This could be done in collaboration with the EU’s on-going efforts to develop civilian capacity and effective training.

Local staffing

4.7 Devise standardized methods to vet, train as necessary, and employ local staff at all levels of mission administration and management, in order to avoid displacement and a two-tiered system of international and local staff, and to ensure that local capacity is in place for the earliest possible handover; correct the salary distortions that attract staff away from local government to service jobs in the international agencies.

V. Financing Arrangements. Institutional and human resource capacity continues to be constricted by timing, allocation, and procedural problems in the financing of conflict management and peacebuilding activities. A good deal has been written about the funding gaps that persist between relief and development and for essential activities in early recovery and reconstruction, including for policing, recurrent administrative costs, and initial economic recovery. Much of the available financial support is directed toward specific projects that either reflect the choices of individual agencies or the preferences of donors for visibility. A substantial portion of funds is programmed through international NGOs favored by their donor governments or through fledgling local NGOs rather than through local governing authorities. And, while QIPs and Disarmament and Demobilization activities are increasingly included in peacekeeping assessments, financing for reintegration and development activities remains entirely voluntary and subject to the debilitating competition for scarce resources that characterizes much of post-conflict reconstruction. Yet, many of these activities are essential international commitments (e.g. human rights, gender equity, child protection, prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS) or requirements for sustainable peace (e.g. DDR, rule of law, security sector reform, justice and reconciliation, and effective public administration). Moreover, despite the much-discussed calculus of the cost-effectiveness of conflict

prevention, the UN System simply lacks the resources to address the needs of weak or failing states or undertake significant conflict prevention activities.

To meet the financing requirements of conflict prevention and multidimensional peacekeeping, the donor community should consider the following options:

5.1 Prevention and good offices. Make available to DPA, subject to a careful review, the resources required to build its staff capacity for strategic analysis for conflict prevention and the conduct of good offices.

5.2 Post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building.

5.2a) Redefine the boundaries between assessed budgets for peacekeeping and voluntary contributions to finance civilian activities that are folded into peace operations mandated by the Security Council but are routinely carried out by UNDP and the Specialized Agencies as integral components of peacebuilding.

5.2b) Expand the use of “pooled” funding, such as the Multi-donor Trust Funds established at the World Bank and the Afghanistan Interim Administrative Fund at UNDP for a more flexible response to multidimensional peacebuilding, including the recurring costs of local administration.

5.2c) Establish a “stand-by” fund to ensure adequate and timely funding in the 12-18 month early recovery and reconstruction phase of operations; review the program timelines, administrative procedures and track records for disbursing such funds at both the Bank and UNDP with a view to determining comparative advantage at different periods of post-conflict recovery, reconstruction and peacebuilding.

5.3 Direct program funding to public sector institutions in host countries while helping to devise self-sustaining local revenue streams and responsible fiscal policies for them.

5.3a) The IFIs should encourage the development of local revenue streams and fiscal capacity, including early generation of public resources through taxes and tariffs, for example on expatriate earnings and imported luxury goods; international agencies should reassess their tax exemptions since their imports constitute an important potential source of customs revenue.

5.3b) The IFIs should establish a body to assess the scope and implications of efforts to erase “odious debts” inherited by post-conflict governments.

5.3c) The IFIs should explore how their lending and grant programs can more effectively support efforts to consolidate peace, by imposing “peace conditionality” or by incorporating peace-accord commitments into Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

5.4 Develop a clear and transparent accounting system for reconstruction aid and a shared method for measuring and evaluating impact. Direct funding to those agencies best equipped to undertake particular activities.

