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Worldview

A bi-annual newsletter edited and published by the Center on International Cooperation

Maxims Matter: The US Response to Terrorism and Its Implications for Multilateral Cooperation

**By Dr. Kenneth Prewitt,
Dean of New School University's Graduate
Faculty of Arts and Sciences,
Chair CIC Advisory Council**

"To make the world safe for democracy" has been a comforting maxim. It is about what we are for -- open societies, rule of law, accountability of rulers, acceptance of diversity. If we take the maxim seriously, it precludes alliances with non-democratic regimes -- for this, of course, is illogical. Equally illogical would be to pursue the cause by means that themselves contradict democratic principles.

"To make the world safe from terrorism" permits what making the world safe for democracy precludes. It shifts the focus from what is embraced to what is feared. A positive becomes a negative. Allies can now include nations that do not practice the rule of law, do not tolerate diversity of religion or culture, do not allow its rulers to be rejected or even criticized. The new maxim also justifies pursuing the goal through means that themselves contradict democratic principles -- such as secret tribunals, ethnic profiling, or surveillance practices not normally acceptable in a democracy.

It is of course not certain that the new maxim will displace the old one, though the momentum is presently running in that direction. Prudence suggests taking seriously the possibility that a "world safe from terrorism" will gain political prominence. This is not because international terrorism is new. The U.S. State Department counts more than two thousand international terrorist acts between 1995 and 2000, as the citizens of Jerusalem, Belfast, Bogotá, Tokyo, and dozens of other cities know all too well. But on 9/11/01, international terrorism dramatically, horrifically, and successfully arrived in downtown New York and at the Pentagon.

Whatever the U.S. takes up urgently, as it most certainly has in its war against terrorism,

assumes global significance simply because of what and who the U. S. is, a point made cogently in CIC's new book, *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*. If we accept that the new anti-terrorism maxim will sustain its hold on public discourse, in the U.S. and elsewhere, what might this mean for international cooperation and the CIC agenda? Consider as one specific example, the future of international migration.

Lower than replacement birth rates are now common across Europe. Under current (median) UN projections, in the next half-century Italy's population will drop from 57 million to 41 million, or 28%; the Russian federation from 147 million to 121 million, or 18%. Similarly in the Far East, Japan, for example, will decline from 127 million to 105 million, or 17%. Replacement migration, to offset the population decline of, especially, the working age cohort, is one response -- and the numbers get very high. To keep constant the size of the working-age population in Italy, for example, approximately 370 thousand new migrants a year would be required and in Germany, just short of a half-million.

International migration of this magnitude would bring millions of workers from poorer to richer regions of the world (about 1 million a year have been coming to the U.S., which is why its population is growing rather than declining). Remittance payments alone could result in a transfer of wealth at a scale that dwarfs current international aid. It might also bring nations closer together, if tolerance toward the foreign born was to extend to better relations with the countries from which they emigrated. Of even more importance, the resulting diversity in nation after nation would oblige democratic theory and practice to work out the ways in which diversity and democracy can be made compatible. This could provide the basis for new forms of international cooperation.

If, however, "making the world safe from terrorism" can be mobilized to slow down international migration to any serious extent, the consequences for a more integrated world are very far-reaching indeed. For instance, economic demands and demographic pressures are likely to increase illegal immigration -- calling for the kind of dubious controls now being implemented in the

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“If 9/11 demonstrated one thing, it is the need to develop multilateral instruments that are adequate to deal with the problems that globalization breeds...”

United States. Wealth redistribution will be negatively affected. Countries will have to manage their economies (and social security systems) with a shrinking working age population and a growing older population.

The point here is not to work out this example in detail, or even to assert that international migration will necessarily suffer. It is simply to suggest that there will be significant unintended consequences if the fight against terrorism undercuts democratic principles and human rights or becomes more single-minded than comprehensive. The way the U.S. "makes the world safe from terrorism" will impact other critical areas in need of effective global management, such as international migration, but also humanitarian assistance, development and international justice.

