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**Rapid Deployment of Civilians for Peace Operations:  
Status, Gaps, and Options**

A Report of the NYU Center on International Cooperation

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## I. Backdrop: A Dysfunctional System

1. The May 2008 thematic debate in the UN Security Council (UNSC) debate identified three primary weaknesses in international performance to support stabilization and early recovery from conflict:<sup>1</sup>

(1) **A strategic gap** – there was no evidence of strategy that encompassed political, security, development and humanitarian tools across bilateral and multi-lateral actors, and no framework for prioritization.

(2) **A financing gap** – the instruments of international assistance are neither flexible nor dynamic enough. Further, and specific gaps were identified for:

- standing capacity for strategic planning at country level;
- support to political processes and implementation of agreements;
- funding that is realistic, flexible and responsive;
- here is a gap in the ability to spend development money early.

(3) A series of **capacity gaps** – in leadership and implementation, in sheer availability of civilian resources, and in purposeful training.

2. The UNSC debate drew in part from a CIC study commissioned by the UK government, *Recovering from War*, a preliminary version of which identified those three gaps. The report highlighted the facts that, with respect to civilian capacity for peace operations, to date there has been no joint assessment of need, and bilateral efforts are poorly coordinated. The report proposed the following four steps to resolve issues around civilian capacity:

(1) Development of a shared assessment of need, and establishment of a 'clearinghouse' to coordinate national efforts.

(2) Improved quality of national investment in civilian standby capacities.

(3) Development of strategies for building (or mobilizing) civilian capacity at a truly global level.

(4) Investment in multilateral planning capacity, training, and standby teams for core sectors such as security reform and the rule of law.

3. The report also emphasized the need to consider and to solve these gaps in a comprehensive manner, noting that: "the strategy gap both drives and is driven by the funding and capacity gaps; providing funding in the absence of capacity to execute or strategy to guide will not address these challenges."<sup>2</sup>

4. Undertaking the analysis for the UK paper involved updating older work on post-conflict recovery and conducting new, empirical analysis of early response efforts. These efforts provided a rich backdrop to this report, commissioned by the Danish government as a part of a broader cooperative effort examining the state of the international post-conflict architecture.

5. This report takes a more detailed look at the issue of rapidly deployable civilian capacity – an important sub-set of the overall early response. The first section, 'A dysfunctional reality,' examines the state of current plans (national and multilateral) to increase rapidly deployable civilian capacity for peace operations. The second section, 'A common framework,' identifies a conceptual approach to categorize tasks undertaken by civilians in post-conflict countries, and proposes a tiered system of deployment that would address these needs. The third section, 'Institutional Arrangements,' provides options in terms of structures that could be used to support this process. Annexes detail the existing plans of each of the major contributors to civilian deployment; categorize these according to the system of tiered deployment proposed here; and provide a taxonomy of types of needs that could be built on

<sup>1</sup> For more detailed discussions on the definition of early recovery, please see CIC, *Recovering from War: Gaps in Early Action*, 1 July 2008, pp.12-13. As per that report, this paper adopts a commonsense approach to early recovery, focusing on early efforts to secure stability, establish the peace; resuscitate markets, livelihoods, and services and the state capacities necessary to foster them; and build core state capacity to manage political, security and development processes.

<sup>2</sup> CIC, *Recovering from War: Gaps in Early Action*, 1 July 2008, p.3.

in a detailed, shared assessment – the necessary and as yet unfulfilled starting point for any serious effort to build effective civilian capacity.

6. The data collection phase of this study was severely hampered by two factors: the paucity of information collected at the national level; and reluctance by UN entities to share qualitative information (such as estimated response times) about their nascent efforts. One early ambition of the study – to provide a comparative evaluation of the civilian response times of different elements of the international system – had to be abandoned due to insufficient data or a lack of willingness to release it.

7. It is evident that much work has begun on these issues, primarily in the form of national efforts in western countries. Our study highlights that these efforts have been undertaken with little attention to one another; with inadequate linkages to multilateral systems, through which the vast bulk of post-conflict response is undertaken; with insufficient attention to the question of building capacity in the global South; and with a minimum of coordination. Without a common framework and improved coordination and partnership, with the UN system at its core, the international community may yet again fail to address its own needs, at substantial cost.

8. The purpose of this paper is not to present a definitive model, but to provoke thought, discussion and action – by presenting an explicit concept of operations, and multiple options for fulfilling civilian capacity requirements. These models, and the numbers recommended are open to discussion and debate: hence the decision to present this paper in its first instance in draft.

### **I.A. The Reality of Deployment**

9. The existence of a gap in capacity was identified by the Security Council; this report returned to the original research for *Recovering from War* and looked in more detail at the pace of deployment in peacekeeping missions. The original conclu-

sions were re-validated, with two core dimensions emerging in the civilian capacity gap:

a. **There is a broad lack of rapidly deployable capacity in [the relevant] institutions.** This includes capacity for **leadership, planning and coordination, and capacity for execution** – including, for example, both the more glamorous and well-recognized need for more rule-of-law personnel, and the less glamorous but equally important need for rapidly deployable project managers, procurement officers, and financial personnel.

b. **The business processes of institutions are inadequate for the task at hand.** The funding regulations, accountability requirements, and, in particular, human resources processes at Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Development Program's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP/BCPR), and the World Bank hinder rather than enhance response efforts.

