Regional Burden-Sharing for Humanitarian Action

David O'Brien
Research Associate
Center on International Cooperation
New York University
April 1999

Discussion Paper

Forward
Introduction
Section 1: Factors Undermining Humanitarian Action
1.1 Declining resources
1.2 Uneven coverage across crises
1.3 Imbalance among humanitarian contributors
Section 2: Regional Responses to Regional Problems
2.1 Organization of African Unity
2.2 Arab Maghreb Union
2.3 Economic Community of Central African States
2.4 Economic Community of West African States
(i) Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
2.5 Intergovernmental Authority on Development
2.6 Southern African Development Community
2.7 Partnership arrangements
(i) Peace and security operations
(ii) Relief operations
Section 3: Financing Regional Responses to Regional Problems
3.1 Non-African funds for humanitarian action
3.2 African financial resources
3.3 The capacity to contribute: some projections
Conclusion
Annexes
References

List of Charts, Tables and Annexes

Chart 1: Global and Africa's Humanitarian Resource Gap: CAP Requirements and Needs Covered ('94 - '98)

Table 1: OAU Member State Profile, Organized by Membership in Sub-Regional Organizations
Table 2: AMU General Indicators
Table 3: ECCAS General Indicators
Table 4: ECOWAS General Indicators
Table 5: IGAD General Indicators
Table 6: SADC General Indicators
Table 7: ADB Special Relief Fund for African Countries Affected by Drought
Table 8: Special Emergency Assistance Fund for Drought and Famine in Africa

Annex 1: Total WFP Contributions for 1997 By Donor
Annex 2: World Donors: Population, Gross National Product, and Contributions to Humanitarian Assistance
Annex 3: Africa: Summary of Data Used
Annex 4: Potential Contributions to Humanitarian Assistance if all African Countries were to allocate 1% of the share of GNP they allocated to Defense Expenditure
Annex 5: Potential Contributions to Humanitarian Assistance if all African Countries were to contribute 0.00018% of their GNP, the rate at which Pakistan contributed in 1996
Annex 6: World: Donors for Humanitarian Assistance, 1996
Annex 7: Africa: Potential Humanitarian Assistance Contribution if African Countries were to contribute the average fraction of GNP allocated by corresponding income classes.

Acronyms
ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative (US)
ADB African Development Bank
AMU Arab Maghreb Union
CAP United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process
CDERA Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency
CILSS Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
DAC Development Assistance Committee
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOMOG ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
GHAI Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (US)
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
OAU Organization of African Unity
OAU SCFAR Special Contingency Fund for Assistance to African Refugee
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SADC Southern African Development Community
SEADF Special Emergency Assistance Fund for Drought and Famine in Africa
SRF Special Relief Fund for African Countries Affected by Drought
UN United Nations
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WFP World Food Program

The Center on International Cooperation is an independent institute that promotes policy research and international consultations on multilateral responses to transnational problems. Its project on "Resources for Humanitarian Assistance" examines an interrelated set of management, coordination, and financing issues in an effort to improve the quality of humanitarian aid.

In September 1997, the Center hosted a meeting that brought together representatives from intergovernmental and non-governmental humanitarian agencies, as well as donor representatives and other experts, to focus on issues of resource mobilization, standby capacity and coordination for humanitarian assistance. In advance of the meeting, the Center circulated a background paper, "Paying for Essentials: Resources for Humanitarian Assistance," which was based on input from the primary intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and other experts.2 The paper, from which the meeting agenda was drawn, analyzed the overall financial situation facing the humanitarian enterprise; examined the ways in which patterns of funding, as well as gross amounts, affect the delivery of assistance; and identified several finance and readiness options that could strengthen the capacity and performance of the humanitarian system.

The meeting participants developed a set of recommendations for additional research and policy consultations. Three reports were subsequently commissioned. One examines alternative funding scenarios, specifically the role of "up-front" funds and their influence on the capacity of humanitarian agencies to secure their core competencies and to improve their ability for early response. The second report explores the potential for, and effect of, greater participation of local and regional professionals in the staffing of humanitarian operations. This, the third report, explores the concept of burden-sharing as a means to widen and increase the responsibility of regional and sub-regional organizations for humanitarian action.

