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**The Emerging EU Civilian Crisis Management Capacity – A “real added value” for the UN?**

**Executive summary**

This paper analyses the emerging ESDP capacity for civilian crisis management to determine how much support the UN can expect from the EU in this field in the near future. The analysis is guided by the following three questions:

- 1) How far has the EU come with respect to establishing its civilian rapid reaction capacity?
- 2) What do the lessons learned from the two ongoing EU civilian operations tell us about the emerging EU capacity?
- 3) What is the state of EU-UN cooperation and how it is likely to evolve in the near future?

The conclusion is that the EU civilian rapid reaction capacity is not a “real added value” for the UN yet. Although the EU has taken over responsibility from the UN for the police mission in Bosnia, the EU is still far from having a reliable civilian rapid reaction capability and incapable of supplying the integrated civilian force packages that the UN demands. The EU civilian operations conducted to date have revealed serious problems related to force generation and procurement as well as capacity problems with respect to mission planning and support. Although EU-UN cooperation has developed substantially in recent years, it does not involve day-to-day cooperation at desk-level and remains limited in the areas of planning, training, communication and best practice that were identified as priorities in the joint EU-UN cooperation declaration from 2003. It is therefore limited what the UN can expect in terms of rapid reaction civilian support from the EU in the near future. On the contrary, the number of personnel provided by EU member states to UN commanded operations is likely to decline further should the EU decide to launch new major civilian operations in the years ahead. The first casualty of such operations would be the EU-UN relationship and five recommendations are proffered at the end of the paper to avoid this situation and to ensure that the two organisations cooperate in order to enhance the pool of qualified civilian personnel available for crisis management operations at short notice:

- Increased cooperation in areas of planning, training, communication and best practice should be made a priority in both Brussels and New York.
- The institutional capacity for rapid reaction civilian crisis management should be enhanced in both Brussels and New York.
- Joint solutions and a pooling of resources should be pursued to the greatest extent possible to avoid wasteful duplication.
- A secure communications system should be established between Brussels and New York.
- A joint EU-UN effort is required to enhance the pool of qualified civilian rapid reaction personnel.

## I. Introduction

The European Commission has been engaged in stabilization and development assistance, humanitarian assistance and structural conflict prevention for a long time and has a wide range of instruments at its disposal for such activities.<sup>1</sup> The Commission also ran the civilian administration in Mostar in 1994-96 in what must be regarded as the first European Union (EU) civilian crisis management operation.<sup>2</sup> Until recently the EU did not have the capacity to engage in crisis management at short notice however, and the perceived need to develop rapid reaction capabilities for “short-term” crisis management was one of the principal drivers behind the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999. Since then events have moved very fast indeed. The European Council decided to establish military and civilian rapid reaction forces in 1999 and 2000, the 60.000-strong military force was declared partly operational in 2001,<sup>3</sup> its civilian counterpart was declared operational in November 2002,<sup>4</sup> and in May 2003 the military reaction force was declared operational for all the Petersberg tasks,<sup>5</sup> while certain limitations and constraints were acknowledged.<sup>6</sup> The EU used its reaction forces to launch its first four peace operations in 2003, and additional operations will follow in 2004. A rule of law operation is currently under way in Georgia and the EU is also set to take over from NATO in Bosnia by the end of 2004. The latter operation involving 7,000 military personnel is the largest operation yet undertaken by the Union. It will link up with the EU police mission (EUPM) already in the country and hence result in the first EU joint civil-military operation. Moreover, the launch of an EU-led military operation in the Sudan is currently being considered following an informal request from Louise Fréchette, the UN’s Deputy Secretary-General.<sup>7</sup>

The development of the military rapid reaction force has been the main priority for (most of) the EU member states.<sup>8</sup> Far more resources and attention have been devoted to the establishment of the military force and this military bias is reflected in the media and academia as well. Very little has been written on the development of the civilian crisis management capacity. From the perspective of the UN, the civilian rapid reaction force is the most interesting, however, since the UN faces far greater problems with respect to rapid reaction in the civilian than in the military field. Implementing the recommendations of the *Brahimi Report* has proved much tougher with respect to civilian than military rapid reaction. Hardly any progress has been made with respect to creating a rapid reaction capacity capable of deploying integrated rule of law missions (police, prosecutors, judges and jailers) at short notice.<sup>9</sup> In theory at least, the EU should be able to help the UN out in this area, since it aims to establish such a capacity and because its stated ambition is to make its civilian and military

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<sup>1</sup> European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit 2003; see also [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cpcm/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/index.htm)

<sup>2</sup> Nowak 2003. If we include WEU operations as well, the WEU conducted police operations in Mostar and Albania.