10. Research into the actual pace of deployment shows that the majority of posts in peace operations remain unfilled for many months. United Nations - African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), for example, was mandated on July 31, 2007, with a deadline for implementation no later than December 31, 2007.<sup>3</sup> As of January 2008, UNAMID had filled 254 of its 1,567 authorized posts for international civilians; by June 2008, only 544 posts had been filled.


11. Similarly, United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was mandated on September 25, 2007. Six months later, 135 authorized international civilian posts had been filled; six months after that, when the post allowance had been increased to 542, just 48 had been filled – a vacancy rate of 91 percent.

12. Vacancy rates are not maintained over time for previous missions; however, as of September 2008 the international staff vacancy rates for the three largest missions were 29.6%

<sup>3</sup> UNSC Resolution 1769

United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 25.0% United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), and 25.8% United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). It is difficult to find either practitioners or policy-makers who do not acknowledge the tremendous problem in the pace of deployment. Anecdotally, vacancy rates are highest in what might be described as mission-critical functions, such as in the justice / rule of law sectors.

**Figure 2: Deployment against authorized strength in UNAMID**



13. Of course, peace operations form only one hub of the in-country civilian presence, though a critical one. Other members of the UN Country Team (UNCT) often have resources and capacities on the ground. A prime example is UNHCR, which is present in a refugee situation prior to a peace agreement, and which has surge and rapidly deployable capacities. The models presented below do not focus on these capacities, but this is not to deny their existence or importance. It is

clear that more effort needs to be made by peace operations to work with capacities that exist outside of peace operations; this is another reason that the need to clarify roles and responsibilities is urgent.

### I.B. Existing Plans

14. This report was built on in-depth research into the nature of current capacities that were either under development or operational. A summary of these capacities, organized by country and by entity, is attached as Annex A: Capacities by country, and tabulated for easy reading as Annex B: Table of capacities. Analysis of the data led us to three key conclusions:

(1) Significant steps have been taken by governments and international organizations towards investment in rapidly deployable capacity. This suggests a widespread recognition of the need for deployable capacity.

(2) This investment is not fully realized – systems are still being planned, these plans are in flux and unformed, and countries often struggle to identify, across the entire range of defense, diplomacy and development actors, as to where, when and for what purposes their civilian capacity has been deployed. This suggests the absence of a shared analysis or a common framework.

(3) That there is a high level of duplication, and yet a number of significant gaps in current efforts. This suggests a serious lack of coordination.

15. These key conclusions led to the following knowledge gaps:

(1) Needs assessments. There is insufficient shared assessment of: (i) the demand and (ii) the gap – i.e., carefully documenting **which specific capacities** are sought by government, civil society and international actors, and matching these against what international actors are

able to deploy.

(2) An operational framework. There is insufficient clarity on the underlying intellectual framework and on the specific tasks for which civilian capacity is being built. Of equal concern is the lack of clarity about the framework and timetable for deployment in practice. As stated in *Recovering From War*, capacity requires strategy.

16. The absence of these data has led to a situation where western states are building civilian capacity, claiming that it is both in the service of their own sovereign needs and that it will ‘assist’ the international community as needed; but there is no sound basis for building such capacity, and insufficient, ineffective linkages to the multilateral institutions that lead most responses.

17. As an example, numerous western member states have actively solicited the names of judges for their civilian capacity rosters. There is little evidence, however, from our research, that retired Western judges are in high demand, or of high utility in (for example) Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone or Timor-Leste; or that several, separate national rosters would be the most efficient way to fulfill that need even if there were the demand.

18. Indeed, what may be needed *ab initio* – as has been identified by Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in their forthcoming paper – are individuals who have the skills to understand how non-state institutions must interact with those of the state in the first few years of peace, while the formal judicial sector is rebuilt. This is not to criticize the intent of nations in creating ‘judge corps’ – but simply to suggest that absent careful planning and scrutiny, there is a severe risk that such a corps created would simply not be suitable for its task.

19. This lack of foresight is not limited to the rule of law – there is a wide array of functions where capacity is allegedly being built across areas as diverse as human rights, urban

planning and governance.

20. Particularly striking in this first phase of research was the near total lack of investment in serious efforts to build middle-income and developing country capacity. It is worth stressing that the goal of this effort should not be to ensure geographic representation, but to secure the civilian capacity most capable of effectively performing the task at hand in fragile states. There is anecdotal evidence – though, as we note, serious research is required – that non-Western advisors in Afghanistan have proved much more capable of supporting their counterparts than their Western colleagues, simply because they appreciate the culture and the context, and have often shared or acquired language skills. There are, of course, many examples of superb performance by Western advisors.

21. The point, however, is that any serious effort to build global capacity to respond to global crises must be global in its nature.