This report focuses on the African continent. While there is some evidence of an ‘African renaissance’, a reference to the determination among African leaders to create the conditions for peace, security and development, Africa remains a continent of concern. The vulnerability to and frequency of humanitarian emergencies are rooted in an interrelated set of political, historical, socioeconomic and environmental factors.

As humanitarian emergencies rarely respect borders, intergovernmental cooperation is often needed and requested. In Africa, the most relevant intergovernmental organizations are those of the UN system, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and increasingly, Africa’s sub-regional organizations. Individual states, NGOs and the private sector are important actors but they rarely have the capacity to undertake, in a coherent and coordinated manner, the range of humanitarian actions this report examines at a national or regional level. Furthermore, most NGOs do not have an independent funding base. While the private and corporate sector make humanitarian contributions, their contributions are episodic and difficult to quantify. Consequently, the burden-sharing debate is most pertinent and pressing at the intergovernmental level. Governments and international organizations regularly negotiate over how best to respond to major humanitarian emergencies, and how to finance humanitarian action. In the final analysis, these actors, complemented by the efforts of NGOs, have to assume the primary responsibility for meeting humanitarian needs.

For present purposes, humanitarian action is understood to include both (1) peace and security operations 3, and (2) relief operations4 in preparation of and response to natural catastrophes and conflict situations. This broad scope is warranted because humanitarian action in Africa frequently involves military and civilian actors5. Military personnel are not confined to peace and security operations, and civilian actors are involved in peacemaking and peace-building initiatives. Moreover, within regional African organizations the distinctions between peace and security operations and relief operations are not so sharp. To focus solely on civilian relief delivery capacities would simplify artificially the range of humanitarian activities undertaken within the international humanitarian system.

The emergence of an international humanitarian system, the codification of international humanitarian law and the corresponding creation of supportive organizations, is arguably one of the most welcomed forms of multilateralism in the 20^th century. At the close of this century, billions of dollars are raised annually by the UN system to alleviate the suffering caused by natural disasters and war but this financial support is declining and increasingly unable to meet humanitarian needs. This declining resource base, along with a search to diversify sources of funding and the recognition that some emergencies receive adequate attention while others do not, raises question for the need for new burden-sharing arrangements.

The burden-sharing concept has been advanced by various actors as a means to alter the existing division of resources and responsibility for humanitarian initiatives. For example, the European Union representative to the July 1998 ECOSOC session on humanitarian issues commented that the EU would like to see non-traditional donors increase their financial contributions to UN humanitarian initiatives. Likewise, the UNHCR annual Executive Committee meeting in 1998 examined burden-sharing as a means to strengthen its work. Meanwhile, OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim has urged member states to increase their efforts to prevent and respond to emergencies. Finally, the UN Secretary-Generals, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his successor Kofi Annan have both called on regional organizations to assume greater political and operational responsibility for humanitarian action. 6

How the burden for humanitarian action is shared can be either voluntarily or legally determined. Burden-sharing as a voluntary act is a form of international solidarity. From the Irish potato famine of the 1840s to hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998, governments, religious and secular organizations have responded voluntarily to humanitarian emergencies. When encoded in international law, burden-sharing binds states to cooperative action to uphold shared goals. For example, the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, obliges member states to cooperate on humanitarian issues, calling on them to "take appropriate measures [to] lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum." 7 Unlike the UN’s formula for assessing membership dues, however, there is no formula in the OAU refugee convention indicating how this burden should be shared. Potentially burden-sharing could take many forms, including both tangible resources such as financial resources and in-kind contributions, as well as non-quantifiable assets like leadership, good offices, and political support that institutions and leaders lend to humanitarian action.

Two agendas appear to be competing in discussions regarding burden-sharing. On the one hand, burden-sharing seeks a new division of labor for humanitarian action based on the principles of cooperation and complementarity. Burden-shifting, on the other hand, has the opposite intent. It seeks to transfer the primary responsibility for responding to humanitarian emergencies to countries or regions that are affected by crises without due concern for whether the organizational capacity exists to respond effectively. Transferring the burden of action to countries or regions affected by humanitarian emergencies is appealing to Western governments that are increasingly reluctant to commit military or civilian personnel to politically volatile and physically dangerous situations 8. On its own, however, this transfer will not result in effective humanitarian action.