<sup>3</sup> European Council Laeken 2001.

<sup>4</sup> EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference at ministerial level, Brussels, 19 November 2002.

<sup>5</sup> The Petersberg tasks mentioned in Article 17.2 of the Treaty of the European Union include “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making” (the EU term for peace enforcement).

<sup>6</sup> General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels, May 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Dempsey 2004; off-the-record conversation with Danish military official in Brussels 6 May 2004.

<sup>8</sup> The establishment of the civilian rapid reaction capacity to complement the military force has been a priority for the Nordic EU members and Holland. These countries were instrumental in putting the civilian capacity on the ESDP agenda and have played a major role in its subsequent development. Klyne and Hansen 2001; interviews in the Council Secretariat, Brussels, 6 May.

<sup>9</sup> Durch, Holt, Earle and Shanahan 2003, pp. xx, xxv, 80-83, 106, 119.

rapid reaction capacity a “real added value” for the UN.<sup>10</sup> This paper will consequently analyse the emerging ESDP capacity for civilian crisis management to determine how much support the UN can expect from the EU in this field in the near future. It will do so by asking three questions:

- 1) How far has the EU come with respect to establishing its civilian rapid reaction capacity?
- 2) What do the lessons learned from the two ongoing EU civilian operations tell us about the emerging EU capacity?
- 3) What is the state of EU-UN cooperation and how it is likely to evolve in the near future?

These questions will be addressed in turn and the findings will be summed up in a conclusion that will also outline five concrete policy recommendations on how the EU and the UN should cooperate to enhance their civilian rapid reaction capacities.

### **How much civilian rapid reaction capacity has the EU established?**

An effective rapid reaction capacity requires a pool of trained personnel available for deployment at short notice, an institutional capacity for directing, planning and supporting crisis management operations, an ability to take quick decisions, and finally financial resources and procedures enabling the quick release of the necessary funds. Each of these requirements will be analysed in turn below in order to determine how far the EU has come with respect to establishing an effective civilian rapid reaction capacity that can be employed in support of the UN.

#### *Personnel*

In June 2000 at Feira European Council, the EU heads of state identified four priority areas in which the Union should establish civilian rapid reaction capacities.<sup>11</sup> A headline goal for policing was formulated in Feira and headline goals for the remaining areas of rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection followed at the European Council in Göteborg in June the following year.<sup>12</sup> The quantitative targets (headline goals) are indicated in the box below and they had all been exceeded by member state commitments in November 2002 before the 2003-deadline expired.<sup>13</sup> It is currently being debated whether the existing headline goals should be increased following the enlargement of the EU with ten new members on 1 May 2004,<sup>14</sup> and the current capacities for rule of law and civilian administration have all been criticised as insufficient.<sup>15</sup> Certainly, an EU with 25 members should be able to provide more personnel in these two critical categories for rapid deployment on peace operations, especially if the global ambition outlined in the recent EU Security Strategy is to be taken seriously.<sup>16</sup> Whether the goals will be expanded remains to be seen. Proponents regard higher

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<sup>10</sup> European Council Göteborg 2001. Annex V. For recent important statements of the EU desire to support the UN see *A Secure Europe in a Better World* 2003 and European Commission 2003.

<sup>11</sup> European Council Feira 2000.

<sup>12</sup> European Council Göteborg 2001. Annex III

<sup>13</sup> EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference at ministerial level, Brussels, 19 November 2002.

<sup>14</sup> After the enlargement the EU now has the following 25 members: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Ireland, Italia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.

<sup>15</sup> Hansen and Klynge 2001; Tardy and Windmar 2003; Woodbridge 2002.

<sup>16</sup> *A Secure Europe in a Better World* 2003.

goals as critical for EU credibility and as the only way to put pressure on member states to enhance national capabilities. Critics of the idea argue that it would be even more detrimental to EU credibility to pronounce more ambitious goals at a time when the member states have difficulty in making the personnel committed to the EU available for crisis management operations at short notice.<sup>17</sup> Member states retain the right to refuse to commit personnel to specific operations, and since most of the personnel committed to the EU force pool have also been made available to the OSCE and the UN, the numbers in the table below does not reflect the actual capacity available for the EU in a crisis. Forces have to be called up and organised for each specific crisis and chances are that a large proportion of the personnel registered in the EU databases already will be deployed on existing operations.