## II. A Common Framework: Tiered Deployment

22. There are a number of toolkits and/or lists that attempt to describe the tasks needed in post-conflict countries. Most of these share a common core of tasks, although different terminologies are used. Among the most cited are:

- (1) The CSIS/AUSA Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework (Annex C)
- (2) The S/CRS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Framework (Annex D)
- (3) Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery (Forman and Patrick)

23. We compared these frameworks to our own review of the taskings of every current peace operation. Drawing on the two sources, an indicative list of spheres of activities and sub-fields follows: *see table on following page*

**Figure 1: Core sectors of activity and indicative list of sub-fields**

Security	Justice	Social & Economic Recovery	Public Administration	Governance & Participation
SSR	Transitional Justice	Water / Sanitation	Civil Service Reform	Political process support (mediation / conflict res)
DDR	Corrections	Economic Recovery	Public Finance	Electoral Assistance
Police	Judicial Reform	Infrastructure	Decentralization	Constitutional support
Peacekeeping	Human Rights	Health and Education	Urban Planning	Media Development
Military Training	Protection	Agriculture	Capacity Development	Civil Society
Strategy and Planning				

24. Responsibility, either at the sectoral or at the task level, for these activities remains unclear within the international system. Quick movement to further clarify roles and responsibilities – thereby creating accountability both of and to member states – is needed. Nonetheless, using these five core areas (security, justice, social & economic recovery, public administration and governance & participation), we propose a ‘concept of operations’ describing how civilian capacity could be deployed.

25. From this point on, the report focuses on UN-led post-conflict integrated operations. This specifically *includes* activities undertaken by UNDP and the World Bank in these contexts. The analysis may be useful for agencies, but does not specifically address their distinct roles and capacities.

26. The challenge here is that the desired output across the entire set of activities is statebuilding. The broad, multi-dimensional task of statebuilding is currently executed by a fragmented array of uncoordinated actors, ostensibly under the leadership of DPKO in peace operations. In practice, DPKO lacks the authority or the capacity to lead, and has specifically been forbidden by member states to engage in core statebuilding tasks, such as capacity development.

27. This architectural problem is beyond the scope of this paper. This report examines civilian capacity needs in the context of the broad definition of statebuilding encompassed by the task framework above. The entirety of this matrix is reflected – albeit in a fragmented fashion – in the mandates of the UN system presence in post-conflict countries.

28. It is also beyond the scope and capacity of this report to define needs for sovereign states, which must make their own assessments of their desire to engage bilaterally and multilaterally. The model described here is additionally intended as a starting point for discussion amongst bilateral policymakers seeking both to develop their own capacities, and strengthen the international system.

#### II.A. The ‘minimum surge’ requirement

29. CIC’s ‘concept of operations’ revolves around two core ideas: (i) that there is a minimum surge capacity that is required; and (ii) that the primary gap in civilian capacity is substantive first, and then administrative and logistical.

30. The concept of ‘minimum surge’ seeks to establish the baseline need for rapidly deployable civilian capacity. The history of UN mission mandates and approvals suggests that a **realistic maximum need for deployment is for one ‘large’ peace operation and one ‘small’ peace operation in any 12-month period**. Therefore, the minimum surge capacity would be the number of staff required to initiate one large and one small mission – not the total staffing requirement for such missions.

31. For the concept of a ‘large’ mission, the paper extrapolates from the UNAMID and the MONUC; for a ‘small’ mission, the MINURCAT, for which a European Union-led military force (EUFOR) was initially mandated to provide the security component, and the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), looking at the civilian component of that mission.

32. For a model of deployment, this paper takes and develops the concept of Integrated Standing Early Recovery Teams (INSERT) proposed in the *Recovering From War*. INSERT teams, as explained in detail below, are comprised of the skeleton staff required to effectively plan and launch the early recovery process.

33. Secondly, a detailed analysis of patterns of deployment and functional tasks in the post-conflict moment, drawing again on interviews, reports, and field experience, suggests that the **primary gap in rapidly deployable civilian capacity is both in substantive areas, and in the administrative and financial management support required for programming.**


34. We note here that deployment is not to a *tabula rasa* – there are often UN Country Team members who have many years of experience working in the context, and whose expertise must be more effectively drawn on by deployed capacity.

35. The Department of Field Support (DFS) must be commended for its effectiveness in deploying the core personnel required to initiate the logistics and IT portions of a mission. DFS appears focused on improving the quality of its response, and therefore, this paper does not address civilian administrative, IT and logistics requirements. This in no way implies that these are not priority issues; the model of an INSERT team described below requires a DFS counterpart team to enable deployment.

## II.B. A Concept of Operations – Tiered Deployment

36. It is evident that the entire staff needed for a mission neither can be deployed nor is required immediately. Discussions with field and planning staff and the analysis from research argued strongly for a tiered system of needs that allowed for assessment and planning initially, and rapidly increased levels of execution as time progressed.

37. The tiered system proposed here is as follows:



38. The first phase of deployed capacity can be split into:

- The ‘drivers’: the individuals tasked with maintaining the political process and simply ensuring that the situation does not go belly-up, and
- The planners: the individuals tasked with conducting rapid assessments, planning the mission, deciding what resources and skills are needed in the near term, and determining how best to relate and support the emergence of national leadership.

39. This phase covers, approximately, the first 90 days of a mission, dating from the approval of a peace agreement or of a mission mandate. For UN peace operations, this is mandate approval by the Security Council; Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and UNDP can deploy under other circumstances.

40. At this stage, there is a limited role for ‘mentors’ – individuals inserted into key government positions to help build capacity and support execution when needed. A mechanism for developing this sort of capacity belongs under the public administration reform.

41. The second phase, with initial deployment at 60 days, lasting a minimum of six months, requires **key sectoral and unit leadership** – the heads of units that have an early degree of

execution responsibility derived from the planning work of the INSERT team, and further responsibility for planning out in detail the work of their units. The roles and responsibilities, and therefore the skills and capabilities, of these individuals would be laid out by the INSERT team.