To improve humanitarian action, burden-sharing must be founded on the principles of complementarity and cooperation, and it must be nurtured and sustained over time. This requires a commitment to humanitarian values and intergovernmental cooperation as a means to prevent and respond to emergencies9. In addition, governments and intergovernmental organizations in the affected regions must have a capacity for humanitarian action. If absent or underdeveloped a domestic response will be inadequate and international assistance will not have a framework in which to complement domestic efforts. These capacities can be developed or strengthened through regional and international cooperation 10. Improving the international humanitarian response system will require the consideration of new and innovative institutional reforms, capacity-building projects, and resource mobilization mechanisms.

This report highlights the capacities of African intergovernmental organizations to respond to humanitarian needs and examines the possibility of greater financial contributions for humanitarian assistance from governments and intergovernmental organizations in the regions in which crises occur. The report describes the existing and evolving institutional mechanisms for humanitarian action as a basis for understanding what needs to be done to strengthen the humanitarian capacities within regional and sub-regional organizations.

The first section examines the weaknesses of the international humanitarian system. The second evaluates the organizational structure, technical capacity and financial resources of Africa’s principal regional organizations, including partnership arrangements that seek to fortify regional organizations’ capacities. In the final section, regional organizations’ current financing arrangements for humanitarian action are discussed, followed by some quantitative projections to suggest how additional resources could be raised.

Section 1: Factors Undermining Humanitarian Action

Three weaknesses of the international humanitarian system are particularly troubling. First, the decline of resources for humanitarian action in recent years has raised serious concerns about the international community’s readiness and ability to respond to humanitarian emergencies. Second, there is an uneven distribution of resources across crises; some appeals receive adequate attention while others are neglected. Third, humanitarian action is predominately financed and designed by the OECD countries.

There is insufficient financial commitment to meet current and projected humanitarian needs. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), global needs decreased gradually from their peak in 1994 to 1997 but rebounded sharply in 1998 (see Chart 1). Meanwhile, funding has declined continually. As a result, resources for humanitarian action are increasingly insufficient to meet overall needs. According to the United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) data, a primary source for monitoring resource trends for humanitarian action, appeals fell consistently short of their targets11. In this regard, 1998 was the worst year to date. The percentage of global needs met through the CAP has declined steadily, from 75.8% in 1994, to 64% in 1997, and to just 32.9% mid way in 1998.12

The coverage of Africa’s humanitarian needs follow the global pattern of a growing resource gap. Chart 1 demonstrates graphically the resource chasm between the requirements and the funds committed through the Coordinated Appeals Process (CAP) for Africa (s ) and globally (l ). The solid lines represent estimated needs and the dotted lines represent the amount of needs actually met.

Source: The Financial Tracking Database for Complex Emergencies at http://www.reliefweb.int/fts/index.html.
* Mid-year estimate

2. Uneven coverage across crises
Funding shortfalls are particularly acute in cases of so-called ‘forgotten emergencies’. Sudan, a country that has continually been the subject of appeals, receives the African average, with 32% of CAP projected needs covered mid-way through 1998. Countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia fall below this 32% average with 28.9% and 27.5% of needs covered, respectively. The 1997 appeal for the Republic of Congo and the recent appeal for Guinea-Bissau received, respectively, only 7.9% and 9.9% of estimated requirements, whereas the Great Lakes appeal was 84.4% fulfilled.13

Related to this is the uneven funding for certain types of assistance. For example, food aid is usually forthcoming but there maybe little support for agricultural rehabilitation efforts. The impact of the unevenness of funding across sectors was underlined by Kofi Annan, who wrote:

In 1995-1996, ten donors accounted for 92% of total funds committed to the CAP funding mechanism;15 the top twenty (all OECD countries, plus the European Commission) contributed 99%. Within the regions in which crises occur, on the other hand, only a few governments have responded to CAP appeals. In Africa, only Libya, South Africa, Tunisia, and Mauritius reported making financial contributions to the CAP in 1995 and 1996; their contributions totaled 0.02% of aggregate funding for humanitarian assistance in those years (see Annex 2). Similarly the WFP reports that among the 69 governments contributing to its programs in 1997, eight were from Africa but their contributions accounted for less than 0.03% of the total (Annex 1). Meanwhile, emergencies in Africa consumed almost 50% of donor assistance during those years.