Globalization, Terrorism and the International Public Sector

The attacks on the World Trade Center represented an assault by non-state actors on civilian targets in the United States, utilizing commercial instruments -- air transport, cellular phones, financial transfers, and freedom of migration -- as weapons of mass destruction. In essence, the basic elements of globalization on which the U.S. economy has come to depend -- the movement of capital, goods, labor and information -- became the tools of global terror. How to rebuild trust in them and make them agents for a more equitable, just and peaceful world should be a major point of U.S. foreign policy in the years ahead.

Since World War II, the U.S. has taken the lead in developing international law and the intergovernmental agencies to implement it in order to promote peace and security, economic cooperation and growth. In effect, the U.S. helped to create an international public sector that has similar functions to the public services in countries around the world. This international public sector consists of over 1800 international organizations, 5000 conventions and treaties, thousands of NGOs and tens of thousands of international workers and civil servants. It is designed to make the laws and set the standards that govern international behavior, including trade and commerce, peace and security. It provides goods and services upon which people the world over have come to depend -- from the non-controversial tasks of delivering the mails and granting landing and docking rights to planes and ships from different countries, to the more controversial subjects of arms control and the maintenance of international peace.

Of course, the international public sector differs from domestic arrangements in a number of ways, importantly in the area of accountability. There are no international elections to provide the bell-weather of performance nor is there a global General Accounting Office to assess the results. In fact, there is no system to track inter-

national public sector expenditures, modest as these are, by our estimate about \$200 billion annually, or less than 2/3rds of one percent of gross world product. If you think about public expenditures in most developed countries as more or less equivalent to the tax rate, you can see how little attention is being paid to the management and financing of the institutions and activities that are meant to govern the processes of globalization for the public good.

CIC's estimates of the costs of goods and services provided through multilateral organizations demonstrate clear regional and sector specific inequities which belie much of the beneficence to which international cooperation rhetorically lays claim. The lion's share of these international public sector expenditures, or about 40%, is spent by the European Union on agricultural subsidies and transfers to poorer countries within Europe. These expenditures, amounting to more than \$80 billion annually in recent years, dwarf the less than \$14 billion that multilateral organizations spent annually on other regional programs during the same period. To put these discrepancies in stark relief, sub-Saharan Africa, arguably the region most in need of external assistance, received only \$267 million, or 13% of funds available through multilateral agencies in 1999.

These regional discrepancies also have a profound impact on sectoral distribution. For example, slightly over half of all multilateral funding is earmarked for development cooperation, but this includes the huge intra-European agricultural subsidies and transfers. Exempt these intra-European expenditures, and transfer payments from wealthier to poorer nations through multilateral organizations amount to less than \$30 billion annually in recent years.

Research and training in science and technology represents approximately eight percent of total annual expenditures, and human rights and humanitarian assistance accounts for little more than one percent. As a prime example of how the world is managing on the cheap, the entire international court system costs approximately \$500 million annually, with regional courts in the European Union and the ad hoc war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda accounting for well over half of these expenditures.

Yet, if 9/11 demonstrated one thing, it is the need to develop multilateral instruments that are adequate to deal with the problems that globalization breeds and are -- in what has now become almost a cliché -- beyond the scope of any single country, even the world's most powerful, to attend to on its own. As the Indian Finance Minister, Yashwant Sinha, told his colleagues at the recent IMF Ottawa meeting, "It's a more integrated world with a greater awareness that we must be able to stand together, developed as well as developing countries, because alienation, poverty degradation, violence, anger, impatience anywhere is a threat to peace and prosperity."