42. The third phase, from six months onwards, is where the bulk of mission staff are recruited and deployed. At this point, sectoral and unit leaders have identified the detailed tasks and responsibilities for their teams, and the skills and capabilities required, against which individuals in this phase would be sourced.

43. In both the second and third phases of deployed capacity, the growing inclusion of capacity building – or more precisely statebuilding – as a core mandated function of peace operations necessitates a further distinction between ‘doers’ and ‘mentors’ – substantive staff who are able not only to competently implement projects, but also to train and, in certain cases, transition functional responsibilities to their national counterparts. Too often, the departure of an international peace operation has left a void that nascent state institutions are incapable of filling, risking at best sustained fragility and at worst the recurrence of conflict.

44. Below, we describe in some detail the nature of each of these phases and their requirements. Again, we stress that this model is open to change and revision – work needs to be done to openly validate the ideas within the UN system against more field-level input, and frank and open engagement with deployments and needs. Assumptions in this report include:

- DFS’s recruitment system and its ability to rapidly deploy staff are deeply flawed and unlikely to significantly improve, as they reflect outmoded or politically palatable but operationally cumbersome contract modalities and business practices driven by member states. DFS is, again, to be complimented, as there is recognition of this challenge at senior levels;

- Persons deployed in each phase will have strong links to structures and organizations sketched out below that will allow for recruitment and deployment to happen in a timely fashion;
- As any mission progresses through the phases above – or progresses through time – the accuracy of predictions made at  $t=0$  as to staffing needs diminishes rapidly. This reality suggests a need for a much more dynamic model for staffing tables than currently exists, which has significant implications for the peace operations deployment process, and is discussed in IV: Conclusion, below.

45. This idea of phases has implications for the confused terminology associated with civilian capacity. Given this model, we define the ‘type’ of capacity by the speed with which it can deploy, as follows:

- 1) Standing capacity is that which can be in-country within 72 hours of need, and remain deployed for a minimum of 60 days;
- 2) Standby capacity is that which can be in-country within 60 days, and remain deployed for a minimum of 180 days;
- 3) Rostered capacity is that which can be in-country within 180 days, and whose deployment term is subject to regular contract.

### III. Institutional Arrangements

#### III. A. Current Operational Modalities

46. In 2008, there were 51 new and ongoing peace operations worldwide. Twenty of these were UN managed, accounting for some 22,000 international and national civilian staff worldwide. An additional 7,800 UN civilian field posts remain unfilled; indeed, the vacancy rate in start-up missions is estimated by DFS at 53 percent.<sup>4</sup>

47. According to the UN's Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) guidelines, the emergence of a crisis triggers the formation of an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF), a headquarters-based planning body with senior-level representation from all relevant UN entities and managed by a lead department. The IMTF is responsible for tasking a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) on which the Mission and Support Concepts of Operations will be based. The TAM proposes the mission mandate, as well as a concept for which occupational units would do what where. Following a Security Council mandate, the mission concept is developed into an operational plan by DPKO's Office of Operations (OO). The Department of Field Support leads the development of mission structure, staffing tables, and budget – an educated guess based on prior missions of similar mandate and scale. Finally, the mission backbone – communications and IT, logistics and transport, security, Standing Police Capacity and initial substantive staff are deployed. Early start-up staff are usually drawn from the existing UNCT, UNHQ or other missions pending the recruitment of mission-specific staff. According to one study, these staff are

“under pressure to return to their posts after a few months. Due to the lengthy recruitment time lines, these key posts then go unfilled or are filled by mission staff who are unsuited for the position and leave their regular duties untended.”<sup>5</sup>

48. The integrated mission planning process has long been criticized as too military and not sufficiently ‘integrated.’ In 2005, the Secretary-General's Policy Committee determined that DPKO should remain the lead planning department for complex, multi-dimensional operations, but with strengthened inputs from humanitarian and development actors (through the creation of small planning cells by United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA). In 2006, the process was completely reviewed and updated around three main stages; ‘advance planning,’ involving the development of strategic options for UN engagement leading to a concept of operations that can be put to the Security Council; ‘operational planning,’

involving the operationalization of the draft mission plan and the transition of authority to the SRSG as soon as one is appointed; and ‘review and transition planning,’ through which the plan is continuously updated and issues of draw-down and transition addressed. This approach envisages the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) being involved at the front end and DPKO retaining its operational lead. However, this system remains to be implemented in practice – and again, the capacities and knowledge of the agencies and the UNCT, despite their many flaws, are inadequately leveraged.

49. It is worth reiterating that the model proposed here both improves the speed of deployment and the ability to integrate. The range of tasks corresponds to a range of actors and capacities within the UN system and the World Bank. Any effective solutions across these phases will therefore recruit from, and be situated across this range of actors, helping to deliver on the idea of integration by virtue of their existence.

