

# Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Seminar

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
Center on International  
Cooperation

# There is no such thing as counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan

- ⑩ Opium production, processing, and trafficking is the largest sector of the economy, over one third of the total, half of legal GDP
- ⑩ This is by far the largest proportion in the world
- ⑩ Requires a total security and development effort integrating counter-narcotics with all policies
- ⑩ Neither the US nor any other actor is currently undertaking such a policy



# The Importance of Opium in the Economy of Afghanistan in 2003



**Farmers' and traffickers' income:  
US\$ 2.3 billion  
equivalent to 52% of 2002 GDP**

# Implications and trends in the size of the opium sector


- **Implications:**
  - ⑩ It is the largest sector of the economy, supporting most power holders
  - ⑩ It uses a relatively small proportion of resources (land, labor) and therefore can easily expand in response to demand, and easily move around the country in response to eradication efforts (continued...)

# Implications and trends in the size of the opium sector

## ■ Trends:


- ⑩ Fall in farmgate price, leading to less income to farmers.
- ⑩ Increase in processing: 80% of border seizures are now of processed products.
- ⑩ Hence more income to traffickers, processors, warlords, terrorists; increased cartelization and vertical integration.

Seizures of opiates in countries neighbouring Afghanistan  
(Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia)




# Opiate seizures in heroin equivalents

Seizures of opiates in countries neighbouring Afghanistan  
(Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia),  
based on calculation in kilogram heroin equivalents



Seizures of opiates in countries in Central Asia,  
based on calculation in kilogram heroin equivalents



# Demonstration of mobility of opium cultivation



UNITED NATIONS  
Office on Drugs and Crime

## Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation in 2003

- Main cities
- ▭ International boundaries
- ▭ Province boundaries
- ▭ District boundaries



District Cultivation (ha)

- Considered poppy free
- 1 - 250
- 251 - 500
- 501 - 1000
- 1001 - 2500
- above 2500


**Continued increase in Badakshan province**

**Spread of cultivation in northern provinces**

**Spread of cultivation from south to mountainous central districts**



# Afghan Opium Economy in Comparative Perspective: Drug crop production in proportion to GDP in leading drug producing countries



9/13/2004

Afghanistan

Myanmar/Burma

Colombia

Peru

Bolivia

Morocco

Sources: UNODC, IADB, ??

# Evaluation of requirements for eradication of the opium sector

Comments from



*Counter-Narcotics Technical Annex*

## ■ 1. Security and law enforcement:

- “Without adequate security, little of the counter narcotics strategy can be implemented.” AREU assessment of security efforts: “The international community as a whole is failing to provide the necessary leadership, funds, programs and forces required.”
- There is a “lack of strong law enforcement units” and a “lack of allocated funding to counter narcotics and policing.”
- “The overhaul of the judicial and penal systems is proceeding slowly and at present there is no capacity or will to arrest, try, convict, or imprison those breaking the [counter narcotics] law.” “Until the justice system works effectively, the effect of improvements in law enforcement capacity ... will be severely limited.”

## Comments from SAF Counter-Narcotics Technical Annex. . . .

- ⑩ 2. Improved governance: “As long as figures in position of authority at all levels (local, provincial, national) remain involved in the narcotics trade, the effectiveness of CNPA [counter narcotics police] will be limited.” Their impact will be “small” unless the Afghan government takes a “firm stand against all officials involved in the business.” Includes nearly all US military allies in war on terror.
- ⑩ (continued...)

## Comments from SAF Counter-Narcotics Technical Annex


- 3. Alternative Livelihoods: “Inadequate debate on the concept and ... lack of agreement on how to implement it and ... link it to ... opium elimination and ... law enforcement.” “The amount of funding . . . fails to achieve the critical mass necessary to actually have an impact on the level of opium poppy cultivation.” There is “no coherent management or monitoring of ... programs.”

