

**Draft Discussion Paper III:
Regional Approaches to Conflict Management in the Great Lakes Region**

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For the Conference on Regional Conflict Formation in the Great Lakes Region of
Central Africa: Structure, Dynamics and Challenges for Policy

Hosted by
Africa Peace Forum, Nairobi
Center on International Cooperation, New York University

Safari Park Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya
11-13 November 2001

October 22, 2001

OVERVIEW

I. Introduction

II. Past Policies in Review

- A. Linkage Assessment
 - i. Structural
 - ii. Operational
 - iii. Systemic
 - iv. Conclusion
- B. Second-Order Effects
 - i. Structural
 - a. Transborder trade
 - ii. Operational
 - a. Regime transformation
 - b. Flows and quality of information
 - c. Migration and alliances of armed groups
 - d. International Intervention
 - iii. Conclusion
- C. Discussion Question

III. Elements of a Regional Strategy

- A. Structural Approaches
 - i. Transborder trade
 - ii. Inclusion/Exclusion of identity groups
- B. Operational Approaches
 - i. Migrations and Alliances of armed groups
 - ii. Flows and quality of information
 - iii. Effect of conflict on economy
- C. Systemic Approaches
 - i. International Regulation
 - ii. Regional Strategies of External Actors
- D. Discussion Question

IV. Role of Regional Actors

- A. Capacity
- B. Partnership
- C. Discussion Question

V. Conclusion

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to use the conceptual framework outlined in Working Paper I (a general analysis of regional conflict formations or RCFs) to (1) analyze the effectiveness of past and current policies in addressing the regional dimensions of conflict in the Great Lakes (GL), and (2) to outline for purposes of discussion some alternative or additional conceptions of what a regional approach to the GL RCF would require. A regional approach here means primarily a regional conflict management strategy that takes into account the linkages among conflicts. Secondly, the term can refer to a strategy that relies mainly on regional actors. The latter includes not only formal regional or sub-regional organizations but also states and networks of civil society.

For the purposes of this paper, the RCF-GL will be understood as the linked conflicts originating in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), plus their linkages to domestic conflicts or destabilization processes in surrounding countries, including Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, and elsewhere. Since the networks that sustain conflict reach beyond that region to include global forces, such as arms traffickers, great powers in competition, and extractive industries, a comprehensive strategy would have to be global as well as regional in focus.

This paper will evaluate conflict management policy toward the Great Lakes or the various crises within the whole RCF (which is far larger than the GL region properly speaking). It will discuss:

- How effectively policy actors have taken into account the regional dimensions;
- Whether they have ignored regional linkages in ways that made their policies less effective or had unintended regional consequences;
- Whether a more self-consciously regional policy would be desirable – even for a region that is not self-defined as such—and, if so, what an effective regional policy might consist of and who might implement it?

The conceptual paper (Working Paper I) makes a first cut at applying some of the concepts of the study of conflict to the regional level of analysis. Conflict analysis generally distinguishes between three types of conflict prevention and management approaches: 1) Systemic, which addresses global factors and institutions which promote or facilitate violence (drug policy, arms trafficking, development models); 2) Structural, which addresses the underlying causes of conflict in a particular place; and 3) Operational, which addresses escalation factors (triggers, accelerators) that spread or intensify conflict. Operational prevention assumes a regional dimension when it focuses on “horizontal” escalation, that is, preventing expansion of or actually reducing the set of actors, territories, or issues at stake, as opposed to reducing or containing “vertical” escalation, decreasing the intensity of violence. Limiting or containing escalation

through operational management strategies is often a precondition for addressing structural issues, which require a more long-term perspective.

A regional approach seems to be particularly important for prevention of armed conflict in actual or potential RCFs. Preventing violent conflict in one country may require resolution of an ongoing armed conflict in one part of the larger region and successful post-conflict peace building in another part, or at least attention to regional linkages. Rather than singling out only potential conflicts-or portions of conflicts-that are not yet violent or that might escalate, a preventive approach to conflict may require strategies for entire regions that address links among conflicts at different stages of evolution.

This outline presents some ideas, based on our current research, about how the lack or incompleteness of a regional approach may have hindered past conflict prevention or management efforts in the GL. We do not intend to claim this was the only, or most important, shortcoming in peace efforts in the GL. There were many others, notably the unwillingness of major international actors to invest or risk many resources in the region. Second, this outline examines what policies might fill this void. Compared to the other region studied in this project (Southern Central Asia) the relevant actors are more willing to attempt regional action, and there are a number of special envoys and negotiation processes or proposals that deal with interlinked regional issues.

Past Policies in Review

This section is comprised of two parts. First, were the cross-cutting issues identified in Working Paper II adequately addressed by the various peace initiatives, proposals and efforts? Second, we will focus not so much on partisan policies that aggravated regional conflict linkages as on peace efforts that had unintended or undesirable regional effects. We are also working on a catalogue and timeline of peace initiatives in the region, from 1993 to present.

Linkage Assessment

The majority of past peace initiatives, proposals and efforts were aimed at attaining a ceasefire leading to a political settlement in the country concerned.¹ Some of these efforts culminated in the signing of a ceasefire accord, as in the case of the Lusaka Accord for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), while others were overtaken by events on the ground, such as the series of ship-board meetings organized by Nelson Mandela between Laurent Kabila and Mobutu. As the various accords represent a degree of agreement between various parties, a significant portion of the analysis below will concentrate on formal peace initiatives that have provided a framework for addressing the elements of the regional conflict formation. These are the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord (and Sirte Initiative) for the DRC, the Arusha Process for Burundi (including the sanctions against Burundi), the Arusha Accords and Protocols for Rwanda, and the Bicesse Accord

¹ It should also be noted that the lack of peace proposals or initiatives, while not addressed in this paper, may also be significant – as in the case of Uganda.

and Lusaka Protocols for Angola. Where relevant, other proposals or initiatives will be included, such as NGO initiatives, various Security Council resolutions, etc.

Structural Mechanisms

Inclusion/Exclusion of transborder identity groups; Weak states; Illegitimate states, predatory regimes; Location and availability of taxable and lootable resources; Transborder trade networks.

