

Peace Operations Literature Review
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The literature on peace operations grew significantly at the end of the Cold War, tapered off in the late 1990s, and has picked up again in the last several years. The most recent wave is attributable to three factors: the surge of new operations since 1999, the release of the UN's Brahimi Report in the year 2000, and the events of September 11, 2001. This survey takes 9/11 as its point of departure, not because the peacekeeping literature changed dramatically at that time, but because 9/11 was a defining moment in thinking about international security and the nature of the international system. It crystallized a trend, begun several years earlier, of situating analyses of peace operations in the broader context of international politics and international relations theory. Writing about peacekeeping was joined with related areas of research in a more systematic and explicitly theoretical way.

The writing on peace operations is extraordinarily diverse and hard to categorize. I have identified five broad areas, but the lines between the categories are blurred and many of the works belong in more than one:

- Peace operations in international relations theory
- Case studies, including empirical studies on the effectiveness of peacekeeping
- Peacekeeping and peace-building functions
- National and regional perspectives
- Peace operations capacity, doctrine and reform

N.B. This literature survey focuses on books, book chapters and scholarly articles published after September 2001, plus a number of earlier touchstone works that help put the current literature in context. Think-tank and NGO reports are not covered, with the exception of a few major collective studies and conference papers.

I. Peace operations in international relations theory

The effort to situate the study of peacekeeping in broader international relations theory has a short history (James 1990, Barnett 1995, Paris 1997, Debrix 1999), culminating in two recent appeals for a "broadening of the study of peace operations" (Paris 2000, Pugh 2003). These were followed by a special issue of *International Peacekeeping* (republished as Bellamy and Williams 2005), and a contemporaneous volume by some of the same authors (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004). The case for more theorizing is made by Paris (2000), who argues that the study of peace operations must move

beyond practical operational issues and instead use “these missions as windows into larger phenomena of international politics”, such as the role of norms, the prospects of revolutionary change in the world order and the nature of global governance.

According to Bellamy (2004), a great deal has been written on the strengths, weaknesses and experiences of peacekeeping, but little reflection on what this tells us about global politics or the role of peace operations within it. He and his co-editors seek to redress that imbalance by dividing opinions on the role of peacekeeping into Westphalian and post-Westphalian perspectives. In the former, stable peace is achieved by creating spaces and institutions for states to resolve their differences on the basis of consent; what goes on within states is not a concern of peacekeepers unless their hosts invite them. In the latter conception, the Westphalian order is collapsing and as a result, peacekeepers are and should be in the business of re-building war-torn societies, if necessary without the consent of the government concerned. Building on the democratic peace thesis (that democratic institutions and processes are conducive to peace between and within states), this post-Westphalian conception sees the theory and practice of peacekeeping as driven by an effort to re-build states along liberal-democratic lines.

Another strategy for thinking anew about peacekeeping is to divide the field into ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ approaches (Pugh 2004, Bellamy 2004). Problem-solving theory accepts the parameters of the present world order and simply tries to resolve problems that arise within it. Critical theory, on the other hand, attempts to challenge the prevailing order by reflecting on the interests it serves and, ultimately, to transform it in a manner that better serves those who are disadvantaged (Cox 1981). Applied to the study of peacekeeping, Pugh argues that most of the literature is of the former ‘problem-solving’ variety and imposes severe limits on our ability to think imaginatively about the functions peace operations serve. He advocates an alternative approach, which questions the received wisdom of peacekeeping – and the global order it serves. This more critical approach will not only deepen our understanding of peace operations, it will improve the operations by releasing them from the state-centric control system, and make them answerable to more transparent, more democratic and accountable multinational institutions.

In a less overtly critical strategy, Roland Paris (2003) draws on world polity theory to explain peacekeeping practices. World polity theory sees the world as possessing a “distinct global culture that comprises the formal and informal rules of international social life”. His argument is that peacekeeping mandates and practices emerge not only from prudential calculations about what works, but also from prevailing global norms that legitimize certain kinds of policies and de-legitimize others. He points to the practices of international organizations to substantiate his claim that peace operations tend to conform to the ideological reorientation of the organizations involved, and he argues that peacekeeping is deeply shaped by a global culture that sees “hasty democratization” and “rapid liberalization” as the route to peace. He argues that other strategies, such as long-term trusteeship, may in fact be more effective but are ruled out because they are “normatively unacceptable”.

Johnstone (2004) employs a similar line of argument in claiming that the UN's peace-building strategies have shaped and been shaped by the existing normative order. On its face, the US-led intervention in Iraq looked like it may have done serious damage to that order and, in the process, made it more difficult for the UN and other multilateral institutions to engage in "state-building" because it would be viewed with suspicion in the developing world. But it turns out that these institutions and their practices are more resilient than meets the eye precisely because they are embedded in a normative order that is not easily cast aside.

Other recent works that adopt a normative starting point include Aksu (2003), Richmond (2004a and 2004b), Varynen (2004) and Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (2005). What these studies share is a commitment either to outline and defend the normative ends that peace operations serve, or to expose and tear down the hidden normative assumptions that guide peace operations. They do not seek to explain the causes, successes, failures and implications of peace operations in purely instrumental terms, but rather how they contribute to some vision of global order. Feminist or gender analysis is also starting to find its way into the literature, spurred in part by revelations of sexual abuse by the peacekeepers themselves. Three noteworthy book-length studies are by Mazurana, Raven-Roberts and Parpart (2005), Mendelson (2005) and Whitworth (2004).