### **Current EU civilian rapid reaction capacities in the four priority areas<sup>18</sup>**

#### **Police**

Headline goal: 5,000 police, of which 1000 should be deployable within 30 days

Actual member state commitment: 5,000 police of which 1,400 are deployable within 30 days. 13 rapid deployable, integrated police units (ranging from 60-110 officers each) and four police headquarters, two of which are available for rapid deployment.

#### **Rule of Law**

Headline goal: 200 rule of law experts (prosecutors, judges and jailers) deployable in 30 days

Actual member state commitment: 284 experts including 72 judges, 48 prosecutors, 38 administration services, 72 penitentiary system officials and 34 others. 60 officials are available for rapid deployment within 60 days.

#### **Civilian Administration**

Headline goal: A “pool” of rapidly deployable experts to set up or support civilian administration in the mission area

Actual member state commitment: 248 officials able to take on assignments of, among other functions, civil registration, local administration and custom services.

#### **Civil Protection**

Headline goal: 2-3 assessment teams consisting of 10 experts available for deployment at 3-7 hours notice. These experts should be on 24 hour call from a group of up to 100 specially selected experts.

2,000 personnel available for deployment at short notice in civilian protection teams.

Actual member state commitment: 2083.

The capacities listed above have so far not been integrated in deployable force packages as recommended by the *Brahimi Report*.<sup>19</sup> The only formed units covering a range of specialised functions are the Integrated Police Units (IPU), which consist of police with military status (i.e. carabinieri and gendarmes). The ambition is to set up integrated civilian rapid reaction units consisting of police, law and order experts and civilian administration as well as joint civilian-military force packages. It will take years to fulfil this ambition however. At the moment there is little integration across the four priority areas and between the military and the civilian reaction forces. Moreover, most of the personnel with the partial exception of the IPU and the civil protection personnel, many of which deploy in small teams or service

<sup>17</sup> Interviews in the Council Secretariat, Brussels, 6 May 2004.

<sup>18</sup> Council Secretariat 2003a, pp. 42-43; interview in the Council Secretariat, Brussels 6 May 2004.

<sup>19</sup> *The Brahimi Report*, pp. xii, 20-21

packages with specific specialities, are individually recruited. Therefore, the current personnel capacity is little more than a database listing the number of individuals that may or may not be available in a crisis.

### *Training*

Training is a national responsibility and member states are expected to provide the EU with well-trained personnel. Common criteria for civilian training and courses have been established for the police and are in the process of being established for the other three priority areas as well. Moreover, EU crisis management exercises involving the civilian crisis management bodies and forces have been conducted since 2002.<sup>20</sup> Pre-mission training to ensure that the mostly individually recruited civilian personnel are able to function as a team immediately upon deployment is still very limited. Civilian training is most advanced with respect to police where training courses have been conducted since late 2001 in cooperation with the UN.

In the priority areas of civil administration and rule-of-law various national institutions in the member states are currently developing and coordinating training modules and pilot projects. The EU Commission started up a pilot scheme for rule of law and civilian administration in 2001. Within this scheme fifteen courses have been developed and conducted in nine EU member states. Some 300 persons had been trained as part of this project by early 2004.<sup>21</sup> This pilot scheme is now being expanded following a positive evaluation in the autumn of 2003. It will be extended to ESDP personnel in its next phase, and it is also the ambition to make these training courses compatible with OSCE and UN training modules, to enhance EU-UN training cooperation through the development of joint courses and to provide joint courses with both civilian and military participation.<sup>22</sup> However, this training will not do much to enhance the EU rapid reaction capacity until a link between training and deployment is established. At the moment this link does not exist and it is estimated that more than 50% of the participants in the Commission courses run to date have no intention of ever going on an civilian crisis management mission.<sup>23</sup>

Training for the ESDP forces is, in other words, still very much in its infancy, but the good news from the UN perspective is that the civilian training is to be developed in close cooperation with the UN.