The most comprehensive of the peace processes in the Great Lakes region, in terms of to what extent it addresses the structural dynamics of the regional conflict formation, is the Arusha Agreement signed by most, but not all, of the parties to the Burundi conflict in August 2000. The negotiations revolved around five committees,² – although later Nelson Mandela, in an effort to reinvigorate negotiations as the new Facilitator of the process, gave explicit priority to the peace and security committee. The Arusha Agreement does provide a framework for addressing the Burundian side of transborder trade networks through the Committee on Reconstruction and Development. Yet, the committee is still operating without a clear mandate, as to whether they are to plan for reconstruction as part of the peace process, or for when the peace process has been successfully included.³ Politically, the Mandela Facilitation Team has promoted the development of an inclusionary democratic government for Burundi. The National Dialogue, established at local, provincial and government levels could also have a potentially positive effect. However, most of the initiatives aimed at encouraging peace in Burundi, in terms of gaining and retaining regional support and addressing the cross-border nature of trade and identity groups, have been decidedly state-centric and sometimes counter-productive, as seen in the next section. Although the framework is in place to address the structural issues within Burundi, the framework does not address the regional dynamics of these structural factors and there seems to be a clear priority given to escalatory factors vs. structural factors in the current negotiating climate.

The Lusaka Accord for the DRC, essentially a ceasefire accord that simultaneously tasks the Inter-Congolese Dialogue with sorting out the cumbersome political issues, barely addresses the structural factors at play. Without directly acknowledging how the weakness of the DRC state, and for some its illegitimacy, has contributed to the current conflict, in the short-term the Lusaka Accord seeks to build a stable ceasefire on a fractured foundation. The Lusaka Accord repeatedly emphasizes the equal rights of “all ethnic groups and Nationalities whose people and territory constituted what became the Congo (now DRC) at independence”⁴. This may do little to calm the inter-ethnic tensions, especially within the Kivus, since some groups have migrated to the DRC after independence in 1960. For those groups whose members may not be considered citizens

² Committee I: nature of the conflict; Committee II: democracy and good governance; Committee III: peace and security; Committee IV: reconstruction and development; Committee V: guarantees to support implementation of accord, from the International Crisis Group, “Central Africa Briefing,” August 27, 2000. Accessed online.

³ International Crisis Group, *One Hundred Days to Put the Peace Process Back on Track*, August 14 2001. Accessed online.

⁴ Article II, para. 16 Lusaka Ceasefire Accord

of the DRC, the region and the Accord lack mechanisms for assuring their participation/livelihood in either the DRC or in neighboring states – in effect, creating a new group of “stateless persons.” Rather than changing, transforming or altering the structural context in the short-term, it takes the structural factors as given, until the conclusion of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Likewise, the phenomenon of political and military control following the location and availability of natural resources is not effectively addressed in the Ceasefire Accord. The Accord does not recognize the economic incentives associated with maintaining current military positions, instead mandating demilitarization, while allowing for groups to maintain political control of the area in the short-term, as in Kisangani. As various human rights reports have indicated, military control (and not political control) has been instrumental in the ability of armed groups to mine mineral resources in Eastern DRC. The Sirte Accord, in comparison, does focus on the location and availability of looted resources, by proposing that the Kivus, and areas of Rwanda and Burundi, come under the occupation of “peace-forces”.⁵ While this is hardly a realistic proposal in the eyes of Rwanda, and may mask ulterior motives of both Kabila Sr., and Museveni, it also supports analysts who argue for the motivating importance of control of the Kivus and its economic resources. In the final analysis, the Lusaka Accord prioritizes the political (and distinctly long-term) elements of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in favor of the economic (and short-term) elements of maintaining the status quo.

The same scenario can be seen in the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol for Angola. Provisions are made for a ceasefire, the reforming of the Angolan army, elections at all levels, and the formation of a Government of National Unity. Bicesse and Lusaka failed to address structural elements such as lootable resources, the weakness of the state, and the transborder trade networks that facilitated UNITA actions in the conflict. This omission was later addressed by the Angolan military, which managed to capture or destroy several UNITA bases used for communications, diamond mining, and trade. The Savimbi-led faction of UNITA is said to still earn a minimum of \$100 million USD a year from illegal diamond sales.⁶ UNITA has been capitalizing on the relatively easy mining of diamonds, as compared to oil. It requires only two elements: the capture of minimal mining equipment from the Angolan government and approximately 300 soldiers to monitor a workforce of 2000 miners. The lootability of the diamond mines is also complemented by transborder trading links between Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UN report notes, “There are historical region and kinship ties across these virtually open borders, and trading across them is a long-established activity.”⁷ The Lusaka Protocol called for the transfer of certain territories from UNITA to the government, without acknowledgement of the incentives associated with maintaining control over those territories. As Human Rights Watch notes, “... UNITA fulfilled only the obligations that it felt were not strategically essential to its

⁵ Note: this agreement was initially negotiated by Museveni and Kabila in Libya. Rwanda has never accepted the validity of this agreement, according to the Africa Peace Forum. *Peace Initiatives in the Democratic Republic of Congo, August 1998-August 1999 A Chronology*. 2000.

⁶ S/2001/363. *Addendum to the Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions Against UNITA*, April 18, 2001

⁷ S/2001/363. *Addendum to the Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions Against UNITA*, April 18, 2001. para 91

security, and which would not preclude a return to war.”⁸ In contrast, the United Nations sanctions against UNITA, as a complement to the Lusaka Process, has attempted to transform these structural conditions by assisting the Angolan government to implement a national certification process for the sale and transfer of diamonds and through pressure on Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, South Africa, the Central African Republic, Zambia, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Rwanda, and Uganda to strengthen their trade and/or border controls to stem the trade in diamonds by UNITA. While still not spectacularly successful, the UN sanctions against UNITA have endeavored to confront the structural linkages in the Great Lakes regional conflict formation, whereas the Bicesse Accords and Lusaka Protocol have not.