Meanwhile, some prominent international relations theorists have begun to turn their attention to peacekeeping and peace-building. Robert Keohane (2003) and Stephen Krasner (2004) look at the peace operations (broadly defined) from the perspective of an "unbundled" concept of sovereignty. In separate pieces, they argue that the classical, unitary conception of sovereignty as the exclusive right to determine policy within a defined territory is an obstacle to effective post-conflict reconstruction. They both draw on Krasner's four meanings of sovereignty to offer a more nuanced account: *domestic sovereignty*: the effective organization of authority within the territory of a given state; *interdependence sovereignty*: the ability of a state to regulate movements across its own borders; *international legal sovereignty*: the fact of recognition of an entity as a state, established by states; *Westphalian sovereignty*: the exclusion of external authority structures from the decision-making processes of a state.

Keohane argues that societies coming out of conflict should not aspire to all four types of sovereignty in an absolute sense; rather policies should be designed on the understanding that there are "gradations of sovereignty". Ultimately, it may be necessary to by-pass Westphalian sovereignty altogether, sending so-called 'troubled societies' straight from limited sovereignty to integration in broader multilateral institutions with supranational powers, like the European Union.

Similarly, Krasner argues that existing policy tools for fixing 'badly governed' or collapsed states are inadequate because policy-makers in both powerful and weak states are reluctant to challenge conventional norms of sovereignty. His thesis is that new institutional forms that compromise Westphalian sovereignty must be devised in order to secure "decent domestic governance in failed, failing and occupied states". To that end, Krasner introduces the notions of a) 'shared sovereignty', an arrangement under which

foreigners share authority with nationals over some aspects of domestic governance (see also Krasner 2005), and b) de facto trusteeship, in which external actors control aspects of domestic sovereignty for an indefinite period, with no commitment to restore local authority quickly.

James Fearon and David Laitin (2004) observe that both the UN and Bush Administration are increasingly drawn into a form of international governance they describe as ‘neo-trusteeship’. Neo-trusteeship has elements in common with old-fashioned imperialism, but is different in two respects: today’s rule by foreigners is largely multilateral, involving a wide variety of states, international and non-governmental organizations, and corporations; and the goal is to build self-supporting state structures and then leave as quickly as feasible. From that perspective, they ask and tentatively answer four fundamental questions about the current peace operations system: who should lead the operations and who should pay? how can the efforts of the multiplicity of actors engaged in these interventions be coordinated? if missions are led by interested states or regional actors, who will oversee their actions and hold them accountable for abuses? how quickly should the neo-trustees leave and transfer authority to local actors? On the last, they argue that the search for an exit strategy is ‘delusional’ if this means handing full control of domestic security back to local authorities by a certain date in the near future. Long-term involvement is often necessary. Here, their solution is like that of Keohane: integration of the neotrust territory into a plethora of international organizations that provide continuous and unobtrusive monitoring of the peace and, in the longer run, make the national level of government irrelevant for people in comparison to the local and supranational levels.

II. Case and empirical studies

The literature on peace operations is still dominated by case studies. This should not be surprising, given the ad hoc and historically improvised nature of the enterprise. The study of peace operations typically takes an inductive approach; principles and lessons are derived from practice rather than the other way around.

Most individual case studies are of recent missions that pose special challenges or introduce new elements into the toolbox of peace operations. An incomplete list includes studies of East Timor (Surkhe 2001, Ryan 2001, Wheeler and Dunne 2001, Chesterman 2002, Chopra 2002, Smith 2003, Naarden and Locke 2004, Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005), Kosovo (O’Neil 2002, Yannis 2004, Simonsen 2004), Sierra Leone (Hirsch 2001, Adebayo 2002, Samuels 2003), Afghanistan (Surkhe, Harpviken and Strand 2002, Chesterman 2002, Martin 2003, Monshipouri 2003, Donini et al 2004), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Ginnifer 2002), Sri Lanka (Misra 2004), and Solomon Islands (Ponzio 2005). These articles tend to be of the “lessons learned” variety, either offering suggestions for mid-course correction of on-going missions or lessons for future missions elsewhere. There has also been a spate of case studies of older missions, designed to draw lessons with the benefit of some historical perspective (Jones 2001 and Dallaire 2004 on Rwanda, Howard 2002 on Namibia, Mays 2002 on the OAU in Chad, Murphy 2003 on

Lebanon and Somalia, Dzinesa 2004 on Angola and Namibia, Razack 2004 on Somalia, Peou 2005 on Cambodia, and Mersiades 2005 on Cambodia and Somalia).

Edited volumes composed of case studies either in whole or part include Cousens and Kumar (2001), Adebajo, Sriram and Cousens (2001), Thakur and Schnabel (2001), Boulden (2001), Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens (2002), Boulden (2003), Malone (2004), Dobbins (2005a) and Dobbins (2005b). Some of these provide comparative analyses of the relative effectiveness and success of the operations studied. Thus Stedman et al (2002) evaluate nine cases of peace implementation between 1980 and 1997. They apply an analytical framework suggested by their review of peace implementation strategies and tasks. The project found that cases of peace implementation differ dramatically in terms of the difficulty of the implementation environment (measured in terms of eight variables such as the number of warring parties, whether or not a peace agreement has been signed and the likelihood of spoilers) and in the willingness of international actors to provide resources and risk troops. A number of policy recommendations follow, the most notable of which is that peace implementation is most successful when a major or regional power sees success as vital to its national security interests. They also argue for setting priorities among peacebuilding sub-goals, with demobilization of soldiers and demilitarization of politics topping the list.