### III. B. Alternative Operational Modalities

50. As outlined earlier, we propose a phased system for early rapid deployment of civilian capacity to peace operations based on the above:

**Figure 4: Phases, time periods, and staffing for tiered deployment**

Phase	Time Period	Location	Staffing
I: 'Start up'	0-90 days	UN	INSERT
II: 'Ramp up'	60-240 days	Global	Sector Specialist Teams
III: 'Staff up'	180 days onwards	Global	Long-Term Personnel

51. The deployment of personnel in these tiers would enable a peace operation to better determine its operational – and therefore staffing – needs dynamically. The selection and sequencing of tasks should be driven by the situation in-country, and bounded by the operations mandate.<sup>6</sup>

52. The system that we propose is designed to be cost-effective, and to be applicable across an array of mission typolo-

<sup>5</sup> Peace Dividend Trust, “Mission Management / Start Up Scoping Project: Final Report,” April 24, 2006, p. 14, <http://www.peacedividendtrust.org/en/data/files/download/pdfs/ScopingStudyFinal.pdf>, accessed January 23, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> A similar argument has been raised in the General Assembly's Fifth Committee regarding the financing of UNAMID, see [www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2007/un0711-4.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2007/un0711-4.html).

gies. It has, specifically, the goal of delivering on what has been called a ‘non-pillar’ oriented strategy – which is to say an integrated strategy that makes the most effective use of the resources available based on demand, rather than supply.

### Start-up (0-90 days)

53. Phase I may be triggered by the transition of a crisis beyond a certain threshold — the initiation of Security Council deliberation, the signing of a peace accord, or another event – at which point an (INSERT) is deployed. *Recovering from War: Gaps in Early Action* called for INSERTs that:

“could be led by experienced RCs/Deputy SRSGs/World Bank Representatives and comprised of 10-15 experts with experience in post-conflict recovery in a range of sectors (e.g., public administration, public finance, agriculture, security sector reform). These teams would stay in country for 3 months, working with the mission and the Country Team as well as bilateral actors to help develop shared strategy. They could also be deployed where no peacekeeping/political mission is planned to support the UNCT.”<sup>7</sup>

54. The function of INSERTs is predominantly internal to the mission or institutional presence: to conduct strategic planning and very early assessment; to establish contact with key local actors; and to identify areas of expertise required to ‘ramp up’ the operation (Phase II).

55. Given this function, it would also be essential for INSERT teams to have access to funding and consultants to gain sociological, historical and ethnographic expertise, as well as sector-specific knowledge as appropriate. We stress again that there will be pre-existing international and national capacities in-country that such a team should be willing, able, and authorized to draw upon.

56. Due to the need for very rapid deployment, and the added value gained through a set team familiar with each other, INSERTs must be comprised of **preexisting, full-time, internal staff** who are explicitly contracted to deploy to crisis situ-

ations on short notice. INSERTs, therefore, would need to be housed within the UN. Full engagement from the World Bank, including willingness to station staff in such a team, is essential to success. Prior to deployment, the INSERT could participate in the headquarters planning group in order to provide continuity, conduct trainings and simulations to maintain preparedness, and work closely on developing best practices materials. These teams would therefore be competent and equipped to carry out the initial phase of assessment.

57. The current mélange of processes – although improving with the recent adoption of the Strategic Assessment process by the Integration Steering Group – needs better clarity. It would be logical for an INSERT team to conduct the initial TAM (and perhaps subsequent TAMs as their deployment would have ended), and to be integrated with the SA process. More analysis needs to be done on this, but this process must be system-owned in order to be viable.

58. The table below (Figure 5) lays out the numbers of individuals working in specific sectors who would form the INSERT team, under the leadership of a highly qualified Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) or

**Figure 5: A model Integrated Standing Early Recovery Team (Large Mission)**

Phase I: Integrated Standing Early Recovery Teams - Proposed Numbers									
Security	#	Justice	#	Social & Economic Recovery	#	Public Administration	#	Governance & Participation	#
Security	2	Justice	2	Social and Economic	2	Public Administration	2	Electoral & Constitutional	2
SSR and DDR	2			Infrastructure (1) Agriculture (1)	2	Public Finance	2	Civil Society	1
Police	1			Health (1) Education (1)	2	Urban Planning	1	PR / PI	1
Core Planning Staff (2 civilian, 1 military) & Aid coordination staff (2)									5
Head of Team (DSRSG/RC Equivalent)									1
<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>								
This table specifically excludes: (i) the military planning portion of any international response (ii) Ongoing support to political processes and peace agreements									

<sup>7</sup> CIC, *Recovering from War: Gaps in Early Action*, 1 July 2008, p. 11. Recognizing that it may be difficult to retain INSERT senior personnel at the level suggested, it may be more feasible to staff at the P-5/D-1 level.

## Ramp-up (60-240 days)

59. Beginning approximately two months from t=0, Sector Specialist Teams (SST) – activated by and overlapping with INSERTs during Phase I – are deployed. Sector Specialist Teams would remain in-country for six months (and could be encouraged to stay for longer periods), bridging the gap between early assessment and planning personnel and the arrival of permanent civilian peace operation staff.

60. Their function would be to conduct more thorough sector-specific needs assessments, provide technical assistance, design and initiate programs, establish function-specific units and sharpen terms of reference within the organization, including identifying specific job profiles/expertise required, enabling recruitment and deployment of full-time staff tailored to the specific mission environment. A further useful function would be deepening and improving the institutional access to local knowledge and recruitment of key local staff.

61. Phase II personnel, ideally, would have the opportunity to remain in-country for longer than six months, if they so desired. When recruiting replacements, however, a deliberate period of overlap should be scheduled, with a formal, structured handover process. This, at low cost, would go a long way to reducing the loss of knowledge that occurs with every transition in the current system.