VI. . Governing arrangements. At the present time, there is no authoritative governing mechanism for setting the broad strategic objectives, developing and maintaining institutional preparedness, or providing oversight for either conflict prevention or post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. While peacekeeping operations are characterized by common objectives and unity of command, peacebuilding to date has been largely an amalgam of projects devoid of a mutually agreed strategy and coherent plan of action. Multiple agencies, both intergovernmental and bilateral, are subject to diverse decision-making bodies, and they plan and implement programs based on their discrete and sometimes contradictory political objectives and operational doctrines. Although the Security Council sets mandates for multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, the multiple organizations within the UN System called upon to do the work are not subject to its authority but find themselves constrained by it, particularly in areas of humanitarian assistance and political and economic development. For their part, NGOs often find themselves squeezed between mission mandates and the interests of their national funders and contractors. The Economic and Social Council has on three occasions established ad hoc committees to oversee post-conflict operations, but with no writ to address security issues, ECOSOC demonstrates only partial oversight capacity at best and virtually no command over deployable resources. The links between the UN and its key partners among the international financial institutions are for the most part voluntary and case specific, thereby limiting the capacity for effectively sharing responsibility, coordinating strategic approaches, or determining a productive division of labor.

The assets and capacities of all of these actors are critical to the successful outcome of multidimensional peacebuilding; yet, there is no systematic way to optimize their roles as part of a holistic, coherent strategy to meet both short- and long-term peacebuilding objectives. While there are various efforts underway to improve coordination among UN departments and agencies and between them and the international financial institutions, a truly integrated system-wide response might well require deeper institutional reforms, which could include the following options:

6.1 Expanding the writ of the Security Council to include broader state-building and development concerns related to conflict situations. If the Security Council is to perform this function, it would be necessary for it to consult more systematically with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

6.2 Establishing an oversight body for peacebuilding within the Economic and Social Council, perhaps through a subcommittee structure with a manageably small subset of ECOSOC members, that could take over operations from the Security Council. This body in turn could consult with the wider set of economic actors, including the World Bank, the regional development banks, and the IMF.

6.3 Creating a free-standing UN-World Bank facility governed by Member States to jointly review conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies and agree on an interlocking response to ensure that the right agencies undertake and initiate appropriate and timely policies and programs and that financing is at hand to do so.

VII. Joining-up the UN System, donor country, and regional efforts. Multiple efforts are simultaneously underway within the UN System, in the European Union, and by individual Member States to strengthen their own capacities for planning and implementing the civilian components of multidimensional peacebuilding. The risk to UN System operations lies in the potential for a growing preference for autonomous EU and Member State operations. On the assumption that collective action is likely to produce an enhanced resource base for peacebuilding, special efforts should be made to structure each of these initiatives so that they contribute to a whole that is greater and more effective than the sum of the parts. This is especially the case with regard to EU-UN collaboration in the context of the Joint Declaration on EU/UN Co-operation in Crisis Management (2003) and with respect to the UN and regional organizations based on the principle of subsidiarity. To these ends, the EU and UN should:

7.1 Increase cooperation in the areas of planning, training and communication through personnel exchanges and the use of liaison officers.

7.2 Develop their respective institutional capacities for planning and implementing operations to complement each other, including in the allocation of staff resources in both Brussels and New York.

7.3 Establish joint inter-organizational task forces to address common issues regarding recruitment, personnel management, and the development of service packages in critical areas of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

7.4 Create a secure communication system to manage sensitive information related to personnel management, mission planning and support, and mission evaluation.

7.5 Develop crisis management curricula in schools of public administration and law in both donor countries and crisis prone regions, and provide incentives, in the form of advanced training and career advancement, to increase the pool of experienced civil service personnel with appropriate language skills available for crisis management.

7.6 Jointly work with regional and sub-regional organizations, especially in Africa, to help design and build their institutional capacity for crisis management in order to increase their potential to make positive contributions in their own neighborhoods.

VIII. Conclusions. The recommendations contained in this report are intended to enhance the capacity of the United Nations System, including the Bretton Woods Institutions, to plan and implement the civilian components of conflict management and peacebuilding. While calling for a substantial reorientation of the way in which business

is now done, the recommendations are consistent with initiatives currently underway in the EU and at the national level in a number of the major donor countries, suggesting that consensus on a way forward is possible. The starting point is to accord the civilian components of peacebuilding corollary status to peacekeeping as integral to multidimensional missions, to stipulate the importance of effective and legitimate state institutions as the basis for sustainable peace and development, to address the urgent need for governing arrangements that are inclusive of the multiple agencies involved in field operation, and to pay serious attention to issues of institutional capacity, coordination and the modalities of financing. This is no easy task but the urgency of need should propel us toward a determined effort at reform.

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