# Development and Security Effort in Afghanistan Compared to other Stabilization Operations

US Mission




UN Mission



# Taliban Eradication

## Afghanistan Opium Production, 1990-2003



# Analysis of Taliban “Success”

- ① Taliban eradicated cultivation only, not trafficking and processing, at a time of glut and low prices.
- ② Taliban defeated, replaced regional warlords with a centralized government, which taxed opium through centralized revenue collection and then banned cultivation.
- ③ Taliban penetrated villages through monitors (mullahs) and deployed police (department for enforcing virtue and eliminating vice) in response to reports.

# Comparison with Current Power Arrangement

- ⑩ US-led coalition destroyed Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan by arming, funding, and supporting warlords.
- ⑩ Each commander took control of revenue sources in his own area, including resurgent opium in situation of high prices cause by Taliban eradication.
- ⑩ Weak central revenue collection.
- ⑩ Political support for central government has not yet counterbalanced material support to regional leaders.

# Comparison with Current Power Arrangement ...

- ④ Paraphrase of statements from Afghan official with responsibilities in this area:
  - There is no free market in opium. Cultivators do not create traffickers. Traffickers create cultivators through debt dependence and coercion by warlords.
  - The government is under pressure to show progress through crop eradication, not attacking trafficking, because members of the cabinet and allies of the US in the war on terror are major traffickers.

# Components of Counter Narcotics

- Law enforcement
- Alternative livelihoods

# Components of Counter Narcotics

- **Law enforcement**
- ⑩ Crop eradication: Worst possible and least effective way to start.
  - ⑩ Raises farmgate prices, incentives to move.
  - ⑩ Debt trap for farmers guarantees they will plant again without full alternative livelihood and enforceable debt forgiveness.
- ⑩ Interdiction of trafficking and processing:
  - ⑩ Lowers farmgate prices by lowering demand but also attacks the most powerful people.
  - ⑩ Can be manipulated by factional politics in elite.
  - ⑩ Creates backlash of the armed and powerful.

# Components of Counter Narcotics ...

- **Alternative livelihoods**
- ⊙ For farming families, laborers: requires investment in:
  - ⊙ Rural areas to create farm and non-farm employment, alternative sources of credit, and settle existing debts.
  - ⊙ Infrastructure for access to markets for alternative cash crops and processing (essential oils, fruit concentrates, etc.), not wheat.
- ⊙ For power holders: requires integrating them into:
  - ⊙ State as politicians, officials, military officers
  - ⊙ Economy as legitimate businessmen
  - ⊙ Custody as war criminals.

# Eradication of Opium in Afghanistan: Long-term goal

- Requires:
  - ◆ Destroying over a third of the economy of one of the world's poorest countries
  - ◆ A degree of success in law enforcement that US has not attained.
- Therefore is at best a long-term goal needing investment in security, institution building, and development at least on the scale set forth in Securing Afghanistan's Future. SAF provides a twelve-year time frame for eradication as a best-case analysis. Experts believe this is overly optimistic.

# Eradication of Opium in Afghanistan: Immediate opportunity to start. . .

- **Prices are falling:**
  - ⑩ Step in with massive investment and new business ideas for profitable farming
  - ⑩ Credit institutions and debt settlement
  - ⑩ Employment creation
  - ⑩ No coercive eradication except when and where these are well established.

# Eradication of Opium in Afghanistan: Immediate opportunity to start

- **Political system and institution building is starting, regional leaders are hesitating:**
  - ◆ Make clear that there is a future in legitimate political institutions (parliamentary elections) and government (appointment of General Daud to Ministry of Interior).
  - ◆ Conditional on not participating in drug trafficking and cooperating fully with DDR.
  - ◆ Transitional justice efforts will start.

# Counter Narcotics, yes War on Drugs, no

- Success requires balancing development, security, law enforcement, supporting Afghan efforts to transform their society.
- A militarized effort against the largest part of the economy will lead to armed resistance with substantial mass support.
- Integrate a long-term counter-narcotics strategy into all efforts

# Thank You!

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