Dobbins and his collaborators (2005a and 2005b) assess eight instances of nation-building when the US took the lead and eight when the UN took the lead. They include in their studies the US occupations of Germany and Japan and UN intervention in the Congo, but most are of post-Cold War cases. Applying various criteria, they determined five UN-led cases to have been successful or mostly successful (Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia and East Timor), whereas three US-led cases fit that description (Germany, Japan, and Kosovo). Of the eight UN-led cases, seven were at peace in 2004 and six were democratic; of the eight US-led cases, four were at peace and four were democratic. The authors observe that, either by design or necessity, UN-led operations tend to be smaller with more limited objectives than US-led ones, a strategy that tends to work well in the less demanding circumstances in which they are typically deployed. The UN is able to compensate, to some degree at least, for its “hard power” deficit with soft power attributes of international legitimacy and local impartiality. Dobbins concludes that “assuming adequate consensus among SC members on the purpose for any intervention, the UN provides the most suitable institutional framework for most nation-building missions, one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degrees of international legitimacy”. The US, on the other hand, brings greater coercive force to any operation, which is almost always a useful complement to a UN operation.

A new feature of the peacekeeping literature is more rigorous empirical analysis of the cases, both quantitative and qualitative. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) undertook a widely-cited quantitative study to test ten hypotheses about the probability of success of peace operations, creating a data set of 124 post-WWII civil wars. They found that UN peacekeeping is positively correlated with democratization processes after civil war, and multilateral enforcement operations are usually successful in ending violence. Other, less

extensive empirical studies include Wall and Druckman (2003) on factors that impact the mediation techniques peacekeepers use, Lebovic (2004) on whether democracies are more likely to participate in peace operations, and Shimuzu and Sandler (2002) on whether peacekeeping burdens are being shouldered mainly by large countries

Gilligan and Stedman (2001) use empirical techniques to answer a simple but normatively important question: what determines where and when the UN sends peacekeepers. They look at all civil wars after 1988 (60 in total), the number to which UN peacekeepers were sent (19 in total), and how much time passed after the start of each war before a mission was deployed. The most significant of their ten findings is that the more severe a civil conflict, measured by the death toll, the more likely the UN is to intervene. They also find that the UN is significantly less likely to intervene in civil wars in militarily strong states, measured by the size of the government army. And they identify a regional bias in favor of Europe over Africa and, surprisingly, Africa over Asia (in the sense that the UN tends to react more swiftly to crises in the former). Taken as whole, their results “suggest an image of the UN that attempts to balance between the dictates of power and concerns of principle”; it seems to respond to civil wars that involve the greatest humanitarian catastrophes, but is also guided by considerations of power, cost and risk.

Fortna (2003a, 2003b, 2004a and 2004b) employs similar techniques to measure the effectiveness of peacekeeping, as well as other mechanisms that may have an impact on the durability of peace. She finds that peacekeeping works, both in inter-state and intrastate conflicts. Her work on inter-state conflicts draws on cooperation theory to make the case that ceasefire agreements are not just “scraps of paper”. Contrary to what scholars from a realist tradition may think, states and international organizations can institute measures to overcome the obstacles to peace. Based on her examination of 48 ceasefires in international wars ending between 1946 and 1997, she finds that peacekeepers, demilitarized zones, third party guarantees, joint commissions for dispute resolution, and specificity in the peace agreements are all effective tools. Confidence-building measures (like hot-lines), formalizing an agreement, and withdrawal of forces may help, but the evidence is uncertain. Of particular interest to the UN is her finding of “a large and statistically significant difference between cease-fires overseen by a fresh set of international peacekeepers and those without the benefit of peacekeeping”.

A similar empirical analysis of the impact of peacekeeping on intrastate conflicts is more difficult because of the need to control for more factors. Fortna, like Gilligan and Stedman, takes on this challenge by considering many factors that *might* affect the durability of peace: the military outcome of the war (ie whether there was a decisive victory by one side); whether a treaty was signed; whether it is an ethnic conflict; the death toll; the number of parties to the conflict; the duration of the war; the level of economic development; the availability of ‘lootable’ resources; the level of democracy; and the size of the government’s army. Examining 115 ‘spells of peace’ between 1944 and 1999, she finds that consent-based peacekeepers tend to be sent to the hard cases rather than the easy ones. This is significant because it means peacekeeping is probably more effective than meets the eye; it can not be judged solely in terms of whether war

resumes, without regard to the baseline prospects for peace. “Just as sicker patients are more likely to receive medical care, places in which the danger of another war is more likely are likely to receive peacekeeping”. Applying a duration model, she concludes that unarmed observer and traditional peacekeeping missions have been highly successful, reducing the risk of renewed war by 81% and 86% respectively. Multidimensional missions reduce the risk of war by 53%, peace enforcement by 43%. Thus the empirical evidence is clear: as a conflict management tool, peacekeeping is not a silver bullet, but is well worth the effort.

III. Peacekeeping and peace-building functions

Taxonomies of peacekeeping still permeate the literature, and they are becoming increasingly specific. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004) list five types of operation: traditional, managing transition, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace support operations. Thakur and Schnabel (2001) identify six “cascading generations” of peace operations: traditional, non-UN, expanded, peace enforcement, peace restoration by partnership and multinational peace restoration/UN state-creation. Diehl (2001) tops them all, with twelve types of mission, ranging from traditional peacekeeping and observer missions to intervention in support of democracy and sanctions enforcement. While these taxonomies give a sense of the broad range of operations that are not always well-described as peacekeeping, the more numerous the categories and the more subtle the distinctions between them, the less useful they are as analytical tools. Wilde (2001) finds the ‘generations’ terminology both unhelpful and normatively problematic. It implies mistakenly that there has been a progressive evolution through successive generations of ever-increasing complexity, and it misleadingly connotes improvement – the notion that later generations are somehow better than earlier types of missions.