The narrow multilateral source of aid raises questions about the importance that governments accord to supporting multilateral humanitarian assistance. The level of disinterest is difficult to ascertain but when an emergency overwhelms national capacities, affected governments do call on the UN system for assistance, irrespective of their previous financial and political support. When this occurs, the UN agencies and the affected governments are ultimately reliant on a few countries for assistance. In 1993, the Executive Secretary for the UN Economic Commission for Africa went so far as to exclaim that the people of Africa have become chronically vulnerable and dependent on international charity for survival.16 Aid dependence can erode the legitimacy of elected governments and it also undermines real participation. As a result partnership arrangements between the international community and affected governments or involved regional organizations become difficult to nurture.

A burden-sharing approach that is firmly based in a sense of partnership could improve these conditions in the following ways. First, a more widely shared burden might increase the aggregate level of financial resources available for humanitarian action. Second, burden-sharing could improve cooperation and coordination, thereby heightening attention to unmet needs and sectoral imbalances. Finally, if countries within the region share the costs for relief aid, burden-sharing can have a positive influence on stimulating preventive action and developing a more coherent approach for humanitarian action.

The burden-sharing debate, if it is to be moved forward constructively, needs to be informed by an understanding of the capacities and potential for humanitarian action within Africa’s regional and sub-regional organizations. This section profiles the continent’s principal organizations and includes information on their mandates, selected economic and demographic indicators of their member states, and their institutional mechanisms for peace and security, and relief operations.

Africa’s intergovernmental institutions have grown in number in the wake of the de-colonization process. Yet, very few intergovernmental organizations have mandates covering humanitarian affairs, and even fewer still have the means or mechanisms to finance humanitarian action. When intergovernmental cooperation for these purposes has occurred, it has been generally on an ad hoc basis and reliant on extra-regional resources. In recent years, however, African states are pursuing efforts to develop and strengthen regional and sub-regional systems for humanitarian action.

In addition to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the principal continental organization, each of Africa's geographic regions currently hosts a sub-regional organization: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in the North; the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central Africa; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the West; Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the East; and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the South. Combined, the members of these sub-regional organizations constitute the membership of the OAU.17

In contrast to the OAU’s broad mandate, these sub-regional organizations are devoted primarily to economic development. Belatedly, and sometimes reluctantly, they have assumed a mandate to deal with humanitarian issues. The ability and capacity of these organizations to undertake peace and security operations and relief operations varies markedly. This section investigates these variations by highlighting basic economic and demographic data and then by exploring regional arrangements for humanitarian action.

Table 1 lists selected economic and demographic indicators of OAU member states grouped by their respective sub-regional organizational affiliation 18. The general indicators recognize the economic size and population distribution. The fiscal data suggests whether or not member states are likely to have resources to finance regional initiatives and whether their ability to do so is improving. External debt figures gauge whether past expenditure has been financed by government revenues, while debt service ratios indicate the current drain borrowing has had on the economy. Finally high aid levels highlight regional dependence on external sources to meet development objectives and food requirements.

Table 1: OAU Member State Profile, Organized by Membership in Sub-Regional Organizations

In terms of the regional variations, Central Africa (ECCAS) and the Horn (IGAD) are the poorest regions in terms of GNP per capita. Their member states have the highest frequency of fiscal deficits; only four of the seventeen countries in these two regions have improved their fiscal balances. In the area of aid dependence, IGAD countries are the most heavily reliant on food aid, while foreign aid represents one third of ECCAS’ combined GNP. ECOWAS and SADC are important organizations simply because of the numbers of peoples they represent and combined size of their economies. However, Western and Southern Africa are heavily indebted regions and have high debt servicing ratios (measured as a percent of exports of goods and services). By contrast, AMU member states are not heavily reliant on aid, have the highest average GNP per capita but relatively high debt service payments. These variations illustrate salient regional differences and influence, but in no way determines, the ability of the organization to contribute towards humanitarian assistance in light of apparent needs.

The OAU was founded in 1963 to promote African unity and solidarity. It is foremost a political forum, a ‘coalition intermediary’ for African states. Its continent-wide scope makes it the principal political forum in Africa. The continent’s gradual but uneven transition to democratic leadership has helped to restore the legitimacy of OAU member states and consequently the OAU’s authority. According to Salim Salim, the 1997 Harare Sessions of Council and Summit demonstrated "great momentum to … efforts aimed at promoting its peace and development agenda. ... The Summit also portrayed the image of an Organization which is ready to assume its share of responsibilities in fulfilling the aspirations of its continent and peoples."19 Its ability to realize its responsibilities is though somewhat constrained by the fact that arrears in OAU membership dues, although decreasing, represent slightly more than half of the organization’s $60 million 1996 – 1998 budget.