- Shepard Forman

Food for Peace? Humanitarian Aid and Security Objectives after 9/11

The first humanitarian relief supplies to enter Afghanistan after international aid workers were forced to evacuate were individual food rations dropped by U.S. planes. A short time into the operation the government hastily changed the meal packaging because their size and color too closely resembled the cluster bombs that other U.S. planes were dropping. This juxtaposition of policy actions was emblematic of the uncomfortably close relationship that has sprung up between military and humanitarian agendas in the current war, a relationship that entails certain risks to the effective and equitable provision of international humanitarian assistance.

Since the end of the Cold War, every U.S. military action has included humanitarian objectives as a component of the operations (e.g., Kurds in Iraq) if not the primary rationale for the mission (Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo). In Afghanistan humanitarianism is an integral operational and legitimizing element of the U.S. strategy. But, policy makers start down a dangerous path when they mix humanitarian with strategic objectives. On the one hand humanitarian operations require the political will of donor governments to underwrite them, but in order to put food in the mouths and blankets on the backs of civilian victims in the most effective possible way, the operations must also adhere to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, as enshrined in the Geneva Conventions. The U.S. government's current attention to humanitarian operations threatens to compromise these humanitarian principles by co-opting relief aid for specific political purposes.

With international relief assistance currently in the spotlight, humanitarian policy makers in governments and international agencies should seize the opportunity to seek progress on three important fronts: First, official aid levels need to increase. In the words of former Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the mere 0.1% of GNP the U.S. has allocated for foreign relief and development assistance during its years of strongest economic growth is "inexcusable and reprehensible." Increasing this percentage to the UN-designated goal of 0.7% would vastly improve the resource base for assistance. Second, the Bush Administration must uphold and promote its stated humanitarian policy of providing aid on a needs-only basis. Third, and more broadly, the international community should take steps to indigenize the humanitarian system so it can function more cost-effectively and with less politicization. The abrupt halt of a large portion of aid distributions when expatriate aid workers evacuated Afghanistan, coupled with the high costs, local economic disruption, and security risks connected with their return, makes the strongest argument to date for building regional and local capacity for relief delivery, and placing local personnel in the senior management positions of aid operations.

The political and operational challenges

in the Afghanistan relief effort only underscore the need for broader reforms. As relief operations transition to recovery and peace-building activities, a new set of challenges will arise. The poor performance of the international community witnessed in past recovery efforts prompted CIC's earlier proposal for a Strategic Recovery Facility to manage a timely response. Perhaps nowhere is the relationship between humanitarian assistance and redevelopment more important than in Afghanistan, for a botched recovery operation there most certainly means renewed risk of internal violence and chaos, which in turn spells increased opportunities for international terrorist activity.

- Abby Stoddard

Perspectives from the Regional Conflict Formation Project

After considerable debate, the U.S. has concluded that only a "stable Afghanistan" would deprive potential terrorists of a receptive launching ground for their attacks. The conflict in Afghanistan, however, forms part of a set of linked conflicts within the South-Central Asia region and beyond. CIC's work on regional conflict formations suggests that in order to ensure long-term security, the U.S. and its partners must focus beyond Afghanistan to foster stability throughout the region.

Regional conflict formations (RCFs) are sets of transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a region, making for more protracted and obdurate conflicts. Characteristics of regions prone to RCFs include: a lack of territorial control by states; migration of armed groups from territory to territory; and regional and global transborder relationships based on unofficial trade and ties of identity.

While the Great Lakes region of Africa is one of the most recognized cases of a regional conflict formation, there are striking similarities to South Central Asia. Lessons that are painfully being learned in the Great Lakes may shed light on effective policies for South Central Asia. The RCF in the Great Lakes has militarily involved nine neighboring states, not to mention the economic involvement of both regional and international actors. The conflict in Burundi, the ongoing unrest in Uganda, the unconsolidated peace of Rwanda, the stalled peace process in Angola, the physical decimation of Democratic Republic of Congo, and the economic instability of Zimbabwe are all inter-linked in the Great Lakes RCF.