62. Sector Specialist Teams would be comprised of standing personnel, standby personnel, or a mix thereof. The exact size and profile of an SST is dependent on the context – e.g., large mission versus small mission, complexity of mandate, security environment and terrain. Estimated numbers are in the table below; the final decisions would be made by the INSERT teams during the planning and pre-deployment phases, based on the mandate and their rapid assessments. The numbers here are indicative, and could vary significantly based on the context; the figures for ‘min’ (43) are typical for a small mission; and the ‘max’ (133) for a large; the total represents an approximation of the minimum surge capacity required (176).<sup>8</sup>

Figure 6: Phase II Capacity Estimates

Phase II: "Ramp Up"									
Security	#	Justice	#	Social & Economic Recovery	#	Public Administration	#	Governance & Participation	#
Defined by INSERT team	Min: 7 Max: 25	Defined by INSERT team	Min: 7 Max: 25	Defined by INSERT team	Min: 7 Max: 25	Defined by INSERT team	Min: 7 Max: 25	Defined by INSERT team	Min: 7 Max: 25
Continued Planning Staff (3 civilian, 2 mil/pol) and Aid Coordination Staff (3)									8
Under the Authority of the SRSg									
Min Total	43				Max Total	133			

63. Processes underway point to the emergence of an uncoordinated and irrational system of national and multilateral deployable teams. Absent a coordinated structure (and therefore a coordinating structure) the gap between supply (teams created bilaterally, not on the basis of demand, nor linked to multilateral structures) and demand (the need for broad, global talent to service mission needs) will be perpetuated. The inability of the UN and other multilateral institutions to utilize seconded or gratis personnel in areas further verifies the inutility of bilaterally built, uncoordinated capacity.

64. This, therefore, is where the opportunity lies to build bridges and formal links between national (bilateral) and international (multi-lateral) capacities for civilian deployment. We can only reiterate the caution that such capacities must be global in their development, and reach across countries at all stages of development.

## Institutional Options for the "Ramp Up" Phase

65. This report therefore proposes three new institutional options for sourcing Phase II personnel include:

- Create **multiple, sector-specific teams of pre-existing, internal staff** based at the UN and World Bank deployable to the field on an as-needed basis. The DPKO's Standing Police Capacity (SPC)<sup>9</sup> is a promising model that could be expanded to other

<sup>8</sup>Though very much 'back of the envelope,' these numbers are based (i) for the low end, on the average number of international staff posts for mission occupational categories with the fewest posts and (ii) for the high end, roughly one-third of the authorized posts for occupational categories with the greatest number of posts.

<sup>9</sup>The SPC was established by DPKO in May 2007 "to quickly start up the police components in new missions and reinforce existing missions." DPKO is currently considering expanding the SPC into a Rapidly Deployable Rule of Law Capacity (RoLCAP) team, with a complement of justice, corrections, and other rule of law related staff. [SSR and DDR could be included.]

critical occupational sectors recognized as common to nearly all peace operations. Sector-specific teams would be established under the appropriate departments, based on a formal allocation of roles and responsibilities. Like the SPC, these teams would engage in planning for and deployment to new missions and existing missions requiring reinforcement, in support of INSERT teams. They would deploy with the necessary logistical support and accessible start-up funding. Ideally, the development of such teams would occur in the context of an overall strategic framework, rather than ad hoc.

- Create a **Rapid Response Civilian Corps**, a trained and prepared multinational team of rapidly deployable civilians. The Corps would operate through centralized recruitment, training and deployment to the field. The notable feature of this model is that units of civilians with expertise in critical early recovery sectors would be ready for call-up in crisis situations. It could take the form of a ‘barracks’ model, where the planning staff as well as a cadre of civilian experts would be physically present at headquarters on a rotational basis for a given period of time. While this might allow for the fastest deployment of personnel to the field, in practice it means large numbers of diverse experts at high maintenance costs. In addition to the costs involved in setting up such a Corps, and the need for inter-governmental buy-in and approval, this model would need to incorporate options for deployment of civilians in contexts where the UN is not necessarily involved.
- Establish multiple **Centers of Capacity**. A center of capacity would focus on a specific task group, or sub-task area (as per Figure 1), and could be co-located within a UN entity (for example, a joint UNDP-World Bank Governance Center of Capacity) or externally.

Lead nations could volunteer to support Centers of Capacity in a specific sector, which they would finance, and agree to provide advice and support to respective UN departments (e.g., a nationally based Center of Capacity on rule of law might be affiliated with DPKO’s OROLSI). For such a model to succeed, it is imperative that Centers of Capacity do not become another mechanism to deepen western penetration into peace operations. Rather, these centers must form part of a broad strategy to ensure that the right capacity is available to meet demands, should represent broad partnerships and long-term strategic thinking, and ideally might be physically located in countries that are close to conflict-affected regions.

The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) might provide a good example for an externally-based Center of Capacity. In return for, say, \$1 million a year in guaranteed funding, ICTJ together with the relevant UN department would identify and recruit 7 staff, split between New York, and Pretoria, who would do research on core transitional justice issues in post-conflict contexts, and possibly teach at a South African University while not deployed. In return, they would have a contractual obligation to deploy on demand, within a 60 day period.