### *Crisis management institutions*

Civilian crisis management within the EU involves all three pillars, but particularly the first (Community) pillar, where the EU Commission is the main player and the second (Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP/ESDP) pillar where the EU Council and its General Secretariat are responsible for establishing and managing the rapid reaction forces.<sup>24</sup>

The decision to establish the ESDP reaction forces led to the creation of a number of new institutions within the European Council. The most visible innovation was the decision to establish the post of the High Representative for the CFSP. The High Representative, who is also the Secretary-General of the European Council (hence the acronym HR/SG), is responsible for formulating, preparing and implementing policy decisions and to engage in

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<sup>20</sup> For these exercises see Brussels 2004; Gourlay 2002; Press Information 2003.

<sup>21</sup> European Council Thessaloniki 2003.

<sup>22</sup> For information about the Commission training project see <http://www.aspr.ac.at/euproject/main.htm>

<sup>23</sup> Gourlay 2004, p. 11.

<sup>24</sup> For a comprehensive introduction to the EU institutions see ICG 2001.

political dialogue with third countries on behalf of the European Council. The HR/SG has become the de facto crisis manager of the EU, and the current HR/SG, Javier Solana, has played an important role in the EU efforts to manage crises in the Balkans and the Middle East. The HR/SG can appoint special representatives (EUSR) to assist him in his work, and their number has increased significantly since 1996 when they were first introduced. The EUSRs are used as either long-term co-ordinators of EU policy towards a region or on a short-term basis as trouble-shooters for a specific crisis.<sup>25</sup>

<b>Civilian Crisis Management across the EU's three pillars</b>		
<b>Pillar one</b>	<b>Pillar two</b>	<b>Pillar three</b>
<p>European Community: supranational community institutions.</p> <p>Long term or structural conflict prevention: development assistance, post-conflict peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance</p> <p>Short-term crisis management: Civil protection, training and financing of the ESDP.</p>	<p>Intergovernmental: CFSP and ESDP.</p> <p>Short-term crisis management: establishment and management of the rapid reaction forces and all the new ESDP institutions</p>	<p>Intergovernmental: Police and Judicial Co-operation in criminal matters.</p>

Another innovation is the Political and Security Committee (PSC). It is made up by ambassadors of each member states and representatives from the Council Secretariat and the Commission and meets twice a week. The PSC provides early warning, offers civilian and military advice and draws up policy option papers for the European Council, either at the request of the latter or on its own initiative. The PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of EU crisis management operations, including civil-military co-ordination and cooperation.

In the Council the PSC is supported by a Military Committee (EUMC) and a Committee on the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) (both 25-strong, one for each member). The latter which is of interest here is responsible for overseeing training and recruitment and ensuring that the civilian headline goals are met. It provides information, makes recommendations and offers its opinions to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management.

In the Council Secretariat a number of bodies have also been established to support the daily work of the HR/SG and the establishment of the rapid reaction forces. The HR/SG is supported in his daily work by a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) with a staff of 30, including one diplomat from each of the Member States. The Policy Unit, as it is known, monitors and plans civilian crisis responses for the High Representative. The PPEWU is supported by a Joint Situation Centre (JSC) with both civilian and military components. It is open 24-hours a day and staffed with seven seconded national intelligence experts.<sup>26</sup> It is

<sup>25</sup> For a list of current and former special representatives see <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/frameEnvoye.asp?lang=en>

<sup>26</sup> This number is likely to be doubled following the decision to create a counter-terrorism unit in the situation centre in the wake of the terrorist bombings in Madrid in March 2004. See Müller-Wille 2004.

tasked to assist the PSC by contributing to early warning, conducting situation monitoring and assessment and by providing relevant intelligence. It also provides facilities for crisis task forces and serves as an operational point of contact for the High Representative. The JSC is not used for sharing very sensitive intelligence and like its counterpart in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), its effectiveness depends entirely on the willingness of member-states to provide it with intelligence. Ad hoc committees may be established within the JSC to deal with specific crises.

In the Council Secretariat's Direction Generale Relations Exterieures (DG E), which is charge of the civilian aspects of crisis management, a Police Unit (10 personnel) has been set up to develop and run the 5,000-strong police force. It is responsible for planning and conducting police operations (including integrated planning and coordination, situation assessment, preparation of exercises and definition of legal frameworks and rules). In addition, it functions as an advisory body for the HR/SG as well as the Council's bodies and helps to facilitate daily contacts with Member States and international organisations.