The Great Lakes RCF illustrates why a country-specific approach must be accompanied by regional economic, political, and social conflict management strategies. The prospect of success of the Arusha Peace Process for Burundi has led some armed groups to move their bases from country to country -- largely to the DRC -- to continue resistance to the peace process and spread

"The abrupt halt of a large portion of aid distributions when expatriate aid workers evacuated Afghanistan, coupled with the high costs, local economic disruption, and security risks connected with their return, makes the strongest argument to date for indigenizing humanitarian assistance."

Johannesburg, South Africa

In November 2001, the Centre for Africa's International Relations (CAIR) at The University of Witwatersrand, in partnership with CIC, organized a conference entitled: "Putting Africa on the Road to Recovery: Exploring a Strategic Recovery Facility and Other Renewal Options." The Johannesburg conference both celebrated the launch of CAIR, and continued a partnership forged during an earlier conference on "Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi Report." Participants examined the SRF's feasibility and modalities in the African context including its potential to link the New Partnership for Africa's Development with the United Nations and external donors.

violence elsewhere in the region. The Interahamwe militia that carried out the 1994 genocide spread conflict when it fled in defeat to the DRC and other countries, but the example of Burundi shows that not only military defeat, but even a peace process, can create harmful regional spillover effects if these are not explicitly taken into account.

As part of its RCF project, CIC, in partnership with the Africa Peace Forum, organized a consultation with African scholars and practitioners in Nairobi to distill some of these lessons. Participants emphasized that while regional approaches are needed, they must complement actions at the local, national and global levels. For example, global initiatives to curb the looting of resources in the region must also be complemented by strengthening regional informational and enforcement capacity. Similarly, media messages directed at the local level must acknowledge a wider regional target audience. And in striking similarity to South Central Asia, the participants noted how the lack of an effective sub-regional organization frustrated conflict management attempts in the Great Lakes region.

CIC is now developing a similar conference for South Central Asia. RCF characteristics are present in the region around Afghanistan, including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Kashmir. The regional linkages are political, economic, social, and military. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) became integrated into the Al Qaeda network based in Afghanistan. The madrasas in Pakistan helped fuel the emergence of the Taliban and also trained young men now fighting in the Ferghana Valley, Kashmir and, according to some sources, Chechnya. Some linkages, however, have the potential for positive, as well as negative impact. Until recently, the trade in smuggled goods stretched from Dubai through Tajikistan. With the right incentives, this trade network could be transformed to support regional economic cooperation, rather than providing resources for criminal networks.

Strategies for reconstructing Afghanistan must extend beyond the borders of Afghanistan to address the region as a whole. That will be the theme of the conference CIC is now planning--how to transform the regional conflict linkages in South Central Asia into regional reconstruction linkages.

- *Andrea Armstrong*

Covering Working Groups for the Reconstruction of Afghanistan

After 23 years of failed revolution, foreign invasion and intervention, pervasive war, and massive displacement, the crisis over international terrorism has prompted a political transition in Afghanistan. While we cannot yet gauge the stability of the transition, it presents opportunities for both Afghan and international actors finally to

address the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Today Afghanistan is the one of the world's worst humanitarian emergencies. Violations of human rights are pervasive and constitute the norm for all political-military groups. Insofar as data are available, the country ranks at the bottom of all human development and security indicators: shortest life expectancy; highest infant, child, and maternal mortality; lowest literacy; greatest gender inequity; largest proportion of disabled people (landmines as well as polio); and largest number of per capita personal weapons. The country's rudimentary road system, its ancient irrigation and water management facilities, its capital city, its nascent national market, agriculture (both subsistence and commercial), and tiny industrial plant have all been virtually destroyed. The country's educated elites have been slaughtered, imprisoned and exiled, leaving it with little human capital and few if any institutions of governance.

The devastation and anarchy of Afghanistan generated an extremist response where, without police presence, outlaw networks flourished. A reconstruction program that gives Afghans a stake in both the development of their own society and international cooperation will provide the best defense against recurrence of these phenomena. Assisting in this effort, CIC has been called upon by the UN to support reconstruction planning. CIC will convene Afghan experts to provide both human capital and local ownership of reconstruction planning.