Recent literature on the functions of peace operations is less focused on the construction of taxonomies and more on the nature of the many tasks being performed. Some of the edited volumes listed above include chapters on functions as well as cases. Thus Stedman et al (2002) includes individual chapters on disarmament and demobilization, economic reconstruction, elections, human rights, policing and local capacity-building. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2001), a comprehensive compilation that goes beyond peace operations, includes contributions on military and non-military forms of intervention, institutions involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and particular functions like humanitarian relief, democratization, the rule of law and the role of civil society.

Recent years have seen a number of single-author books on the phenomenon of peace-building generally. Paris (2004) examines the nature and evolution of peace-building from the perspective of the “liberal peace”, arguing that most of the 14 operations deployed between 1989 and 1999 were guided by a generally unstated but widely accepted theory of conflict management: promoting political and economic liberalization post-civil war would help to create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace. Although the missions varied in many respects, they all sought to transform war-shattered states into ‘liberal market democracies’ as quickly as possible. Paris does not reject the

broad goals of this strategy, but questions its efficacy when pursued too quickly and aggressively. He proposes “institutionalization before liberalization” as an alternative approach, which would minimize the destabilizing effects of liberalization by managing the process in more gradual, incremental steps, and by ensuring that self-sustaining governmental institutions are in place before rushing to introduce democratic and market-oriented reforms.

Caplan (2005), Fukuyama (2004) and Chesterman (2004) have written books on state-building, and Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur (2005) recently published a multi-author volume on the theme. The books differ in their particular focus and conclusions but share a concern with building or rebuilding institutions of governance in the aftermath of war. Moreover, they were all animated either directly or indirectly by the changed context caused by 9/11, which prompted a reversal in the US administrations antipathy towards ‘nation-building’ (Chesterman 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2004).

International transitional administration – when external actors themselves assume governing powers for a transitional period as in Kosovo and East Timor – is the most intrusive form of state-building. But the concept also encompasses missions like Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia and Afghanistan, where external actors either assumed some governing functions, or worked so closely with local authorities that they in effect became partners in governance.

Chesterman et al (2005) and Caplan (2005) address the “patron v. partner” issue directly, i.e. to what extent should external actors take on the burden of state-building themselves. The central assumption of Chesterman et al is that the collapse of state structures does not lead to a vacuum of political power. Less formal mechanisms remain in place and local political leaders retain a degree of control over local populations; the challenge for outsiders is to engage effectively in such an environment. “Local ownership” is important, but means different things in different places. In some cases, strong leadership by local elites may be required; in others, broader participation is a more effective strategy. And if local actors are unable to work peacefully together or institutions simply do not exist, it is better to acknowledge that local ownership is “an end rather than the means”. Ultimately, however, states cannot be made to work from the outside. International action should be seen as first and foremost facilitating local processes and breathing life into responsive, robust and resilient institutions.

Based on a review of four cases where varying degrees of international administration were exercised - Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor and Kosovo - Caplan (2005) identifies a number of factors that enhance the likelihood of success of a mission: favourable objective conditions (eg. a decisive military victory); clarity and appeal of operational aims (i.e. the extent to which the local population supports the aims); the type of operation (i.e. whether it has full executive authority); and the structure of the operation (eg how much authority the head of mission has over its component parts). Of particular interest, Caplan carefully studies the balance between external civil administration and local capacity-building. In principle, he favors local ownership, noting that pressure to achieve demonstrable results quickly has created a tendency among

external actors to take too much of the administrative burden on themselves, resulting in a legacy of weak states. But he acknowledges that less interventionist measures can sometimes be worse alternatives.

Similar issues are addressed by Chopra and Hohe (2004) and a special issue of *Global Governance* journal on the politics of international administration, edited by Mats Berdal and Richard Caplan (2004), which includes essays by two senior UN officials (Edward Mortimer and David Harland), and case studies on Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor. Dwan and Wiharta (2005) trace the evolution of peace-building in the 1990s and examine four specific dimensions of the current agenda: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) rule of law, economic reconstruction and elections. They conclude with a survey of possible responses to the challenges this agenda poses, ranging from the minimalist approach captured by the notion of “local ownership” to a maximal response of “benevolent autocracy”. Morphet (2002) offers a variation on the ‘patron v. partner’ theme, arguing that transitional administrations are more likely to achieve national and international legitimacy if the peacebuilding work is based on international legal standards and norms.

In addition to these works on the broad phenomenon of peace-building, there are a good number of books and articles on particular peacekeeping/peacebuilding tasks. Renata Dwan’s (2002) edited volume on ‘executive policing’ deals with a relatively new phenomenon in peace operations. She defines executive policing as “the power and practice of law enforcement by international police within a particular territory”. It is closely related to the phenomenon of transitional administrations, where the external actor’s governing powers over a territory necessarily includes law enforcement responsibilities. While there have been only two cases of international transitional administration (East Timor and Kosovo), the functions of and conditions for effective policing are central to many current peace operations and likely future ones. These functions range from monitoring, training and vetting local police, to rebuilding police forces and teaching them civilian policing principles, all the way to engaging in law enforcement, criminal-intelligence gathering and riot control. Thus relations with the military, human rights and rule of law components of a peace operation become critically important. Graham Day, Deputy High Representative in Bosnia, and Christopher Freeman write about “police-keeping” (2005) and propose the creation of a UN ‘blue force of gendarmes’, integrating the civilian and police dimensions of peace operations. More broadly, they call for the establishment of an international policekeeping center, devoted to training and the development of standard operating procedures, and more centralized civilian capacity rosters. Other work on policing includes Hills (2001), Freeman and Pavilionis (2003) and Collantes Celador (2005).