Centers might serve dual roles as policy ‘think tanks’ and/or training centers with a mix of deployable internal staff capacity as well as an ability to draw on networks of outside expertise. The experiences and challenges of current centers (such as Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and Protective Security Coordination Centre (PSCC)), and the reality that training is a specialized skill, are important caveats to any final plan.

Staff would commit to a specified number of such deployments over a set multiyear period (e.g., two deployments of at least four months’ duration over three years). During their ‘inactive’ time, staff could, inter alia, research and compile lessons learned, participate in planning exercises, develop common standards, maintain rosters of experts, and develop and conduct training, working closely with headquarters. To reduce costs associ-

ated with maintaining high levels of readiness, internal staff could have a two-tiered contract entitling them to increased salary and/or benefits when ‘activated’ for deployment, dropping back down upon completion of a four- to five-month deployment.

66. For this phase – as with INSERT teams – the need to seek out and invest in appropriate capacity, rather than simply capacity from wealthy nations, must be a priority. A mechanism that does not address this challenge, for example by basing centers in Nairobi, Jakarta, Delhi and Dakar rather than Stockholm, Copenhagen and London, will neither be politically viable, nor, more important, produce the desired effect.

#### **Staff Up (180 days onwards)**

67. Approximately six months from the activation date of the operation, multilateral organizations and bilaterals engaged in the peace operation should begin to transition from rapidly deployed personnel to permanent field personnel.

68. There is a current lack of an ‘impact potential’ assessment. Given resource constraints, a serious assessment that identifies, based on reasonably detailed typologies of capacities, what the pre-conditions are for international capacity to actually help to build stable and resilient states is urgently required, and how this building manifests itself during phase III – the most substantive phase of civilian deployment in terms of output.

69. Options for institutional arrangements to recruit full-time staff for Phase III include:

- Utilize rosters maintained by the **Centers of Capacity**, described above. Additionally, members of Sector Specialist Teams may elect to stay on, becoming full-time field staff.
- Establish a **clearinghouse**, including a website and virtual network, to share information and coordinate

actions among organizations developing rapidly deployable civilian capacity.<sup>10</sup> (Rather than a single clearinghouse, it may be more feasible to establish either sector-specific or regional clearinghouses.) Information could include rosters, training, lessons learned, and development of common standards. This would enable a better grasp of opportunities for collaboration according to capabilities and niche expertise. Such a clearinghouse would be institutionally based; ideally, a strengthened Peacebuilding Support Office would have responsibility for collecting and sharing information across member states and regional organizations.

- Establish a “GlobalDem” based on the Canadian “Canadem” model.<sup>11</sup> GlobalDem would serve two functions. First, it would provide a platform for a consolidated pool of multilateral and bilateral civilian capacity rosters – a **global roster of rosters**. GlobalDem program staff would routinely (quarterly or biennially) solicit updated rosters from other organizations, as well as maintain their own list. Second, GlobalDem would serve as a **‘matchmaker’** for the UN and other international and bilateral organizations, identifying candidates for specific positions on request. All applicants in the online roster would undergo a preliminary screening; an optional advanced screening would qualify applicants for recruitment to DPKO (as currently required of Canadem rolls). On demand, GlobalDem would identify available candidates and forward them to the requesting organization, which would maintain responsibility for recruitment and deployment. Such an institution, either hosted by the UN or established as an independent entity, would require financial backing from lead countries, though the aim would be to achieve self-sustainability through its own job posting site. It could additionally provide pre-deployment training in areas such as security to prospective job seekers for a fee.

An alternative version would be to secure funding for key RegionalDem mechanisms, to support and ensure access

<sup>10</sup> As part of its action plan for “Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations,” the G-8 agreed to establish a web-based platform for coordination of activities in support of African PSO capacities.

<sup>11</sup> Canadem is Canada’s roster of civilian experts.

to a truly global pool of candidates, but without a single ‘clearing house’.

In either case, the technology to allow the RegionalDems, or GlobalDem to submit pre-screened applications from people who have met pre-defined criteria exists, just not at the UN. There are layers of complexity around geographic equity and pre-selection, but as part of a careful, global program aimed at addressing capacity needs, these can be overcome.

- **United Nations Volunteers (UNV)** currently mobilizes more than 7,500 personnel every year. According to UNV, more than 75 percent of its volunteers are from developing countries, and more than 30 percent volunteer within their own countries.<sup>12</sup> UNVs are currently used as a staffing of last resort mechanism by DFS to make up vacancy rates. Hence, UNVs currently comprise one-third of all international civilians working in UN peace operations. UNV is thus a relatively effective mechanism for getting staff into mission, but restrictions on gratis staff (discussed above), as well as different privileges and immunities, limit their utility for rapid deployment.

70. Missions have also explored the **UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS)** as a potential means for contracting staff. UNOPS has an ability to deploy personnel rapidly, and appears to have more flexibility than Human Resource (HR) systems in DFS. Further attention to these modalities, and the means by which a partnership with UNOPS can accelerate deployment might benefit DFS.

#### IV. Conclusion: Architecture and Responsibility

71. The above options should be easy to implement; they will not be. The reason is that the current UN architecture for post-conflict response is flawed: and these flaws contribute to the messy reality that is the civilian response to conflict.