The experience of recovery and reconstruction aid shows that success requires inter alia: a shared sense of objectives; joint planning in order to reach agreement among key actors on priorities; local ownership of and capacity to participate in the planning and implementation of reconstruction; timely and adequate mobilization of resources to bridge relief and development efforts and ensure that the building blocks of sustainable peace and development are in place; and monitoring and accountability of the use of those resources to meet the stipulated priorities. Uncoordinated efforts by competing foreign donors and NGOs, on the other hand, can generate more conflict among the recipients, fail to meet even elementary objectives, and do more harm than good.

Afghanistan currently has no institutions or organizations with either the credibility or skill to carry out such activities. The country no longer possesses cadres with sufficient technical expertise to address these questions. CIC has therefore been asked to act as a convener and clearinghouse to start the process of planning with Afghans and other relevant experts. CIC will do so by assembling working groups of Afghan intellectuals and technocrats to develop options for the recovery and reconstruction process in key areas.

CIC brings to the table the lesson-derived from its comparative case study project on Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery, which led to the proposal to establish a Strategic Recovery Facility. Both the analytical conclusions of that project and the network of experts CIC established in the course of that work will enable it to communicate relevant lessons about post-

conflict recovery and identify and convene relevant international experts.

The project, headed by CIC's Barnett Rubin and Ashraf Ghani, on leave from the World Bank, is identifying expatriate Afghans to comprise working groups in relevant functional areas, such as repatriation and resettlement, employment and income generation, and operative laws for an interim governing authority. Rubin and Ghani participated as advisors to the UN in the conference on establishing a transitional authority for Afghanistan, convened in Bonn on November 27, 2001. The project works closely with the office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative on Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi, as well as other parts of the UN system. It has thus far received financial support from the Open Society Institute, the European Commission, UNDP, and the governments of the United Kingdom and Norway.

- Barnett Rubin

Beyond September 11th: Bending Paradigms in International Justice

Great catastrophes can abruptly reveal the inadequacy of existent social institutions and call for new responses. September 11th is just such an event, exposing the vulnerability of modern and open societies to terrorist attacks, and forcing democratic governments to scramble to find emergency solutions. Not all of the immediate answers, however, seem to be on par with the situation and coherent with the announced goals.

If America's long-run objective is to carry out an unprecedented war against terrorism and the international criminal activities that directly or indirectly feed it (money-laundering, narco-traffic, weapons-traffic etc.), the U.S. government will need to contribute to the establishment of effective multilateral institutions, including those needed to prosecute the perpetrators of international terrorist acts and crimes. However, the special military commissions announced by President Bush may not be the best way to go.

Franklin D. Roosevelt was the last U.S. President to approve the constitution of such commissions, in the midst of World War II, to try German saboteurs. Trials by these special courts would be secret and could take place anywhere -- on a U.S. ship on the oceans, or even on foreign territory. They would be swift, giving prosecutors a free hand to introduce evidence that would be excluded in any other court, presumably for reasons of national security. Convicted terrorists could be executed shortly after with few or no rights of appeal. This model seems inappropriate, however, to today's environment. If the United States wants to secure the continual backing of the international community, prosecution of terrorist networks must be as transparent as possible.

Over the last half-century, the international community has developed a wealth of alternative options, ranging from ad hoc international

criminal military-tribunals (like those in Nuremberg and Tokyo), to ad hoc criminal tribunals under the aegis of the UN (the international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda), to permanent criminal courts (the International Criminal Court). Even when seemingly insurmountable political and legal obstacles lay in the way of justice, creative multilateral solutions have been crafted to try indictees. For example, to get around the problem of the refusal of Libya to extradite two of its own nationals to the UK to face charges for the bombing in Lockerbie, and break a deadlock which lasted for a decade, a Scottish court sat in The Netherlands, under the terms of a special agreement. And when fully international criminal tribunals cannot be created for political reasons, domestic courts of affected states can be buttressed by the international community, creating hybrid "internationalized criminal bodies," as occurred in Kosovo and East Timor.