Several books have been written on justice and the rule of law in the last few years, including Mani (2002) and Sriram (2004). In an interesting article, Pouligny (2002) makes a number of methodological proposals regarding the study of the impact mass crimes have on rebuilding social and political relations in war-torn societies. Her main proposal for helping to overcome a history of mass crimes is to draw on local methods that have been constructed over time, while also borrowing in various ways from the

outside. Gaer (2003) focuses on the role of human rights NGOs in UN peace operations, as advocates, monitors and implementing partners. Chandler (2004), drawing on the lessons of Bosnia, challenges current conventional wisdom that 'rule of law' ought to be given priority over political processes and elections. The 'rule of law' approach, he argues, gives too much credit to legal and administrative solutions, while seeking to shortcut political problems.

Reilly (2002) looks at the pros and cons of elections as a peacebuilding device, and concludes that they are an important part of the broader process of democratization, but ill-timed, badly-designed or poorly-run elections can undermine peace and indeed the democratization process itself. Along those lines, Belloni (2004) argues that elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) had a problematic impact on peacebuilding. Timid 'integrative' devices (in the form of electoral rules) were adopted in a 'consociational' system that reinforced ethnic division and complicated compromise. *Global Governance* devoted an entire special issue to the connection between democratization and peacebuilding (Call and Cook 2003). The editors note that "the democratic reconstruction model" has been widely embraced in peacebuilding circles, but find that its implementation has been highly problematic (i.e. many countries that have experienced peacebuilding missions are far from democratic). This does not lead them to reject the approach, but rather to appeal for greater integration of external governance models with local, legitimate practices in war-torn societies: "national modes of governance must cohere with and selectively build on local institutions". The special issue identifies points of convergence and divergence in the democratization and peacebuilding literatures, noting for example that the former tends to be more skeptical about the role external actors can play. Their research leads to a number of recommendations on how to improve post-conflict governance: more conceptual precision and better comparative empirical work on peacebuilding; take better advantage of the multiplicity of models of governance and democracy; exercise patience in building liberal, representative institutions; and seek to identify and integrate local voices in decision-making. The last may require drawing on traditional channels for participation, and compromising liberal values (including some individual rights).

DDR has been the subject of a good deal of research. Knight and Ozerdem (2004) assess a number of programs over the last two decades to substantiate their claim that the success or failure of DDR directly affects the long-term peacebuilding prospects for any post-conflict society. The majority of these initiatives adopted an overly narrow 'guns-camps-cash' approach that fails to address the full range of issues related to DDR. They propose treating the process in social contractual terms, as opposed to the current more military-centered approach. Alden (2002) and McMullin (2004) offer contrasting assessments of the reintegration of ex-combatants in Mozambique. The former sees the process as largely successful, with possible lessons for elsewhere. The latter is less sanguine. Though conflict in Mozambique has not resumed, McMullin sees two remaining challenges to long-term security associated with ex-combatants: involvement of some of them in organized criminal activity; and instability caused by the continuing politicization of reintegration issues.

A growing awareness of the need for better coordination in peacekeeping and peacebuilding has spawned an impressive body of literature. Cousens and Kumar (2001) argue that the starting point for effective coordination is to understand peacebuilding as a political activity. "Peacebuilding as politics" (the title of their book) means that conflict resolution should have pride of place within a framework that includes a range of assistance activities. Sensible as that sounds, from an institutional point of view, it can be difficult. A peace operation tends to be of relatively short duration, while some of the institutions and other actors that are involved are typically there before the peacekeepers arrive and stay long after they leave. They all wish to preserve their institutional autonomy and, indeed, the parties to a conflict often benefit from poor coordination because they can play the external actors off against each other. This is all the more reason why an integrated strategy is necessary. Jones in Stedman et al (2002) writes about some of the UN coordinating mechanisms designed to facilitate that. "Institutional proliferation" has meant there are many more actors involved in the peace implementation business, and the UN's authority vis-à-vis these actors is diminishing. Moreover, coordination is not just a technical exercise. As Jones' points out in describing what went wrong in Rwanda and Burundi, an effective strategy is not just about getting external actors to divide up the labor, it is about figuring out how to create space for the supporters of a peace process, and how to constrain or obstruct "spoilers". And yet the more you need to rely on coercive strategies, the more likely it is that there will be controversies and conflicts among the external actors, making coordination all the more difficult.

IV. National and regional perspectives

The range of countries that participate in peacekeeping has fluctuated over the years. Some traditional contributors like Canada and the Nordics are participating less, while new countries like Brazil and China are entering the field. This has prompted research on the attitudes and policies of particular countries and regions. Book length studies include Fleitz (2002) on the US, Dobson (2003) on Japan, Kent and Malan (2003) on South Africa, MacKinlay and Cross (2003) on Russia, Briscoe (2004) on the UK from 1948-67, Jaffrey and Ishizuka (2004) on Ireland, and Sorenson and Woods (2004) in an edited volume on ten countries from the North and South. Regional perspectives are addressed in Boulden (2003) on Africa, Pugh and Sidhu (2003) on various regional organizations, Adebajo (2004) on West Africa, and Spillman and Wenger (2001) on European organizations. Articles offering either a regional or national perspective include Johansson and Larsson (2001) on Sweden, Bolton (2001) on the US, MacQueen (2003) on Portugal, Ishizuka (2005) on Japan, Smith (2002) on Europe, Berman (2003) on French, UK and US peacekeeping policies towards Africa, and Gigerich and Wallace (2004) on Europe.