A total of just fifteen staff are available for planning and mission support within the Council Secretariat, compared to some 150 military staff for military operations. A 2003-proposal by the HR/SG calling for the creation of 27 new posts to boost the planning and mission support capacity of the Council Secretariat has not been implemented. Only twelve new posts appeared to be in the cards in early 2004.<sup>27</sup> The capacity of the Council Secretariat to assist the UN with planning and support for civilian operations is hence very limited indeed.

The 135-strong Military Staff (EUMS) within the Council Secretariat is worth mentioning in relation to civilian crisis management because the European Council decided to equip it with a civil-military planning cell at the European Council in December 2003. The planning cell (25-strong), which is currently in the process of being established, is supposed to: "assist in planning and co-ordinating civilian operations; develop expertise in managing the civilian-military interface; and do strategic planning for joint civil-military operations."<sup>28</sup> Whether it will result in an increase in the number of civilian personnel involved in the planning of civilian operations or merely result in a reallocation of existing personnel is an open question, however.<sup>29</sup>

Summing up, a basic institutional infrastructure giving the EU a capacity to direct, plan and support crisis management operations is now in place. This said, the capacity for civilian and joint civil-military planning and mission support is still limited and as such very much a work in progress. The same is true for the overall institutional setup which is far from etched in stone and likely to be changed as a result of lessons learned in the field and institutional reform aimed at improving the unclear division of labour, and the resulting duplication and heavy institutional infighting, between the Council Secretariat and the Commission. Generally speaking the Commission can be said to be in charge of long-term or structural conflict prevention, i.e. development assistance and post-conflict peacebuilding as well as humanitarian assistance, whereas the Council Secretariat is responsible for short-term rapid reaction crisis management. In practice there is considerable overlap between Commission programmes and the new civilian crisis management bodies in the Council Secretariat. The Commission pays for most of the costs related to the training and running of actual crisis management operations, the Commission and the Council Secretariat run two different civil


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<sup>27</sup> Gourlay 2004, p. 8.

<sup>28</sup> Council Press Release 2003.

<sup>29</sup> CivCom 2004.

protection schemes, and their coordination of field activities is limited since the EUSRs appointed by the HR/SG has no power over Commission activities.



*Decision making procedures*

Decisions to launch ESDP operations belong in the second pillar and are hence taken by the member states either in the Council of Ministers, the General Affairs Council (GAC) consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which is made up by the EU-ambassadors in Brussels. Decisions are generally taken by consensus but civilian ESDP operations that do not have military or defence implications can be launched by means of qualified majority voting. Moreover, the Treaty of the European Union also allows member states to abstain “constructively” permitting the other members to launch an operation without their support. In practice all ESDP operations to date have been decided by means of consensus, however.

The requirement for (near) consensus is by many seen as a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the ESDP, and the fact that the COREPER and Council of Ministers only meet once a week and month respectively is also seen as a weakness. This problem is probably overstated, since the EU members can react quickly when they perceive a need to do so. Emergency meetings can be called during times of crisis and the decision to launch Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo was taken in less than a week.<sup>30</sup> The principal problem with respect to civilian operations is therefore not the requirement for consensus, but the problems related to financing and force generation that we now turn to.

### *Financing*

Effective procedures for the rapid financing of civilian crisis management operations using ESDP capacities do still not exist.<sup>31</sup> Although the need for such procedures was pointed out by the Commission in 2001,<sup>32</sup> all ESDP operations conducted to date have been financed in an ad hoc manner. The participating states have covered some of the costs related to the secondment of their personnel while the rest has been covered by the Community budget in a variety of ways that have changed from one operation to the next.<sup>33</sup> While this is doable on operations with a long lead-time, the lack of procedures for the quick release of funds for planning and mission start-up could deny the EU a rapid reaction capability in future crises. While the problem was manageable during the planning of the EU police mission in Bosnia (EUPM), which had a lead-time of one year, it very nearly delayed the start of the EU police mission Proxima in Macedonia, which had a lead time of 2½ months. In this case the cumbersome procurement regulations would have prevented the mission from starting on time, if the OSCE had not stepped in to help the EU out, and one month into the mission Proxima still lacked basic equipment such as personal computers and vehicles.<sup>34</sup> Under the current regulations procurement of new equipment takes at least three to five months. The question of financing was thus a key difficulty encountered in planning of both operations and it remains unresolved.<sup>35</sup>