72. Part of the logic behind the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office at the UN was that a central focal point for peacebuilding at the UN could provide an Archimedian point from which to drive operational reforms of the post-conflict architecture (the responsibilities for which are otherwise divided across, inter alia, the Secretary-General, the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the UNDP Governing Board.) That Archimedian point had, of necessity, to bridge the Secretary-General and member states.

73. The issue of roles and responsibilities was flagged as a primary concern throughout this report. *Recovering From War* called for a move towards a system with clear division of labor around priority tasks, and noted that the forthcoming memorandum between the World Bank and the UN provided a platform, for coordination on the country level. The report noted, however, that urgent further work, was necessary to ensure that future investment in the overall capacity of the system is coordinated – building, for example, on the World Bank’s expertise in Public Administrative Reform, on BCPR’s work in the justice sector, on DPKO’s experience in SSR and on DPA’s work with constitutions and elections – rather than duplicating capacities.

74. The Secretary-General – using the Peacebuilding Support Office and/or the Policy Committee – also has critical responsibilities: for triggering action, and for ensuring that that the international system comes together around effective strategy in support of the in-country lead: ideally, a well-qualified SRSR with effective authority, supported by a properly resourced Deputy SRSR/RC1 – linked to effective donor coordination mechanisms and a well-resourced and coherent Country Team.

75. We proposed, in Figure 1, a simple division of core activities in the post-conflict arena into five sectors: (i) security; (ii) justice; (iii) social and economic recovery; (iv) public administration; and (v) governance and participation, with a layer of strategy and planning across these themes. On this basis, an

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Volunteers: What We Do, “<http://www.unv.org/what-we-do.html>”

intelligent division of labour could be proposed – one that articulates responsibility, creates accountability, and is driven by capacity. Sector leads for security and justice naturally belong to DPKO, and responsibility for strategy should be managed by the PBSO. Divisions on the social and economic recovery side, as well as public administration, are more complex, and careful attention should be given to ensure that the international architecture does not subvert a field reality. Responsibilities may shift over time – where UNDP through BCPR should be accountable for setting up the exo-skeleton of the state where it does not exist, as state functions come online, the World Bank might take over broader responsibility for public administrative reform.

76. There is perhaps no ‘right’ answer. But an answer, driven by a careful review of actual capacities and the UN Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory, is essential, and we hope that the forthcoming PBSO report on Early Recovery will provide concrete detail. Unless a viable and efficient system of roles and responsibilities is (a) clarified, and (b) driven by real capacity, the current system of clusters and working groups that bring multiple members of marginal relevance into decision making processes will ensure continued incoherence, a failure to deliver, and increased irrelevance for the UN as a whole.

77. The PBC and PBSO have not (to date) taken on the envisaged function of clarifying roles and responsibilities, or for leading strategic processes. In particular, the Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory provided a realistic examination of capacities as they were, rather than as they might be mandated to be, but has languished in a filing cabinet.

78. There are multiple reasons for this lack of engagement, but if left unchanged it leaves the UN system without a focal point for driving towards an effective system for conflict response.

79. Responsibility for this state of affairs is diffuse, a significant variable we believe lies in the lack of attention to the tools of peace and security shown by the UN Secretary-Gen-

eral in his use (or non-use, to be more precise) of the PBSO as a tool through which he could fulfill a core responsibility: to ensure that the UN system responds effectively with all of its tools. That is not just a crisis-specific responsibility: it is the responsibility to articulate a vision of an overall UN system whose political, military, developmental and humanitarian tools can form part of a coherent whole in response to conflict. Yes, responsibilities to deliver on a coherent vision will still be diffused across multiple formal bodies, and lie in the hands of member states: but hard to hold multiple bodies to account for failure to implement a coherent model when the one body capable of articulating that model – the Secretary-General – has failed to do so.

80. More needs to be done to foster clarity in the division of labour for the UN system, including on early recovery and civilian capacity for response; we urge the Secretary-General, with the support of the PBSO, to articulate his vision as a priority.

81. There are other issues that are not the responsibility of PBSO; notably human resources and business processes of the UN system. The business processes of the system, where posts and budgets are specified far in advance, with inadequate planning and low levels of flexibility, are simply not fit for purpose. Peace operations are not six months in duration, never have been, and never will be, and the pretense that this horizon is a reasonable way to plan is a significant detriment to performance. A serious commitment to reform of business practices, to standardized and effective human resources systems and benefits, is essential.

82. The importance of changing the mission planning process, so that the tasks, and therefore the capacities and posts for the mission are specified through a gradual, phasing-up process, cannot be over-emphasized. This requires a fundamental alteration to the budget processes of the UN – including more flexible and more responsive financing. Investments in improving start-up will pay for themselves.

83. Here, we have confidence that the newly established Department for Field Services has the issue well in hand, at least analytically. Whether DFS will be able to build deep enough political support to push through the necessary deep reforms to UN business practices remains to be seen and, again, is the responsibility not of DFS per se but of the Secretary-General.

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## **Annexes**

**(Please click link for access to file)**

**Annex A:  
Capacities by Country and Entity**

**Annex B:  
Table of Capacities Phase I: Start Up (0-90 days)  
Table of Capacities Phase II: Ramp Up (60-240 days)  
Table of Capacities Phase III: Staff Up (180 days onwards)**

**Annex C:  
Post Conflict Reconstruction  
A joint project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Task Framework©  
May 2002**

**Annex D:  
Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks  
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization United States Department of State  
April 2005**

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