The OAU Charter strongly upholds state sovereignty and respect for non-interference in member state domestic affairs. Consequently, the OAU has undertaken peace-making and peace-building initiatives on an ad hoc basis. Only recently and in exceptional circumstances has the OAU undertaken peacekeeping operations and condoned peace-enforcement interventions.

Among the OAU’s peace-making activities are its fact-finding and mediation missions. The OAU Secretary General, as a matter of course, offers his good offices for conflict mediation. The OAU has attempted to mediate conflicts with mixed results in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Zaire, Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The International Panel of Eminent Personalities investigating the causes and atrocities committed in the Rwandan genocide is an important example of the OAU’s widening range of post-conflict peace-building activities. The increasing use of OAU election monitors is another, and suggests that states are loosening the strict application of non-invention in domestic affairs.

Only very recently has the OAU become involved in peace-enforcement and peacekeeping. The first OAU military response to a domestic conflict was the 1981 Inter-African Force to Chad. The financial, legal and political problems resulting from this mission led some within the OAU to doubt the organization’s capacity for such action. However, insufficient international response to subsequent African crises has forced the OAU’s hand to act. Recent examples include OAU peacekeeping missions to Rwanda following the Arusha Agreement, which was subsequently taken over by the UN in October 1993. Five African countries shared the burden of this mission by fielding a battalion (800 soldiers). Shortly thereafter, the OAU organized and deployed the OAU Military Observer Mission to Burundi (OMIB), maintaining relative order until the 1996 Buyoya coup d’etat enveloped the country in chaos. Although OMIB has been cited as an OAU success story, the fact that it was largely funded by non-OAU countries, has "both set an important precedent for future OAU conflict management activities, and created a dilemma for the OAU as external funding necessarily diminished its control over missions."20 The OAU’s inability to assume and sustain the entire financial burden of its initiatives has been one factor that has undermined its effectiveness.

Seeking to improve upon its ad hoc and crisis-driven reaction to regional crises, the OAU in 1993 established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Mechanism provides for a new organizational structure with a mandate to prevent and resolve conflicts. According to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, it was created "because Africans have come to realise that peace and stability are the sine qua non of the socio-economic development programmes of their continent."21

The Mechanism is under the political direction of the Central Organ, a committee of member states that meets at the level of Heads of State, Ministers and Ambassadors, annually, twice yearly and monthly, respectively. These are the Mechanism’s deliberative and policy making bodies. The operational arms of the Mechanism are the good offices of the OAU Secretary General and the Conflict Management Division of the OAU Department of Political Affairs.

The Conflict Management Division has three sections, (i) the Conflict Prevention and Research Section, (ii) the Conflict Resolution, Defense and Security Section and the (iii) Military Section. To augment the Division’s work, the Conflict Management Center is currently being developed to monitor conflict situations in Africa. The Center will also provide the Secretariat and policy-making bodies with information on potential Special Envoys, Special Representatives of the Secretary General, and election observers; monitor the impact of conflicts in Africa (refugee flows, internal human displacement, environmental degradation, etc.); and generally act as the OAU’s institutional memory on conflict issues.

Strengthening the capacities of these specialized organs could greatly enhance the OAU’s ability to prevent and mediate African conflicts. The OAU has also discussed the feasibility of developing a standing peacekeeping force but it is unlikely to take concrete steps in this direction in the near term. At the present moment, the OAU Secretariat is not pushing for a continental stand-by force but is encouraging sub-regional organizations to develop their own peacekeeping capacities.

The majority of the OAU’s relief work is undertaken by its refugee bodies: (i) the Commission on Refugees, (ii) the Coordinating Committee on Assistance to Refugees, and (iii) the Division for Refugees, Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Affairs.

The Commission on Refugees was established in 1964 to examine Africa’s refugee problem and make recommendations to the OAU’s policymaking body, the Council of Ministers. This Commission has a mandate to provide assistance to refugees, to conduct fact-finding missions, and to coordinate member state relief assistance and humanitarian appeals. It has authorized numerous missions that include Algeria, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Liberia, Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone. Since its inception the membership of the Commission has expanded from the original ten countries to all OAU member states.