The Arusha Accord for Rwanda, negotiated between 1991 and 1993, was extensive in the structural issues to be addressed in terms of the predatory nature of the state and the inclusion/exclusion of transborder identity groups. Its failure to provide a sustainable peace in Rwanda may have more to do with the way it was negotiated and by whom, than to the agreement itself. As early as 1991, the Presidents of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire met to discuss the return and repatriation of Rwandan refugees, culminating in the Dar Es Salaam Declaration in February 1991. The Declaration mandated that Rwandan refugees be offered three options: returning to Rwanda as citizens, retaining Rwandan nationality while remaining in their host country, or adopting the citizenship of the host country. Later in the negotiating process, the RPF and the Government of Rwanda agreed to the mechanisms under Annex V of the Arusha Agreement outlining the repatriation and resettlement of Rwandan refugees and displaced persons. The Annex is detailed and specific, even mandating the conditions which refugees must fulfill in order to claim their previously held lands, the materials to be supplied to those who can not place those claims, and how their status as a refugee or displaced person is to be determined. The same can be said for the protocols mandating the composition, rules of procedure, institutions and methods of government, each meticulously documented. At its most basic level, the Arusha Accords provided a framework for addressing the most pressing structural linkages in the Great Lakes region – but the same cannot be said for the operational linkages.

Operational Mechanisms

Regime transformation; Flows and quality of information; Region-wide economic crises; Flows of refugees; Migrations and alliances of armed groups; Strategies of regional leaders; Blowback effects of conflict; International intervention; Arms trafficking; Extractive industries and looting; Effect of conflict on economy.

The Arusha Accords failed to integrate the structural elements of the peace process with the ongoing operational escalatory mechanisms that were continuing to destabilize Rwanda and the region as a whole. The timetable set for the transitional government, a mere 37 days, increased the stakes for both parties involved within the context of regime transformation. The Accords did not provide for a pressure release mechanism, in terms

⁸ Human Rights Watch, *World Report*, Angola, 1999. Accessed online.

of an institutional joint committee mandated to ongoing dialogue and dispute resolution. The Accords mandated detailed benchmarks for every realm of the public sphere, but did not contain measures if the benchmarks went unfulfilled or a coordinated independent joint monitoring and verification system for confirming violations. Case in point is the joint communique issued in March 1993, which prohibited engaging in negative propaganda through media or meetings. Although the Neutral Military Observer Group is mandated later in the paragraph to monitor the activities of each party in their respective zones, this seems to be in reference to subsequent items within the same paragraph, i.e., cessation of army recruiting and the acquisition and distribution of weapons.⁹ In fact, there is no process for monitoring the flows or the quality of information, an element that was fundamental to the ability of the Rwandan government and the Interahamwe to orchestrate and organize the genocide of 1994. More positively, in March of 1993, Uganda and the Government of Rwanda were able to successfully, and transparently, limit the horizontal territorial escalation of the conflict, by requesting placement of a monitoring force on the Rwanda-Uganda border.¹⁰ This observer force, UNOMUR, was fully in place on the Ugandan side of the border by the following September, and its mandate was continued when UNOMUR became integrated under the UNAMIR command later that year¹¹. While the Accord did provide clauses relating to the demobilization and reintegration of the RPF and the formation of a new National Army, these processes were later undermined by international policies, that facilitated the migration of the Interahamwe, while simultaneously undermining the ability of the new Rwandan government to provide a stable state of return. Given the number of studies on this subject, a few details may suffice to support this point. At its height, the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance for Rwanda estimates that international aid agencies spent \$2 million/day providing food and shelter for Rwandan populations outside of Rwanda. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the remaining UN agencies did not have the budget allotments to contribute to the basic reconstruction of the Rwandan state. Even once funds were pledged, such as at the Geneva Round Table 1995, those funds were subject to the usual delays, increasing conditionality and deteriorating trust. Even now, the Security Council and the Rwandan government continue to affirm that the principles of the Arusha Accords provide the best framework for rebuilding the fractured Rwandan state.

In terms of the operational mechanisms, the various initiatives to mediate the Angolan conflict have focused on democratization of the Angolan political process, while simultaneously applying pressure to the UNITA faction led by Jonas Savimbi. Given the debates surrounding the positive and negative incentives created by democratization, this two-pronged process may be inherently contradictory.¹² Second, neither of these

⁹ S/25385, March 9 1993. Para 3, Annex, Joint Communique issued at the end of the high-level meeting between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, held in Dar Es Salaam March 5-7,1993.

¹⁰ S/25356, March 3, 1993. Letter from Perm Rep. of Uganda to the UN addressed to the President of the SC. and S/25355 March 3, 1993. Letter from Perm Rep of Rwanda to the UN addressed to the President of the SC.

¹¹ United Nations, Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996*, 1996. p. 19, 25.

¹² Democratization can extend armed hostilities, if one or more parties believe that they will not gain a

approaches has been necessarily successful. The U.S. Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS) notes that “elections can not bring peace to Angola,” and that the security and logistical issues were not paramount in their negative assessment of the conditions for elections. Rather, they note that a “climate of understanding” and a commitment to abide by the democratic process is lacking.¹³ Travel between UNITA controlled areas and those controlled by the governing MPLA is highly restricted, and as a USIP assessment mission noted, prevents the emergence of bottom-up momentum to sustain the peace process and promote reconciliation.¹⁴ Another barrier is the presence of 12,000 refugees in Congo-Brazzaville, unable to participate in the Angolan process. Recently, UNHCR has repatriated approximately 600 Angolan refugees from Congo-Brazzaville, however this was not in coordination with other peace mediation efforts.¹⁵ The recent increase in terrorist attacks by Savimbi’s UNITA faction may be a response to increased willingness of the MPLA government to implement democratic reforms and increased pressure from the United Nations for a democratic solution to the conflict.¹⁶ In July 2000, the Security Council set up the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA, with the mandate to collect information, investigate leads, and develop methods to improve the efficacy of sanctions against UNITA. The Security Council states that the sanctions are a result of UNITA’s refusal to implement elements of the Lusaka Protocol and to force UNITA to return to the negotiating table. SADC has recently endorsed the sanctions and will examine how it can comply with Security Council measures.¹⁷ Recent efforts to combat the flows and quality of information have begun in the NGO sector. The Open Society Institute, in a joint venture with the Catholic Church in Angola, has organized informal elections throughout the country on whether “the war was a solution to Angola’s problems”.¹⁸ Through this initiative, they seek to provide a climate of reconciliation that is open to repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people and place the blame for the conflict squarely on the Angolan elite.