### **Lessons learned from ongoing EU operations?**

In addition to the two civilian missions listed below, the EU also conducted two military peace operations in 2003: Concordia in Macedonia (350 personnel) and Operation Artemis in Democratic Republic Congo (1,400 personnel). The two civilian operations conducted to date provided but a limited test of the EU capacity to plan and conduct operations. Both operations were small, their mandates were limited to monitoring and mentoring, they were not complex in nature involving police only and the lead time was relatively long (2½ months for Promixa and one year for EUPM). Even so these operations still tested the EU civilian capacity to the limit. The existing capacity for planning and mission support proved inadequate and force generation and procurement emerged as major challenges. The Council Secretariat lacked the capacity to provide the EUPM planning team in deployed in Bosnia with sufficient back-up and support due to its limited police planning capacity, limited financial and personnel resources, limited secure communication channels and lack of specialised expertise.<sup>36</sup> Capacity problems were also evident in the preparation of Proxima, but as mentioned above agreement on how the Council Secretariat should be strengthened has still not been reached.

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<sup>30</sup> Lynch and Missiroli 2003, p. 5.

<sup>31</sup> Agreement on a mechanism for financing military operations was reached in early 2004. See Council decision 2004.

<sup>32</sup> European Commission 2001.

<sup>33</sup> Manca 2004, p. 7; Missiroli 2003, pp. 12-13.

<sup>34</sup> Council Secretariat 2004.

<sup>35</sup> House of Lords 2003, p. 10; Manca 2004; interview in the Council Secretariat Brussels, 6 May 2004.

<sup>36</sup> Council Secretariat 2003b, p. 14

Force generation proved no easier for the EU than it does for the UN. Although member states have pledged 5,000 police to the EU, it proved very difficult to find the 650 required for EUPM and Proxima. EUPM and Proxima is 12% and 20% under-strength even though non-members have been invited to contribute to the operations, and the Council Secretariat has recruited 30 police officers directly outside the force pool. Member states have offered three reasons for their failure to provide personnel: 1) financial – they cannot find the funds and believe that the deployment should be financed by the Community (pillar one) budget and not the contributors themselves, 2) lack of available personnel because of deployments elsewhere, and 3) increased policing requirements at home following September 11 and the Madrid bombings in March 2004. The EU is in short suffering from the same shortage of qualified personnel that is also affecting the OSCE and the UN adversely.

As mentioned above, procurement also emerged as a major challenge because cumbersome procedures prevent the rapid release of funds. Even if funds exist they cannot be released quickly in a crisis because the procedures take at least 3-5 months.

<b>EU civilian operations conducted under the ESDP</b>			
<b>Operation</b>	<b>Tasks</b>	<b>Authorised strength</b>	<b>Duration</b>
The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice by means of monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities.	500 police	Jan. 2003-
EU Police Mission Proxima in Macedonia	Monitor, mentor and advice the country's police thus helping to fight organised crime as well as promoting European policing standards	150 police	Dec. 2003-

### **The state of EU-UN cooperation and its likely evolution?**

Five guiding principles have been formulated to guide EU cooperation with other actors: added value, interoperability, visibility and decision-making autonomy, and six different options for operational cooperation have also been outlined:

- a) National contributions to an operation led by international organisations, without any EU co-ordination;
- b) National contributions to an operation led by international organisations, but following EU consultations aimed at e.g. identifying opportunities to pool resources;
- c) A co-ordinated EU contribution;
- d) A whole EU component in an operation under the overall lead of an international organisation;
- e) A EU-led operation with some components provided by international organisations; and
- f) An autonomous EU operation.<sup>37</sup>

In addition, the EU has also displayed a willingness to involve non-members in its crisis management operations. Most European countries have been invited to participate in EU

<sup>37</sup> European Council Göteborg 2001. Annex V.

operations, including Ukraine, Russia and Turkey, and invitations have also been extended to Canada and the USA.<sup>38</sup>

