



**CENTER ON  
INTERNATIONAL  
COOPERATION**

# **Recovering From Conflict: Strategy For An International Response**

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## **CONTENTS**

**PREFACE**

**SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF RECONSTRUCTION**

- I. ORGANIZING ASSISTANCE FOR SOCIETIES EMERGING FROM CONFLICT**
- II. MOBILIZING ADEQUATE, APPROPRIATE RESOURCES**
- III. DEEPENING INSTITUTIONAL REFORM**
- IV. HARMONIZING AND HUMANIZING AID CONDITIONALITY**
- V. IMPROVING LOCAL COORDINATION**
- VI. BUILDING ON LOCAL CAPACITIES**
- VII. ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY**

**THE WAY FORWARD: A STRATEGIC RECOVERY FACILITY**

**APPENDICES**

## PREFACE

During the 1990s the international donor community pledged more than one hundred billion dollars in aid to three dozen countries recovering from violent conflict. From Cambodia to Bosnia, El Salvador to Rwanda, and Tajikistan to Lebanon, multilateral and bilateral donors have supported conflict resolution and peace-building with generous packages of grants, low-interest loans, debt forgiveness and technical assistance. Providing a bridge between emergency humanitarian relief and long-term development, these financial and material resources are designed to persuade formerly warring parties to resolve conflicts peacefully and intended to lay the foundations for a sustainable transition to economic growth and participatory governance.

While these aid packages undoubtedly have contributed to recovery from conflict, it is nonetheless disturbing that a significant proportion of the pledged resources has either never materialized or done so very slowly. Moreover, the planning and implementation of reconstruction aid has frequently suffered from inadequate preparation, poor coordination and lack of perseverance on the part of donors. In some instances the precise amounts, sources and contents of pledged aid have remained vague, as have the specific conditions attached to it. Moreover, pledges are selective, so that essential but less palatable elements of recovery often are not addressed. At a minimum, these discrepancies produce skepticism among donors, recipients, and publics alike about the ultimate value of the vast amounts purportedly committed to reconstruct conflict-torn societies.

Given the apparent magnitude of the aid response and the contested views of its impact, the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and the Social Science Research Council in September 1997 convened an international group of scholars and practitioners to initiate a comparative study of aid delivery to societies emerging from conflict. Employing a common methodology, teams of scholars from donor and recipient countries spent the following eighteen months investigating six cases: El Salvador, Mozambique, Cambodia, the West Bank and Gaza, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and South Africa.

We selected these cases for a variety of reasons. First, all six transitions have assumed symbolic importance as harbingers of renewed peace and security in the post-Cold War world. Second, their geographic range permitted us to analyze external support for recovery from conflict across different regions. Third, the sample included different types of transitions following assorted types of conflicts: class-based civil war (El Salvador); post-colonial conflict (Mozambique); factional power struggle (Cambodia); battle for racial equality (South Africa); ethnic conflict fanned by political ambition (Bosnia-Herzegovina); and national liberation struggle (West Bank and Gaza). Fourth, the cohort represented different degrees of successful resolution, from consolidated peace (Mozambique) to fragile peace-in-progress (West Bank and Gaza). Together, these studies provide a broadly representative gauge of the international community's capacity and will to mobilize resources and design effective interventions for post-conflict recovery and peace-building in a variety of settings.

The task of each team was to examine any financial and programmatic gaps that occurred along the chain from pledges to disbursement to implementation. We asked the researchers to explain the causes of any gaps with reference to a number of variables. These included the context, composition, sources, and objectives of aid; the conditions placed on assistance; the mechanisms created to mobilize, coordinate, deliver, and track aid; and the absorptive capacities and political environments of the post-conflict states. Finally, the teams were to assess the causes, consequences, and implicit lessons of any gaps between pledges and disbursements.

These four categories of questions promised to establish an empirical record of pledge delivery and to identify causes of delays and/or shortfalls. But the questions transcended these first-order objectives. They also probed the design, coordination, and implementation of foreign assistance

and the respective roles of the donor community and the recipients in mobilizing resources, establishing the terms of assistance, and executing recovery.

As the research teams undertook their specific case studies, Center staff consulted widely with members of the donor community involved in designing, coordinating, delivering, and implementing post-conflict assistance. We met with officials at bilateral aid agencies and foreign ministries; international financial institutions; and the departments, programs, and agencies of the United Nations. During these consultations, the Center was asked to prepare several draft papers for the multi-donor Brookings Roundtable on the Relief to Development Gap.

This report concentrates on concrete policy recommendations for members of the donor community. It is based on insights emanating from the six country studies, from the Center's parallel process of consultations, and from the papers commissioned for the Brookings process. Because it concentrates on broad patterns that reappear across a wide variety of cases, this report makes no effort to capture the finer points of each country case. Those interested in learning more about any of these case studies are encouraged to read the Center's publication, *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). The paper prepared for the Brookings Roundtable, "Meeting Essential Needs in Societies Emerging from Conflict," can be found at [www.nyu.edu/pages/cic/pubs](http://www.nyu.edu/pages/cic/pubs).