Christine Gray (2004), in the latest edition of her book on international law and the use of force, devotes a chapter to the legal issues associated with regional peace operations (as well as a chapter on the UN). Wilson (2003) performs a useful service by assessing

the comparative advantages of regional organizations and coalitions of the willing. His main conclusion is that there is little difference between the two options as both can sometimes provide more military capacity than UN peacekeeping operations, and yet both may suffer from the perceived illegitimacy that comes with dominance by a single powerful state.

In a welcome development, the literature on perspectives from the developing world is growing. In autumn 2001, the Fund for Peace (2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003) launched a two-year program aimed at systematically probing global views on military intervention in humanitarian and other kinds of crises. Conferences were held on four regions - Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe – with twenty-five to thirty high-level opinion leaders from each region participating. In varying degrees, all the regional conferences recognized a growing “responsibility to protect” civilians. But they differed on when, who and how action should be taken to fulfill this responsibility. The African group (2001) was the most forward leaning, both in terms of the circumstances that would justify intervention and a willingness to act. Participants agreed that new challenges had prompted African states and institutions to move away from traditional non-interventionist approaches to conflict management. They expressed more confidence in the potential of sub-regional organizations to help resolve internal conflicts than either the UN or OAU. They agreed that military intervention is legitimate when mass killings, mass atrocities, ethnic cleansing or genocide is occurring or threatened. It is also legitimate when an internal war threatens the stability of the region or sub-region. Intervention *may* be considered when other means have failed to restore a democratic government overthrown by force.

In the Americas (2002b), a strong commitment to democracy and human rights did not translate into a clear endorsement of military intervention to uphold those principles. The conference began with a flat denial that the issue of humanitarian intervention applied to the region, but concluded with an understanding that problems associated with fragile political systems and economies could deteriorate into humanitarian emergencies requiring intervention. There was a call for strengthening regional mechanisms to address internal strife, and a set of guidelines for intervention in “rare and exceptional” cases was adopted.

The Asian conference (2002a) expressed a strong preference for quiet diplomacy and non-coercive intervention, but did not rule out the possibility of military intervention in “extraordinary and exceptional” cases. The main conclusion of the opinion-leaders from Northeast and Southeast Asia was that events of the previous decade were obliging Asian governments to address the tension between regional norms of sovereignty and calls to respond to humanitarian crises. In the end, they agreed that military intervention should be considered, as a last resort, in response to: genocide; massive loss of life (actual or imminent); massive displacement of persons; systematic and gross violations of human rights; and/or a threat to regional security. A geographically balanced force organized and commanded by the UN, and drawn from the largest possible number of countries, offered the best hope of success in carrying out such interventions.

Ayoob (2004) draws on the findings of the above and other conferences to offer similar observations on Third World perspectives on international administration (IA) and humanitarian intervention (HI), which he sees as closely linked. The thrust of his argument is that developing countries are suspicious of both, but to varying degrees across regions. Because there is greater risk of state collapse, sub-Saharan African states tend to be more receptive to arguments for HI than their Asian, Latin American and North African counterparts. Intervention followed by IA is seen in Africa as “a short-term measure that in the long run must help to restore sovereignty and the declining authority of states.” There is less enthusiasm in Asia, where states are more protective of sovereignty and more suspicious of great power motives. Interestingly, the two largest Asian countries -- India and China -- have adopted similar positions on HI and IA, at least in official pronouncements. The Latin American position as a whole is similar to the Asian one, but there are quite significant differences among major Latin American countries on NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. Argentina and Chile were moderately supportive, Mexico was strongly opposed, and Brazil stood in the middle. More generally, the Latin American approach is coloured by the history of US interventions in the region – which translates into strong opposition to “unilateral” action. Concerns about selectivity and double standards are felt most acutely in the Middle East. According to Ayoob, the failure of the Security Council to act in response to Israel’s practices in the Occupied Territories makes other cases of HI and IA suspect in the eyes of much of the developing world.

A distinctly Asian perspective on peacekeeping is offered by Banarjee (2005). He comments on a number of issues and/or challenges “as perceived from Asia”: the concept of human security (which has been quite well-received on the continent); the merits of addressing intra-state conflict and ethnic tension within a region (but Asia lacks regional organizations chartered to conduct peace operations); promoting good governance as a form of preventive action; and the use of police forces in peace operations, which would be especially welcomed in Asia, where sensitivities about the use of regional military forces remain high.

Pang (2005) finds that China is increasingly well-disposed towards and likely to participate in UN peacekeeping, but worries about ‘mission creep’ in view of the changing nature and context of peace operations. Policy has evolved considerably since the 1970s, in part out of concern about the geo-political challenge posed by a US-dominated world.

Among the motives behind China’s greater participation in peacekeeping, he lists the desire to be a responsible global player, maintaining a “low profile” foreign policy while engaging more actively in international affairs. Equally important, peacekeeping is a way for China to promote its “peaceful rise” as a regional player, without projecting itself as a strategic competitor to the US. Pang notes that China adheres to a traditional concept of peace-keeping, which could hold back its ability to contribute innovative insights and to participate fully in UN operations. He senses the emergence of a more flexible attitude among the leadership, moving away from rigid application of the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in international affairs. As China learns more about new peacekeeping concepts and processes, it will be able to play a more significant role.