The Chiluba Initiatives, the efforts that culminated in the Lusaka Accords, were notable for recognizing the political linkages and strategies among the warring parties and for ensuring that regional leaders were either involved or informed as the negotiations proceeded. Through the Inter-Congolese dialogue, which many have argued is key to a sustainable peace in the entire region, the Lusaka Accord has the potential to address many of the escalatory mechanisms. By encouraging a national dialogue and changing the nature of how information is received and delivered, it can help address the rumor-war economy dynamic that has increased inter-ethnic violence in the Kivu region.

significant majority in the election process, in order to increase negotiation leverage and the allotment of government positions prior to elections.

¹³ Angola Peace Monitor, no.12, vol. 7, September 5, 2001.

¹⁴ John Prendergast and David Smock. “Special Report: NGOs and the Peace Process in Angola”. United States Institute of Peace, 1996. Accessed online.

¹⁵ Angolan Peace Monitor, no.12, vol. 7, September 5, 2001.

¹⁶ President Dos Santos has indicated that he will not run in the next elections. However, certain conditions must also be met before the next elections, as the presidential advisory committee mandated: a national census, the drafting of a new Constitution, adoption of a new electoral law and reinstating the free movement of people and goods. Angola Peace Monitor no.12, vol. 7, September 5, 2001.

¹⁷ Angola Peace Monitor, no.3, vol. 7, Oct. 5, 2001

¹⁸ BBC News. “Church launches Angola peace effort”. September 29, 2001. Accessed online.

Through its discussions on a new political dispensation for the DRC, it provides a dispute resolution mechanism to decrease the inherent tensions of democratization, as called for in the Lusaka Accord.¹⁹ It also mandates that neighboring countries security concerns be addressed through the halting of all covert or overt assistance and the tracking and disarmament of all armed groups operating in the DRC by the Joint Military Commission in partnership with the United Nations and Organization of African Unity.²⁰ Although this does not address the pre-implementation actions of the armed groups, which can continue to destabilize the entire region – if successful, it will help to build trust among the state parties if the armed groups that remain in the DRC are addressed. The Lusaka Accord, while not an outright ban on arms trafficking, does obligate the signatories to stop the sale and transfer of weapons to armed groups operating in the DRC. The Accord is also complemented by the UN Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth on the Democratic Republic of Congo, which while admittedly incomplete, provides a partial roadmap of accountability in the mining and extraction of resources from the DRC. The report's recommendations have yet to be implemented by the United Nations Security Council, other than mandating that the Panel continue its investigations. As to the economic effects of the conflict on the economy, the Accord is significantly lacking. It does not present a vision, nor task the Inter-Congolese Dialogue to develop, a plan of reconstruction or development. More pressing, in the eyes of many analysts is the current lack of funding for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) and the lack of inclusion of various Mayi-Mayi groups. The ICD suspended its deliberations on October 18 in Addis Ababa due to delays in the delivery of pledged assistance for the ICD by various donors, and after neither Kabila, Jr. nor other armed group leaders attended. Deliberations are expected to resume in South Africa, where the government has provided facilities. It is as yet unclear how groups previously excluded from the process will be included, although consensus seems to be developing that inclusion of the Mayi-Mayi groups is essential to insuring a stable outcome of the ICD.

The Arusha Agreement for Burundi has also been notable for involving regional states in peace efforts. President Museveni, as head of the Regional Heads of State, was present at the signing of the Arusha Agreement and has been kept informed by Mandela's Facilitation Team. Mandela's Facilitation Team has also urged regional heads of state in Kigali, Nairobi, Kinshasa and Dar-Es-Salaam, to isolate all groups that have not complied with the Arusha process. His attempts to de-link DRC state sponsorship from Burundian rebel groups is aimed at limiting the options for continuing the conflict. However, we have not seen a similar attempt to de-link the various non-state actors. The FDD of Burundi has been linked with militias and ex-FAR groups – and in some instances, has staged coordinated attacks against their respective countries. Yet most efforts have been concentrated on pressuring the Kinshasa regime to renounce these groups, an action which it may be incapable of taking. The Arusha Agreement for Burundi seeks to create a government of national unity through transitional leadership, through investing in good governance and democratic institutions and through its plans to address human rights abuses and war crimes. However, the Mandela Facilitation Team

¹⁹ Annex A. 5.5 iv in the Lusaka Accord.

²⁰ Chapter 8, 9, 12 in the Lusaka Accord.

has been criticized for only distributing leaflet copies of the Agreement. Instead, one NGO has argued that in order to create the necessary social capital for the population to invest in the new Burundian government, the Team should engage in radio broadcasts and travel through Burundi explaining the implications of the Arusha Agreement.²¹ By transforming both the flows and quality of information, it is hoped that the Burundian people would effectively separate their struggle from that in neighboring Rwanda and the DRC. Similarly, the Committee on Justice is expected to finalize two bills that foresee how Burundi can address the massacres of 1972, 1993 and grave human rights abuses during the current conflict. As many scholars and practitioners have noted, incorporating human rights into a peace process can be potentially destabilizing, if done incorrectly. However, if done evenly and transparently, the future government of Burundi can significantly transform the current negative flows of information, and hopefully contribute to lessened ethnic tensions and de-link the fates of the Rwandan and Burundian populations. Mandela has also repeatedly called for the United Nations to designate the conflict in Burundi as a threat to international peace under Chapter VII of the Charter and to mandate peace-enforcement troops to the country to facilitate the stability of the transition government, an initiative which both the Security Council and African states have been unwilling to support.²² South Africa's latest proposal to provide 700 troops may be a partial effort to limit the further migration of armed groups, although given the multitude of tasks already assigned to this small group (assuring security of transitional leaders, monitoring, etc.) – their activities may have a more internal, rather than regional, character. The initiatives in Burundi seem to reflect the belief that the majority of non-state actors can be effectively controlled and pressured by the states in the region. This may not necessarily be the case.