Each of these options (international criminal military tribunals, criminal tribunals under the UN, and permanent international courts) has its own practical limitations and shortcomings, but each is preferable to any special U.S. military trial. In the last analysis, the U.S. and other states can resort to ordinary domestic criminal courts. The scale of the terrorists' actions and their amazing ubiquity provides enough jurisdictional links to empower a broad range of states to apprehend and try terrorists in their own fora.

Of course domestic trials, especially if carried out in the U.S. or other western countries, would be looked at with a wary eye by the world public, especially in Muslim countries. But they could be opened up to public scrutiny. Much to the dismay of those who believed that the Lockerbie trial was going to be a victor's justice, one indictee was sentenced and another acquitted. The verdict has been accepted without much fuss by the countries involved and their citizens.

To effectively respond to the challenge of global terrorism, existing legal paradigms and institutions must be reshaped and adapted. For multilateral cooperation to become a permanent fixture of the fight against international terrorism and crime, the international community would need to harmonize law and judicial practices in the criminal field way beyond what has already been done. This could be achieved in the existing criminal judicial system or by creating special national courts in charge of international and transnational criminal and terrorist activities, in either case applying universally agreed upon criminal laws and procedures. To be globally acceptable these common criminal laws and procedures would have to incorporate the highest standards of judicial guarantee, impartiality and transparency.

This new paradigm, which could be called cooperative jurisdiction to differentiate it from the principle of universal jurisdiction, would be a radical departure for the U.S. judicial system. However, the judiciary, at federal and state levels, has to adapt to the challenge of the world heralded by the September 11th attacks as all other government branches are striving to do. The U.S. has put itself at the head of the coalition of the war against terrorism. It should take the same leadership position in helping to consolidate the interna-

"Uncoordinated efforts by competing foreign donors and NGOs... can generate more conflict among the recipients, fail to meet even elementary objectives, and do more harm than good."

tional legal framework required to effectively tackle the challenge of international terrorism and crime.

- Cesare Romano

Implications for the Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy Project

Nairobi, Kenya

In partnership with the Africa Peace Forum in Nairobi, Kenya, CIC organized a three-day meeting to examine the regional conflict formation in the Great Lakes region of Africa, including its structures, dynamics and challenges for policy. Scholars and practitioners from Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Zimbabwe, the UK and the U.S. gathered to discuss the various linkages which facilitate conflict in the region and found that regional approaches are appropriate when they involve local actors in the planning and implementation of conflict management strategies. A summary of the meeting proceedings will be posted on the CIC website in early 2002.

One of the most striking -- and welcome -- aspects of the U.S. response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been the energy and skill the United States has devoted to forging a broad international coalition. Prior to September 11, pundits were preoccupied with the question of whether the country should "go it alone or with others." The attacks revealed the unreality of this debate. In responding to terrorism -- and to other transnational problems that define our global age -- the United States has little choice but to combine its own efforts with those of other countries and international organizations. The challenge for U.S. policymakers is to design effective frameworks for collective action that expand policy options while minimizing infringements on U.S. freedom of action and sovereign prerogatives.

While the administration of George W. Bush responded to the September 11th attack with a multilateral approach that seemingly departed from its initial unilateralist tendencies, the campaign against the Al Qaeda terrorist network raises several questions.

1) How multilateral is the antiterrorist effort? The administration wisely adopted a multi-dimensional approach, seeking international cooperation not simply at the military level but also in monitoring and regulating financial transactions, gathering intelligence, policing terrorist networks, providing humanitarian assistance, and (ultimately) rebuilding Afghanistan. But the coalition resembles a "hub-and-spoke" model, involving a series of bilateral deals, representing varying degrees of commitment, cut with a heterogeneous collection of countries whose objectives overlap only imperfectly. This "variable geometry" may make consensus elusive when the antiterrorist effort moves beyond Afghanistan.