Adebajo (2003) compares what he calls “hegemonic peacekeeping” by the US in Somalia and Nigeria in Liberia. The thrust of his argument is that the two interventions are quite similar, yet have been portrayed very differently in the media. The lead interventionists in both cases were a regional and global power who shared a historic missionary zeal. Both had to ratchet up their involvement to a more robust approach, but in both cases, policy eventually changed from attacking to appeasing the ‘spoilers’. The US, more sensitive to domestic public opinion and with less immediate national interests in Somalia than Nigeria had in Liberia, felt compelled to withdraw after a year when things turned sour. Nigeria, on the other hand, stayed for eight years and eventually succeeded in disarming the factions and organizing elections. About ‘hegemonic peacekeeping’, he concludes that such leadership is often indispensable, but ways must be found of broadening decision-making.

An interesting African perspective is offered by Madlala-Routledge and Liebenberg (2004), who assert that Africa needs a new “developmental peacekeeping” doctrine. They argue that the main drivers of conflict in Africa are resource-based and that an overly military approach to peace-keeping ought to be replaced by a more multidimensional, developmental approach. Elaborating on the nature of African conflicts, they stress that many societies have become “war economies”, where the expulsion of populations, killing and large-scale human rights violations are a means of accumulating resources. The authors claim UN peacekeeping in Africa has largely ignored this dynamic. They offer ‘developmental peacekeeping’ as an African alternative, defined as “post-conflict reconstruction intervention which aims to achieve sustainable levels of human security through a combination of interventions aimed at accelerating capacity building and socio-economic development...”. On a practical level, this means African missions should be multi-disciplinary, with a mandate to develop an integrated post-conflict reconstruction programme, even if there is no ceasefire.

V. Peace operations capacity, doctrine and reform

The Brahimi Report spawned a substantial body of literature on peacekeeping capacity. Two major studies are by Durch et al (2003) and a team assembled by the Conflict Security and Development Group at King’s College (2003). The first is an item-by-item review of progress made in implementation of the reforms recommended by the Brahimi panel. They are divided into three categories: doctrine and strategy, capacity for peace operations, and rapid and effective deployment. It ranked progress made on each specific recommendation on a scale of 1-5 (from “recommendation unimplemented” to “implementation exceeds report recommendation”) and finds that, by the summer of 2003, results were decidedly mixed. The greatest progress was made in the more concrete and operational recommendations, implementable by the UN bureaucracy. Recommendations pitched at the level of doctrine or strategy, and those requiring action by UN member states fared less well. Among their more interesting findings:

- the Brahimi Report’s implicit appeal for a more robust approach was not endorsed by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (representing most troops contributors), but

since 2000 a number of relatively robust missions have been deployed, including in Liberia and the DRC

- Little formal progress has been made in strengthening the UN's capacity for information-gathering and analysis (as the GA rejected the concept of an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat), but the retooling of various units within the Secretariat and other innovations have led to modest improvements in this area.
- The Integrated Mission Task Force concept has not been successful, at least in terms of decision-making, and needs to be revised.
- Slow progress is being made in creating more regional "brigade-size forces" (along the lines of SHIRBRIG) and more needs to be done to support the AU and other regional organizations and developing countries to meet this goal.

The King's College assessment of four operations (East Timor, Kosovo Sierra Leone and Afghanistan) is the basis for its case for a changed approach to peace operations. They stress that priority should be given to security sector reform, as well as the establishment of effective rule of law institutions. They also make recommendations on how to better manage the relationship between the military and humanitarian actors in these operations.

Less comprehensive assessments of capacity include an essay by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping (Guehenno 2002), which discusses Kofi Annan's effort to turn around the fate of UN peacekeeping. If the recommendations of the Brahimi Report are implemented, he argues, the UN will be equipped to undertake more complex missions. While UN peace operations cannot be risk-free, the gambles associated with involvement in ongoing conflicts or exceedingly fragile security environments can be better managed if missions match the need on the ground, if resources match those mandates, and if peace operations are deployed in a more judicious and deliberate manner. O'Shea (2002) a former Operations Officer with UNTSO-OGL on the Israeli-Lebanon border, casts a more critical eye over the report's recommendations and identifies areas that raise some concern. Kaysen and Rathjens (2003) return to a well-worn theme (first mooted by SG Trygve Lie in 1954 and then revived by Brian Urquhart in 1993) in making the case for a "volunteer UN military force." They argue that peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Yugoslavia would have been more effective if a well-trained and better equipped force of volunteers had been deployed, as a "UN foreign legion".

A central finding of O'Hanlan and Singer (2004) is that there is a large gap between the demand for peacekeepers and the available supply. They estimate that roughly 200,000 peacekeepers (military and police) are needed to meet current demand, about double the number now in the field. Considering that the international community spends \$800 billion per year on military forces and keeps more than 20 million men and women under arms, the authors argue that achieving that number is feasible. Assuming forces should be deployable within 2-3 months for at least one year, a pool of 600,000 is already available, 2/3 of which come from the US. Instead of calling for increased US commitment, which neither American nor international sentiment is likely to accept, they propose drawing specified numbers from Europe (150,000), Japan (25,000), Africa (50,000 fully equipped troops and another 50,000 not fully equipped), Middle East and South Asia (similar

goals), South America (50,000), plus modest improvements in capability from Canada, New Zealand and others, as well as more meaningful contributions from Turkey, South Korea, Russia and China in the future. Western countries would need to provide many of the resources required for developing countries to meet the target (\$10-15 billion for the first 100,000 soldiers and half as much for the second group of 100,000). Private military markets could fill gaps in logistics and transportation to support poorer states and regional organizations. Mainly because of concerns about accountability, private military firms should not be hired for combat functions. O'Hanlon and Singer's bottom line is that with minimal investments and some shifting of military resources and force structures, superior global capabilities for such missions are achievable.