Systemic Mechanisms

Regional strategies of external powers; The role of international financial institutions and donor governments; International Corporations; International Regulation Regimes.

Competition between France and the United States for influence in Central Africa, and Rwanda in particular, led to their support of destabilizing regimes in the Great Lakes region and was manifested in the French Operation Turquoise and extensive sales of arms to the countries of the region. William Hartung and Dena Montague note that as of 1999/2000 the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia and Zimbabwe all continued to receive military arms and/or training from the United States, approximately \$4.8 million in 1999 alone.²³ The strategies of international financial institutions, donors and aid agencies were partially linked to political developments, but not sufficiently integrated creating second-order effects of regime weakness, and in Regine Andersen's view "triggered the

²¹ International Crisis Group, *One Hundred Days to Put the Peace Process Back on Track*, August 14 2001. Accessed online.

²² Ibid

²³ William Hartung and Dena Montague. *Deadly Legacy Update: U.S. Arms and Training Programs in Africa*, Arms Trade Resource Center. March 22, 2001.

(Rwandan) conflict.”²⁴ Rather than stabilizing the Great Lakes region, the systemic mechanisms served to facilitate the Great Lakes regional conflict formation.

In Angola, the International Monetary Fund has been promoting an extensive Structural Adjustment Program. In an effort to comply with the IMF and thus receive access to debt re-financing and reduction, the Angolan government has recently reduced petroleum subsidies, which will have a significant effect on the living standard of Angolans.²⁵ It is not clear whether the IMF is working in concert with the Angolan Peace Process, or separately. The Kimberley Process, in response to the sale of diamonds to finance UNITA activities, remains stalled, although a ministerial meeting is scheduled for later this year. The Kimberley Process seeks to create a transparent and harmonized certification, transportation and sale process that allows buyers to verify the legality of the diamonds purchased. Producer countries, and the EU, have invested the most in furthering the process, while the U.S. has refused to commit to any agreement eventually reached by the Process. Russia and Portugal, both Troika members, which act as observers/mediators to the Angolan conflict, entered into military supply agreements with the Angolan government as late as 1999, significantly undermining their role in building a sustainable peace process.

Similarly, a lack of cohesion among donors is evident in the Burundi peace process. The Friends of Burundi donor group allotted approximately \$440 million for reconstruction and development during the December 2000 Paris Conference.²⁶ However, differences exist among the donors as to whether the funds should be given to the government of Burundi, international NGOs, national NGOs, etc. They are also undecided as to which elements of reconstruction should be funded using this money. Their indecision, along with the lack of delivery of funds to any of the potential implementers, is a significant barrier in developing the social and economic confidence necessary for the transition government to begin governing by November 1, 2001. This indecision/lack of coordination has also been prominent in a number of other peace initiatives, namely international ambivalence toward (and growing lack of support for) the sanctions against Burundi and the competitive nature between the Africa-led negotiations and the Sant’ Edigio process in Burundi (which may have slowed peace efforts as a whole).

Although the UN Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth on the Democratic Republic of Congo has provided some information, the recommendations contained in the report have yet to be acted upon. And while there has been increased NGO pressure on international companies to restrict their activities in the sale and mining of coltan from the DRC, compared to the initiatives currently under way regarding the Angolan diamond trade, this pressure has largely resulted in ad hoc, unverifiable, and unilateral statements by some of the involved companies, rather than a comprehensive approach. In contrast, the DRC peace process may have contributed to increased coordination of activities within

²⁴ Regine Andersen. “How multilateral development assistance triggered the conflict in Rwanda”. *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 3 pp. 441-456, 2000.

²⁵ Angolan Peace Monitor, October 5, 2001.

²⁶ International Crisis Group, *One Hundred Days to Put the Peace Process Back on Track*, August 14 2001. Accessed online.

the UN. The World Bank, in consultation with UN agencies, donor and recipient countries, is “working towards the establishment of a multi-country programme of demobilization and reintegration in the Great Lakes region,” in addition to organizing donors to financially reward specific and measurable progress in the implementation of the peace process.²⁷ UNDP has also adopted a more regional approach to the Great Lakes, by embarking on a “mapping and programming mission” to Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda to facilitate effective disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration.

Conclusion

Did any one of the peace efforts adequately account for economic, political, security and social linkages? Simply put, no. The majority of peace efforts and proposals have neglected an opportunity to provide for economic incentives and transformation, in their focus on establishing peace and security. The underlying implication is that once peace and security are established, economic flows and activity will readjust to take advantage of the new environment. However, in a secure state, especially one geographically surrounded by insecure states, informal economic activity may become even more profitable – an alternative that most of the peace proposals in the Great Lakes region are unprepared for.

However, the lack of a comprehensive plan in resolving the Great Lakes conflict, can also be seen as a prioritization of the perceived causes of the conflict. While some Western scholars and institutions have rallied around theories of “war economies” as motivators of conflict, it would seem that the African response (since indeed the majority of peace efforts were initiated by Africans themselves) has instead taken the view that “war economies” sustain conflict, rather than motivate it. In this light, the emphasis on peace and security may be correct.

What is evident, is that the majority of policies, when they did take account of the various linkages, sought to de-link the conflicts from one another at the state level. Concerted attempts to limit non-state actors actions through engaging the relevant host state has been evident in the Lusaka Protocols for Angola, the Arusha Accords for Rwanda, the Lusaka Accord for the DRC, and the Arusha Process for Burundi. Comparable attempts to engage non-state actors external to the process, for example engaging the Burundian FDD through the Lusaka DRC process, has not been evident, although this may be beyond the various mandates of the facilitators. Through political pressure on supportive or facilitating states in the region, the general diplomatic trend is that resolution of one conflict does not require resolution of a neighboring conflict. However, as we shall see in the next section, the various peace agreements have had destabilizing second-order effects, even as they sought to de-link the various processes.

²⁷ Ninth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. October 16, 2001. S/2001/970.