The EU-UN relationship has developed substantially in recent years. A practice of high-level consultation has been institutionalised, training cooperation has been established in the field of police, and at the operational level cooperation began in earnest in 2003 with the handover of the UN police mission in Bosnia to the EU and the launch of Operation Artemis in the DRC, a three-month stop-gap military deployment at the request of the UN Security Council. The increased cooperation between the two organisations led to the adoption of a *Joint Declaration on EU/UN Co-operation in Crisis Management* in September 2003, which identified four areas where cooperation should be intensified further: planning, training, communication and best practice. Civilian cooperation in these four areas is still embryonic with the exception of police, and desk-level day-to-day cooperation between the relevant bodies in the Council Secretariat and the DPKO is still non-existent. It does exist in the military field between the EUMS and the Office of the Military Advisor to the DPKO, however.<sup>39</sup>

At the operational level, the EU operations undertaken to date and the EU desire for visibility and decision-making suggest options *e* and *f* listed above, as the ones most likely to shape future EU-UN cooperation in the field of civil operations. Option *a* is still the most important form of EU member state support for the UN. In late April 2004, the EU of 25 provided 916 civilian police officers to UN commanded peace operations; in comparison option *f* in the form of EUPM and Proxima only involved some 450 police from the EU countries.<sup>40</sup> However, if the current trend indicating a shift from option *a* towards option *f* continues, the inevitable result will be a situation in which the number of civilian personnel serving in EU commanded operations will dwarf the number serving in UN commanded ones.

Needless to say, the EU-UN relationship would be the first casualty in this scenario. It would extend the Western “commitment gap” existing in the field of UN commanded military operations to the civilian field as well and trigger strong UN/Third World criticism that in turn would damage the legitimacy of EU operations. The key to a successful EU-UN partnership in crisis management – civilian and military – is therefore EU support that employs all six options and not just *e* and *f*. Such support would create a win-win situation that would strengthen both organisations whereas single-minded EU pursuit of options *e* and *f* in order to maximise EU visibility and decision-making autonomy would result in zero-sum competition and a suboptimal outcome for both.

The EU lessons learned reports produced on the cooperation with the UN in the field with respect to both civilian and military operations all draw the same conclusion: closer coordination and cooperation is a must. Many of these reports are classified for some reason, but the report on the planning of EUPM, which is not, paints a clear picture that is backed up by officials in both Brussels and New York: it was a lesson learned in how not to do it. The double-hatting of the head of the EU planning team and the UN force turned out not to be a good idea. The double-hatted leader was buried by the workload and incapable of doing either of his two jobs consistently and credibly. Continuing with the same head of mission also made it harder for the EUPM to function as a distinct and independent mission and to adopt a different approach than the UN. In addition to these problems, cooperation between the UN

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<sup>38</sup> Proxima Factsheet 2003.

<sup>39</sup> Lee and Novosseloff 2003, p. 6.

<sup>40</sup> DPKO 2004; EUPM 2004a and b; Proxima Factsheet 2003.

and the EU missions was hampered by a lack of sufficient advance coordination at the strategic level and information sharing was inadequate at mission level. The EU lessons learned report proposes the establishment of a joint EU-UN transition task force as the solution to these problems in future handovers.<sup>41</sup>

### **Conclusion and recommendations**

The clear conclusion emerging from this analysis is that the EU civilian rapid reaction capacity is not a “real added value” for the UN yet. The EU is still far from having a reliable civilian rapid reaction capability and incapable of supplying the integrated civilian force packages that the UN demands. Recruitment is for the most part individual and the personnel are not formed and trained as units prior to deployment, with the partial exceptions of IPU and civilian protection. Force integration across the four priority areas (police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection) is still very limited and common training standards and courses at the EU level have only been established for the police. However, the greatest limitation from the UN perspective in terms of personnel stems from the fact that EU personnel are by and large drawn from the same force pool that the UN (and the OSCE) relied on prior to the establishment of the EU force. The EU civilian operations conducted to date have revealed serious problems related to force generation and procurement as well as capacity problems with respect to mission planning and support. Although EU-UN cooperation has developed substantially in recent years, it does not involve day-to-day cooperation at desk-level and remains limited in the areas of planning, training, communication and best practice that were identified as priorities in the joint EU-UN cooperation declaration from 2003.