The literature on peace operations doctrine has benefited from an important book by Trevor Findlay (2002). Findlay meticulously traces the history of the use of force in UN peace operations, from UNEF I through to Sierra Leone, with full chapters devoted to the Congo (1960-64), Somalia and Bosnia. He discusses the evolution of thinking in UN circles post-Cold War, as reflected in *Agenda for Peace, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* and the *Brahimi Report*. He also analyzes numerous training manuals, documents, lessons-learned reports, operational guidelines and rules of engagement, mainly in the UN but also among key northern states such as the US, UK, France, the Nordics and Australia. His core assessment is that "[i]n general the use of force by UN peacekeepers has been marked by political controversy, doctrinal vacuousness, conceptual confusion and failure in the field". Findlay concludes with a set of bold recommendations on SC mandates (eg they should all be under Chapter VII), mission planning (eg DPKO should produce model strategies and standard operating procedures for different circumstances), capacity (eg. an offshore rapid reaction force whenever a mission is deployed in a dangerous environment), rules of engagement (eg. he lists five considerations that should go into their drafting) and doctrine (eg sometimes force must be used "pre-emptively" or in a "crushing military engagement").

Doctrine is also addressed by Cassidy (2004) who compares UK and US peace operations doctrine as it evolved in the early 1990s. He notes that both were deeply influenced by the missions in Bosnia and Somalia respectively and, despite superficial similarities, were quite different in the mid-1990s. The British drew a sharp line at consent – a "Rubicon" that could not be crossed in a peacekeeping operation – whereas the US treated consent as a "variable", implying it was a matter of degree. The UK stretched traditional peacekeeping to new circumstances (and called it "wider peacekeeping") whereas the US essentially grafted the Powell-Weinberger doctrine (overwhelming force) on to peace operations. Cassidy notes but does not examine the convergence of the two doctrines in the late 1990s.

MacKinlay in a chapter in Tardy (2004) stresses that post-9/11 is time for a rethink of peace operations doctrine. He suggests there has been little evolution in doctrine since 1996, and that just as the lessons of Kosovo were starting to be learned, 9/11 changed the strategic context again. There is a need to conceptualize "insurgents" as the enemy and develop doctrine for four different types: lumpen forces, clan forces, popular forces and a global force (Al Qaeda).

Boulden (2005) addresses another important peace operations principle: impartiality. She disaggregates impartiality *of a mandate* from impartiality *in mandate implementation*. An impartial mandate is “without prejudice” to the position of the parties (the principle that underlies Article 40 of the UN Charter). Monitoring a ceasefire or peace agreement is, almost by definition, an impartial mandate. The Gulf War of 1991, on the other hand, was based on a ‘partial’ Security Council mandate. The multiplicity of mandates given to UNPROFOR in the early 1990s was in a gray area. Impartial mandates will not necessarily be implemented impartially – for example if actions by the peacekeepers have an impact on the positions of one of the parties (Somalia). She suggests impartiality is not always achievable or even desirable in gray area operations. Boulden does not reject the value of impartiality as a guiding principle, but calls for a deeper understanding of what it means and greater care in its use. Pretending a conflict like Rwanda or Bosnia can be dealt with through “impartial” peacekeeping allows the SC to avoid its responsibility to take more effective action. Other recent articles on the impartiality principle are Hughes (2002), Donald (2002) and Donald (2003).

Hansen (2002), Hansen in Dwan (2002) and Hills (2001) all have interesting things to say about peace operations doctrine in the context of policing. Hills (2001) drawing on Oakley et al (1998) identifies “deployment” and “enforcement” gaps in peace operations, which neither the military nor unarmed civilian police have effectively been able to fill. Formed police units (para-military, gendarmerie-type forces) may be a way of filling both gaps, but in themselves are not a solution (Hansen 2002). What is needed is better functional cooperation between the military, formed police and unarmed civilian police, operating on a common doctrinal basis. On related operational issues, including civil-military relations and the role of private security firms, see Diehl (2002), Brayton (2002), Spence (2002), Singer (2003), Quinlivan (2003), Lewis (2004) and Spearin (2005).

Other recent work on the use of force in peace operations is a chapter in Chesterman (2004), Bullion (2001), Lovelock (2002), McLaughlin (2002) and Stephens (2005). Frantzen (2005) makes the interesting argument that, while doctrine for “peace support operations” (PSO) has developed in NATO countries, it has suffered from a failure to properly come to grips with the changing nature of war. He looks at the evolution of thinking in the UK, Canada and Denmark, as well as NATO itself, between 1991 and 1999. In all places, doctrine was developed on the assumption that peace operations were different from war in the following respect: “The common expectation is that when war breaks out, policy retreats into the background. PSO are considered to be different from war because this policy retreat does not happen”. This sharp distinction meant that doctrinal debates of the 1990s failed to address the central question of how force could be used to support diplomacy or limited political purposes. Moreover, all three countries reverted to a “war-fighting first” approach for their military establishments, which stood in the way of developing common doctrine on how force could be used to support peace processes. In Frantzen’s view, the notion of “overwhelming force” (associated with total war) is inappropriate in most cases and should be replaced by a more fully conceptualized doctrine of “measured or regulated use of force”.

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