Second-Order Regional Effects

This section focuses on whether the various peace processes and efforts had unintended or undesirable regional effects. These may include:

Structural Mechanisms

Transborder Trade

- Economic sanctions against Burundi (1996-98) may have transformed or crowded out existing licit transborder networks, as well as created negative regional incentives against lifting the sanctions. While Kenya and Zambia refused to respect the sanctions after 1997, they also continued to profit from the high prices generated by the sanctions in the Burundian market.²⁸
- The international approach to economically undercut the UNITA faction's ability to finance the war against the MPLA is oddly complementary to (and somewhat legitimizing) the Angolan effort to force Savimbi to return to negotiations. One of the reasons repeatedly cited for Angolan military intervention in the DRC, is to cut off supply and diamond trading routes that support UNITA action in Angola. The government of Angola also intervened in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997, ostensibly for the same reasons.²⁹ For the Angolan government, they are simply enforcing the UN sanctions against the Savimbi-led faction of UNITA militarily. For UNITA, as the comparatively stronger states in the region increase their control over borders and trade, Savimbi has clear incentives in keeping the DRC destabilized and preventing implementation of the Lusaka Peace Process in the DRC.

Operational Mechanisms

Regime Transformation

- Recent developments in the Burundi Peace Process has led to Rwandan concern that democratization in Burundi will lead to genocide, which could potentially spill over into Rwanda, given the historical and ethnic ties between the two states.
- Pressure for democratization within the region has made the issue of citizenship and inclusion more important, which bears relevance to the struggle of the Banyamulenge throughout the region. The Security Council has called for the democratization of all states in the Great Lakes region, leading to increased fears of exclusion by the Banyamulenge region-wide. Democratization in Tanzania has been accompanied by increasingly anti-

²⁸ Gregory Mthembu-Salter. 1999. *Assessment of Burundi Sanctions*. Action Aid.

²⁹ Human Rights Watch, *World Report*, Angola, 1999. Accessed online.

refugee and anti-Tutsi rhetoric as political parties attempt to create constituencies that enlarge their access to political and economic resources.

- International pressure for power sharing in Rwanda may have led to perceptions of a zero-sum game and contributed to the genocide. Regine Anderson writes that democratization, in the context of economic decline, and as linked to international pressure for forward movement in the Arusha peace process at once increased the stakes of the actors involved while also shrinking the space for them to act³⁰. Moderate Hutus were not given time/space by the international agenda to build support for the Accord at home. The international pressure on Rwanda and the genocide of 1994, contributed to destabilize the Burundian peace process.

Flows and Quality of Information

- Weak international response to the 1993 coup in Burundi was perceived as international complacency and, as transmitted and communicated among transborder ethnic groups, may have been a contributing factor to the lack of domestic support for the Arusha Accord in Rwanda and the willingness to engage in genocide. This speaks directly to Kofi Annan's repeated calls for an end to the "culture of impunity" and its destabilizing effect on future events.

Migrations and Alliances of Armed Groups

- The prospect of the withdrawal of foreign armies and the disarming of foreign militias in the DRC may be escalating armed conflict within Rwanda and Burundi, in addition to putting increased pressure on Tanzania and Uganda. Reports indicate that Burundian and Rwandan rebel groups based in the DRC, in response to DDDR initiatives in the DRC, have staged coordinated attacks on their respective countries. The Arusha Agreement for Burundi has not included the FDD, an armed Hutu-majority group operating out of Congolese territory. Their non-inclusion in the peace process, has spurred their links to Interahamwe and ex-FAR groups in the Kivu region. There is evidence of coordinated strikes from the Kivu region into Burundi and Rwanda. In this respect, the Arusha Agreement for Burundi, rather than taking account of those linkages, has actually increased their potential to destabilize the Central African region.
- UNITA has a clear incentive to keep the DRC unstable and its borders porous, due to the DRC's importance as a vital smuggling route for fuel, arms and diamonds, as the sanctions against UNITA take hold in previously used trading routes. There have been reports of coordinated action between UNITA and Congolese/Rwandan rebels in south-western Congo and of

³⁰ Regine Andersen. "How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda" *Third World Quarterly*. v. 21, n. 3: 441-456. 2000.

Zambian and Ugandan arming and training of UNITA. Both of these reports have been denied by the respective state parties, however, as Van Eck notes, “At a time when most knowledgeable observers had written UNITA off as a spent force, UNITA reappeared from the bush better armed and prepared than ever before. To merely write this off as coincidence, would be grossly naive.”³¹

International Intervention

- The extensive humanitarian aid to Rwandan Hutu refugees and other fugitives in the Kivus after 1994, without adequate safeguards against use of aid by armed groups, facilitated increased armed conflict in Rwanda and the 1996 war in the DRC.

Conclusion

Only one of these examples has affected the structural environment of the Great Lakes regional conflict formation; namely transborder trade networks. All of the remaining examples would suggest that the secondary and unanticipated effects from conflict management policies have mainly served to horizontally escalate the conflict. Given the various factors established in the paper on the dynamics of an RCF, and which were used to evaluate the effectiveness of conflict management policies, two factors appear more frequently and seem to be more harmful than others. First, democratization, when in combination with contested citizenship and weak security, can act as a destabilizing force in a region, when utilized as a conflict management approach. Second, the conclusion of peace agreements that are lacking in a geographically regional focus, can motivate armed groups to migrate and form alliances, linking originally separate conflicts into a regional conflict formation.

Discussion Question:

- 1) Given the framework developed here, what are the ramifications (in terms of linkages) of a number of current proposals – a) the French/UN Security Council proposal for an International Conference on peace, security, and development in the GL region, which attempts to take a comprehensive approach, and b) a proposal to the EU for an international preventive deployment in the Kivus, which proposed a strategic intervention in a locale where many regional factors interacted. What were the merits of these ideas, and why have they not been implemented?

Elements of a Regional Strategy

Regional strategies consist of sets of policies that address multiple arenas and sources of conflict within a given region in an integrated way. At times they may make use of

³¹ Jan Van Eck. “Burundi Report: Scenario-Sketching for the Countries of the ‘Greater’ Great Lakes Region”. February 28, 1999. Centre for Conflict Resolution. p.8

positive regional linkages. At other times they may attempt to de-link national or sub-regional problems from regional conflict processes. For instance, DDRR of transnational armed groups in the Congo is linked to the construction of nationally coherent institutions of representation and administration in the DRC. At the same time, stability of the national project in the Congo will require its integration into a framework for regional cooperation, perhaps in the context of the new African Union.