The Coordinating Committee on Assistance to Refugees is under the political direction of the Commission on Refugees. The Coordinating Committee is comprised of OAU representatives, UN agencies (UNHCR, WHO, UNDP, UNECA, UNESCO, and WHO) and NGOs. It coordinates action among these organizations and mobilizes support for capacity building projects. The implementation body is the Division for Refugee, Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Affairs, which receives its political directives from the Coordinating Committee. Its duties include upholding the OAU refugee convention, undertaking education and training activities, and keeping the international community informed on the refugee situation in Africa.

Attempts to establish a North African sub-regional organization date back to the 1960s but the Treaty establishing the AMU was ratified only in 1989. The main purpose of the AMU is economic integration and joint planning in the areas of agriculture, industry, food security, and trade. The Secretariat has a small annual budget of $1.7 million.

Table 2: AMU General Indicators

The AMU has the smallest population base and the highest average per capita GNP of the five sub-regional groupings. Member state fiscal balances are favorable, and the region is not heavily reliant on aid or food aid. These favorable conditions aside, the AMU has not been an effective organization in promoting its principal objective of economic integration. Tunisia, historically the political force for regional integration, has been less inclined recently to champion the AMU cause.22 The deep political and security crisis in Algeria and the international isolation of Libya have also reduced regional cooperation.

As with other regional organizations, non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states is a pillar of the AMU Treaty. Whereas the OAU and some sub-regional organizations have begun to view domestic conflicts as a threat to regional security, and been willing in some instances to give precedence to human security over national sovereignty, the AMU has not altered its original position. Given the prolonged dispute over the Western Sahara, border tension between Morocco and Algeria, and Tunisia’s distrust of Libyan policy towards it,23 AMU member states are unlikely to develop a collective action mechanism, let alone a specialized agencies to coordinate humanitarian interventions.

The AMU Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers has four specialized Ministerial Commissions. The work of one of these commissions, the Ministerial Commission on Food Security is relevant to reducing vulnerability to natural disasters. However, the AMU Secretariat cannot act on the Commission’s recommendations because the latter does not have the technical competency or resources to implement projects. Once the AMU establishes, as envisioned, a regional development bank to finance projects, the Commission’s work may evolve into AMU sponsored projects.

Established in 1981, ECCAS aims to promote cooperation and regional development. The objective of ECCAS is to improve the quality of life within the region, to foster economic cooperation, and to build peaceful and closer relations among member states. This will be a challenge since the sub-region has been afflicted by many international and civil wars in recent years. The organization employs 71 full-time staff. Its budgetary details were unavailable for this report.

Table 3: ECCAS General Indicators

The quantitative figures that stand out for ECCAS member states are their relatively high dependence on food aid, high external debt, and worsening fiscal balances. The region also has the second lowest GNP per capita. Combined, the ECCAS grouping is not in a favorable position to mobilize resources for the humanitarian assistance needs facing most of its members.

Despite the wave of crises in the region, ECCAS has not developed a specialized organ devoted to humanitarian issues. Its Section of General Affairs does have a security mandate but the secretariat does not have a reactive capacity. Similarly the Section on Agriculture and Industry investigates agricultural production and trade issues but there is no system in place for regional food distribution in times of food shortage or for emergency response.

The ECOWAS treaty was signed in Lagos in May 1975. The primary objective of the organization is to create an economic and monetary union although its activities extend to agriculture, industry, natural resource management, health, and social programs. West Africa has a relatively strong tradition of intergovernmental cooperation, reflected by the region’s numerous multilateral institutions. In a move to rationalize intergovernmental cooperation, state representatives agreed at the 1990 Banjul Summit to incorporate other West African sub-regional organizations under ECOWAS’ framework. This bolstered ECOWAS’ importance as the primary intergovernmental organization in the sub-region.

However, Lansana Kouyate, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS has criticized member state leaders for their partial support of the organization. Exact budgetary details are unknown but one recent account estimates that member states owe $30 million in arrears.24 Since the organization’s annual operating budget is approximately $10 million dollars, these arrears severely hamper its activities. ECOWAS employs approximately 200 people.

Table 4: ECOWAS General Indicators