2) What are the limits of the ad hoc approach? Today, the key foreign policy debate is less about unilateralism versus multilateralism than about the trade-offs of alternative strategies for the latter. The Bush administration has tended to champion temporary "coalitions of the willing" that can coalesce around limited objectives under U.S. leadership. While such coalitions are useful in meeting discrete contingencies, particularly where no standing international framework exists, ad hoc-ism has its limits, requiring reinventing the wheel in every circumstance and lacking the legitimacy of policies sanctioned and implemented by international institutions.

3) How far will the administration's new multilateralism extend? It is not yet clear whether the coalition strategy represents a fundamental shift in U.S. engagement or simply a limited response to a dramatic but discrete and time-bound challenge. Plausibly, the administration could build on its antiterrorism experience to advance sustained, institutionalized cooperation on a wider set of global issues. Yet Washington is likely to resist extending authority to global bodies that might shackle U.S. freedom of action or threaten U.S. control of the global agenda.


4) Is a high degree of selectivity in the use of multilateral instruments plausible in the long run? In the days before the attacks, one U.S. foreign policy official described the administration's strategy as one of "a la carte multilateralism." Certainly, some selectivity in the country's global engagement is unavoidable. But it is uncertain that other countries will be enthusiastic about cooperating with the United States on issues about which it cares a great deal, if the United States reserves the right to opt out of or say "no" to other rules and institutions of equal importance to them.

5) What institutional reforms might be required to adapt the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy to transnational threats? As transnational issues have proliferated, traditional domestic agencies have taken on new international missions, straining the ability of the State Department and National Security Council to coordinate foreign policy. The United States has responded to the terrorist attacks by creating an Office of Homeland Security. Similarly, it needs to adapt the national security and foreign policy bureaucracy to meet transnational challenges and take advantage of the opportunities of global interdependence.

To help shape the debate on these issues, the Center is issuing a policy paper, "The United States in a Global Age: The Case for Multilateral Engagement," and has initiated a series of public symposia around the country. On November 14, 2001, the Center co-sponsored a conference in Washington, DC with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "After September 11: American Foreign Policy and the Multilateral Agenda." The conference assessed the U.S. track record on managing global issues; analyzed the impact of the terrorist attacks on U.S. policy; and discussed foreign views of the U.S. commitment to multilateralism. The highlight of the meeting was an on-the-record address by Dr. Richard N. Haass, the Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department, on the topic, "Multilateralism for a Global Era."

(available on the State Department web site at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/index.cfm?docid=6134>)

- Stewart Patrick



Books

*Center on International Cooperation —
Studies in Multilateralism*
published by Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery

edited by Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick
(Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000),
ISBN 1-55587-854-7 (Hardcover) \$55;
ISBN 1-55587-854-7 (Paperback) \$22, 432 pages.

Promoting Reproductive Health:

Investing in Health for Development

edited by Shepard Forman and Romita Ghosh
(Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999),
ISBN 1-55587-877-6 (Hardcover \$49.95), 320 pages.

Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement

edited by Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman
(Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Fall 2001).
ISBN: 1-55587-854-7 (Hardcover) \$55;
ISBN: 1-55587-854-7 (Paperback) \$22, 432 pages.

Forthcoming:

International Perspectives on U.S.

Unilateralism and Multilateralism
edited by David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong
(Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Winter 2002).

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Remodeling Humanitarian Assistance

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by Abby Stoddard


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Center on International Cooperation

New York University

418 Lafayette St., suite 543

New York, NY 10003

tel. (212) 998-3680

fax (212) 995-4706

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Name _____

Organization _____

Address _____

Postcode _____ Country _____

Telephone _____ Fax _____

E-mail _____