Even if a regional strategy is identified, how can the key power brokers on the group be convinced that participating in a regional approach is better than holding out for an approach which focuses on their country? In fact there are numerous disincentives to local decision makers to acquiesce to a regional approach. First, they may be concerned that their issues will be overshadowed or given lesser priority than other problems in the region. This concern has been voiced by Rwanda in reaction to the proposed conference on peace, security, and development in the Great Lakes region endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1097 in 1997. For Kagame, participation in the conference equates the devastation (and guilt) caused by the genocide in 1994 with subsequent events in the region. Second, local power brokers lose a considerable amount of influence, as they will be less able to influence the peace making agenda because of the multitude of actors. Third, it can partly invalidate some of their initial reasons for resorting to violence. In part, the justification for violence often relies on claims to a “unique” situation that can only be resolved through violence. By participating in a regional peace process, each participant must acknowledge not only that their individual situations are not necessarily unique, but also that their actions are negatively affecting areas that are not necessarily the source of their problems. Given these disincentives, should a regional conference be an option? Would clarity of agenda, firm commitments by donors, internal development programs which link to the conference, assist in convincing local power-brokers to participate?

Regional strategies can include at least some of the following elements:

Structural Approaches

Transborder Trade

- Integrating into peace processes efforts to begin regional economic cooperation and transform illicit regional integration into licit forms of cooperation and development that reduce incentives for smuggling and looting. This will require engagement on terms acceptable to the region by major international financial institutions (WTO, World Bank). This could take several forms, such as strengthening existing sub-regional economic associations, or investing in infrastructure and building the Beni-Kisangani highway advocated by Museveni.
- Increasing capacities of states to regulate interactions, not so that national boundaries will block regional networks, but, on the contrary, so that states and societies will better be able to enter into transparent and legal regional

interaction for mutual benefit. Is the Cross-Border Initiative, a project of the African Development Bank, a potential method for this approach?³²

- A number of these issues are closely interlocking, providing a rationale for the proposed International Conference on Peace, Security, and Development. Is this the right forum for such discussions? Who should convene it? Should such sub-regional conferences take place, or should this process occur solely at the pan-African level? Should it be a one-time meeting, or a permanent component of the African Union or sub-regional arrangements, as the CSCE became institutionalized into the OSCE?

Inclusion/Exclusion of transborder identity groups

- The regional citizenship questions are all inter-related, and democratization processes make them more acute. Hence the region will need to enter into a dialogue on criteria for citizenship and cross-border ethnic relations. Perhaps this should be a pan-African process within the context of the African Union, moving away from concepts of citizenship based on indigeneity and toward a civic identity based on residence and participation.

International Intervention

- Each actor must undertake an evaluation of the regional effect of the proposed measure, in addition to the potential consequences when that measure is placed within the context of other actors and peace efforts.

Operational Approaches

Migrations and Alliances of Armed Groups

- A focus on key sub-regions or relationships where linkages are concentrated, such as the Kivus in the Great Lakes region, through, for instance, preventive deployments, targeted development projects or humanitarian assistance, mediation, or monitoring. How does the Lusaka Accord or MONUC need to be strengthened here?
- A focus on key relationships such as those between governments and insurgent groups. What the key ones are in this region is politically controversial: Rwanda-RCD, or Kinshasa-Interahamwe, for instance?
- Timing efforts at Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, or Resettlement (DDRR) in different regions so that arms do not flow from one

³² Cross-Border Initiative is not a new institution, but rather a “framework of harmonized policies to facilitate a market-driven concept of integration in eastern and Southern Africa.” Participation includes Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, among others. Members of COMESA, EAC, IOC and SADC invited to participate. <http://www.afdb.org/cbi/brief.html>

conflict to another, as mentioned above with respect to the DRC and its neighbors.

Flows and Quality of Information

- Efforts to counter information flows that provoke or intensify conflict through regional exchanges of information, regional media, or arranging speaking tours of local leaders throughout the region. Is this a role for the UN or an NGO initiative?
- Measures for justice that hold all regional violations to the same standard of justice. Should the mandate of the ICTR be extended geographically or temporally?

Effect of conflict on economy

- Providing security, livelihoods, health, and education for displaced people, in particular youth, keeping in mind that development should benefit local communities so as not to create resentment between local and refugee populations.

Systemic Approaches

International regulation regimes

- Efforts to stem the flow and sale of conflict resources, whether through embargoes on arms, conflict diamonds (as against UNITA) or coltan, or strengthening the capacity of local and regional actors to monitor and interdict such flows, as in the UN's program on arms trafficking in West Africa.
- Creating incentives, regulations, or targeted sanctions that encourage private corporations and governments to regulate the sale and purchase of conflict resources, such as diamonds, coltan and arms, such as the Kimberly Process for diamonds?

These are only a few examples, but they illustrate that a regional strategy should be comprehensive functionally as well as geographically.

Discussion Question:

- 1) How can the existing protocols for the DRC, Burundi and Angola be modified such that they coherently and effectively address the regional linkages? Or is a new Agreement, possibly region-wide, more attainable or desired?

Role of Regional Actors

One of the problems with generalizing the role of regional actors, however, lies in the definition of “region.” A region should not be conceived of as a strictly bounded set of states; states can belong to different “regions” for different purposes. If West Africa is the region where the UN has first tried to elaborate a self-consciously regional strategy in partnership with a sub-regional organization, ECOWAS, it is partly because it is one of the few regions where such an organization with some capacity and experience overlaps closely with the region relevant to conflict management. In the greater GL RCF, the sub-regional organizations are too small, the OAU is too large, and all are too weak or divided. Regional conflict management there, in the absence of a hegemon or strong regional organization, has largely taken the form of balance-of-power negotiations among the concerned states and armed groups, but it is unlikely to succeed without substantial global commitments.

First we examine, in brief, the capacity of various organizations, groups and individuals to implement linkage-focused regional strategies in the Great Lakes region. This is not an assessment of the organizations per se, but rather their ability to act comprehensively. Second, we examine the methods for partnership among various organizations, groups and individuals.