It is therefore limited what the UN can expect in terms of rapid reaction civilian support from the EU in the near future. The principal means of EU member state support for the UN will continue to be personnel contributions that do not involve Brussels at all, and should the EU decide to launch new major civilian operations in the near future, the result would be a further reduction in the number of civilian personnel from EU member states serving on UN commanded operations. The launch of such operations would therefore inevitably occur at the expense of the UN and do serious damage to the EU-UN relationship. The EU would therefore be well-advised to do more to support UN-led operations instead. Although EU-UN cooperation has intensified over the last few years, lessons learned from the field reveal ample room for improvement, and the lack of civilian capacity in both Brussels and New York points to a need for closer cooperation and a pooling of resources and information. While the joint EU-UN declaration of cooperation from September 2003 represents a step in the right direction, flesh still needs to be put on its bones. The first recommendation flowing from this analysis therefore emphasises the importance of doing so:

### **Recommendation one: Increased cooperation in areas of planning, training, communication and best practice should be made a priority in both Brussels and New York.**

Implementing this recommendation will require personnel exchanges between the two secretariats and use of liaison officers to create the personal networks usually required for effective inter-organisational cooperation. This would also be the simplest way to ensure timely information sharing between the situation centres in the two organisations. However,

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<sup>41</sup> Council Secretariat 2003b, pp. 20-22; interviews in the Council Secretariat, Brussels, 6 May 2004; interview in the DPKO, New York, 12 May 2004.

this can only happen if the bodies responsible for civilian rapid reaction crisis management in both organisations are provided with additional resources.

**Recommendation two: The institutional capacity for civilian rapid reaction crisis management should be enhanced in both Brussels and New York.**

Both secretariats are currently directing, planning and supporting civilian operations with a minimum of staff and resources, and additional personnel is therefore required to create space and time for effective cooperation.

**Recommendation three: Joint solutions and a pooling of resources should be pursued to the greatest extent possible to avoid wasteful duplication.**

Given that both organisations are currently struggling to build up their civilian rapid reaction capacity, the EU and the UN should pool their limited resources and seek joint solutions to the problems they are facing. The criteria employed by both organisations for recruitment, vetting of personnel, training and personnel management, the establishment of law and order packages and joint civil-military force packages, security etc. should be the same. Moreover, since the organisations are establishing them at the same time, it would make most sense to let joint inter-organisational task forces do it. At the very least both organisations should be represented in the working groups and task forces set up to address such issues. This also applies to the establishment of databases for personnel management, lessons learned, the development of best practice etc. Joint training and exercise programmes are also logical given that both organisations are relying on the same force pool. Finally, joint mission analysis and planning would also seem logical for operations involving components from both the EU and the UN.

**Recommendation four: A secure communications system should be established between Brussels and New York.**

Joint cooperation along the lines suggested here would involve the handling and sharing of sensitive information related to personnel management, mission planning and support and lessons learned. To make this possible secure communications between the two secretariats is a must, and it should go beyond the mere establishment of a hot-line.<sup>42</sup>

**Recommendation five: A joint EU-UN effort is required to enhance the pool of qualified civilian rapid reaction personnel.**

The single greatest obstacle to civilian rapid reaction and EU-UN cooperation is the desperate shortage of qualified personnel. It is therefore imperative that the EU and the UN, in addition to building up their institutional capacities, give priority to enhancing the force pool. This will require structural reform in the member states as they will have to build “excess” capacity in the relevant personnel categories. There is more to this than merely enhancing the number of say police officers and judges. While quantitative increases may be required in these areas, changes in the incentive structures and education systems may be sufficient in others. Individual states could make international service more attractive for rule of law and civil administration personnel by making it count in their own personnel management. At the moment international service is generally not a trump in the promotion game for civilian

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<sup>42</sup> For this and other proposals see Ehrhart 2002, p. 66.

personnel in the public sector. If that was changed and civilian crisis management operations were made part of the curricula in law schools, public administration schools ect., the pool of qualified personnel willing to serve on such operations would no doubt grow. The EU and the UN should encourage such changes in their member states and in addition make a major efforts to support the training and recruitment of qualified personnel outside of Europe. Africa should be a priority area in this respect since the majority of the crisis management operations conducted by the two organisations will take place on the African continent in the foreseeable future.

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### **ABBREVIATIONS**

CFSP            Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIVCOM        Committee on the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

DG E	Direction Generale Relations Exterieures
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina
EUSR	European Union
GAC	General Affairs Council
HR/SG	High Representative/Secretary-General
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
JSC	Joint Situation Centre
OSCE	Organisation for Stability and Cooperation in Europe
PPEWU	Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
PSC	Political and Security Committee
UN	United Nations
WEU	Western European Union