Capacity

The United Nations, with its institutional links to the Bretton Woods organizations, its inclusion of most countries of the world, its history and involvement in various peace negotiations, its relative credibility and through its global programs, can also be seen as the one organization with the most comprehensive capacity. Given the political will, it can marshal economic, political, diplomatic, institutional and security resources – however it can be argued that simply because it possesses the potential to do so does not necessarily mean it has the ability to do so. Its comprehensive nature, both functionally and geographically, is also one of its main downfalls. Repeatedly criticized for poor coordination and collaboration in the Great Lakes region, the United Nations may be best conceptualized as a potential resource and support mechanism in conflict management, rather than as the lead actor.

Other global organizations, such as civil society networks, tend to be single-issue organizations. They may be able to significantly contribute in discrete areas such as international law, refugee assistance, development assistance, early warning, human rights – but their global nature may also be their Achilles heel. Although this project intends to examine regional conflict formations as a general and global phenomenon, it in no way assumes that all regional conflict formations require the same approaches. Similarly, global organizations may be hampered by bureaucratic impulses to apply the same template to various conflicts, regardless of their motivations, causes or location.

Thus, regional involvement becomes key in the approach to regional conflict formations, both for the success of the initiatives aimed at managing the conflict and because of the uniqueness of each state and region. But what does this mean for the Great Lakes region,

where the regional hegemon is one of the sources of conflict, rather than a potential resource for conflict management?

SADC has become increasingly important in addressing the Great Lakes conflict, but its actions have also become an indication of increasing tension within the organization itself. Rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe for leadership and influence has been exported from SADC Summits to the DRC. Some analysts have pointed to the DRC's new membership to SADC as one element increasing friction between Uganda and the Kinshasa regime. The OAU, known for its principles of territorial sovereignty and non-interference, is often a behind-the-scenes facilitator of talks, but lacks the muscle to support its recommendations or positions. As an organization, its visible activities consist of issuing communiques in support of individual initiatives and personalities. The inauguration of the Mechanism for Preventing, Managing and Resolving Conflicts in Africa within the OAU may be able to provide structure to the efforts of the Secretary-General. It remains continuously underfunded and unable to mount effective peace keeping or peace enforcement operations. It remains to be seen whether the African Union will possess the resources and member support to become more visibly assertive. IGAD, of which Kenya and Uganda are members, has shown initiative in mediating the Sudan peace process and encouraging a political settlement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is unclear whether IGAD possesses the capacity to invest in yet another ongoing peace process, given its limited resources.

Regional organizations can be a positive incentive for managing the Great Lakes regional conflict formation. Rwanda, and more recently Burundi, have both been mentioned for membership in the East Africa Co-operation, as a way of increasing positive economic ties among the region. Analysts have also suggested the establishment of permanent region-wide liaison and political institutions in order to provide a future framework for disputes. Yet, as Gilbert Khadiagala has written, successful regional organizations were constructed using a foundation of strong states as a basis, and that regional organizations based on weak states are bound to result in weak regional organizations.³³ Even those groups that have the potential to act comprehensively, do not necessarily have the potential to act equally comprehensively in all areas. Because of the linkages and dynamics, an effective strategy for managing regional conflicts implies partnership between various groups and organizations.

Partnership

Certainly partnerships among the UN, regional organizations, and other actors such as sub-regional organizations, individual states or coalitions of the willing, and private organizations (both for-profit and non-profit) can strengthen international capacity to design and implement conflict management strategies. Partnership was not evident between the Sant' Edigio process in Rome and the Nyerere-facilitated process in Arusha for the Burundi conflict, and did not lead to increased capacity. Also, the various conflict management processes in the Great Lakes have often relied on the important personalities

³³ in Terence Lyons, "Regional Actors and African Conflict Management" *African Reckoning*, Francis Deng and Terence Lyons (eds).

and leaders – making the partnership question all the more relevant in the African context. So the more relevant question becomes: how can these partnerships become more effective, accountable and transparent?

In the Great Lakes region, the UN witnessed each of the agreements and was present as an observer to the various peace negotiations. A particularly valid question is, which organ of the UN is the observer representing? The United Nations signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord for the DRC as a witness, along with the SADC, the OAU and Zambia. The Accord had specific provisions for the establishment of a Security Council mandated Ch. VII peace enforcement mission, yet MONUC only received limited Ch. VII authority (mainly for self-defense).³⁴ Various questions emerge from this incident: What was the responsibility of the UN witness during the negotiations? To whom was the UN witness responsible, in terms of reporting and instructions? What obligations are witnesses to agreements under, and how can those obligations be made self-enforcing?

³⁴ International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo*. December 20, 2000.

Discussion Question:

- 1) What are your conclusions on the capacity of the currently engaged actors to attempt a regional approach to the Great Lakes regional conflict formation and what mechanisms or processes need to be developed to ensure that the approach is coordinated and collaborative?

Conclusion

This is a summary based on our research and conceptualization thus far. While much of it is stated in positive terms, it should be seen as a set of tentative proposals very open to amendment, contradiction, or supplement. A list of desirable measures also does not constitute a strategy. Just as we ended the draft outline of Working Paper II with a question about how to conceive of RCFs as process rather than just phenomenon, so here we conclude with a question about the sequencing and inter-relationship of measures in conflict management in the GL RCF and RCFs more generally.

As the predominant regional framework, the Lusaka Accord will probably deserve particular attention. It is notably vague on the inter-relationship and sequencing of its different components, with each party insisting that the part most important to it must come first. Can international efforts promote greater reciprocity and reliability in the implementation of the component parts of this Accord? Can the UN Secretary-General's vague suggestion of "... parties to the Lusaka process ... explor(ing) means of associating Burundi more closely with the peace process in the DRC" strengthen the potential for peace in the region?³⁵ Can a regional civil society dialogue or peace movement (such as was being discussed in Nairobi during Rubin's 1998 visit) help support the inter-Congolese dialogue and vice versa?

³⁵ Ninth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. October 16, 2001. S/2001/970. para 103.