The views contained in this report are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of individual participants in the study or of our donors.

## **SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

In this paper we identify seven challenges that the international aid community must address to maximize its support for sustainable peace and reconstruction in the wake of conflict. We call for stricter collaboration in (i) designing aid interventions; (ii) mobilizing resources; (iii) deepening institutional reform; (iv) harmonizing aid conditions; (v) coordinating assistance locally; (vi) enhancing recipient capacities; and (vii) ensuring accountability in aid delivery and implementation. In the end, we recommend institutionalizing these efforts in a new Strategic Recovery Facility that would ensure the timely disbursement of aid in a more coherent and equitable manner.

Although global private capital flows now dwarf official development assistance, most foreign direct investment destined for the developing world focuses on a handful of dynamic emerging markets. Most poor countries — and war-torn ones above all -- are marginalized from conventional world markets. Thus, the donor community retains an indispensable role in assisting beleaguered societies to achieve enduring political stability and sustainable economic growth.

Bilateral and multilateral donors have committed themselves in principle to encourage and support conflict resolution and recovery. They have reaffirmed this objective repeatedly in pledging conferences and other venues by offering generous support for these purposes. Good intentions notwithstanding, external interventions to support recovery have been hindered by insufficient collaboration in the design and execution of assistance; inadequate financing for transitional needs that fall between relief and development; misleading pledging conferences; incompatible aid conditions; inattention to local capacities; unreliable databases; and weak tools to gauge the impact of assistance.

Improving international assistance is not simply a technical exercise. It requires careful analysis and planning and, above all, political will. We believe that our project's findings and concrete

recommendations can dramatically improve performance and thereby help to strengthen that political will. In that spirit, we propose that donors adopt the following steps:

- I. *Formulate an agreed framework for each situation to permit timely and effective collaborative action for recovery from conflict.* This shared vision would define overarching principles, goals, and strategies. It would lay the groundwork for a common needs assessment, a joint action plan, appropriate levels of assistance, a productive division of labor, and benchmarks for evaluation.
- II. *Establish a new compact to mobilize and disburse resources rapidly for transitional situations.* Collectively, donors should consider the value of an expanded and consolidated appeals process and a global reconstruction fund to ensure that essential needs are met in a timely and comprehensive manner. Ideally, they would pool their resources in a single trust fund and utilize other financing tools that encourage collaborative action. Individually, donors should streamline financial support for reconstruction activities and ensure that pledges made at Consultative Group meetings and Roundtables correspond to realistic needs assessments and are driven by recipient priorities.
- III. *Strengthen and accelerate institutional reform.* The United Nations system organizations, international financial institutions, regional actors, and bilateral donors should provide greater authority and resources to their functional post-conflict units and explore fruitful divisions of labor based upon their respective comparative advantages. The establishment of a strategic recovery facility would be an effective mechanism to bring about the full integration of these efforts.
- IV. *Harmonize and humanize the conditions placed on assistance.* The donor community must ensure that the various conditions it places on aid are appropriate, coherent, and consistently upheld. In particular, they need to reconcile their support for macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment with their concerns for social adjustment and peace-building.
- V. *Improve coordination in the field.* While individual donors should establish a local presence as early as possible and delegate authority to their country missions, they should also place their resources at the disposal of a common country-level effort, and work within the leadership structure established under the agreed framework. The agency with the greatest local capacity and legitimacy should take the lead.
- VI. *Place the capacities of societies emerging from conflict at center stage.* Donors should encourage local ownership of policies and programs by working with recipient governments and civil society actors at every stage, ensuring that local parties shape the aid agenda. Donors should help finance important public sector expenditures, temper their concern for macroeconomic and fiscal balance with a clear recognition of the fiscal implications of peace-building, facilitate debt reduction, and encourage mobilization of local resources and cost sharing arrangements. The donor community must adopt realistic time frames that permit sustainable recovery from conflict.
- VII. *Create a standardized, transparent system for tracking and monitoring aid flows and sharpen the tools to assess the impact of aid.* It is imperative that donors create a database in each situation to track pledges, commitments, and disbursements to countries under reconstruction. Benchmarks need to be established in order to evaluate the effectiveness of aid and undertake corrective action as programs unfold.

Each of these individual steps, if implemented, promises to strengthen the international community's ability to respond effectively when societies emerge from conflict. Their full impact can only be realized, however, if they are brought together in a new, holistic approach to recovery. Too often, the international community has missed valuable opportunities to save lives, livelihoods, and assets in responding to crises as it struggles laboriously to find common ground, resources, and structures to respond to recovery needs.

We therefore recommend the establishment of a full-fledged Strategic Recovery Facility to facilitate timely and effective action. Such a Facility would be open to the participation of the core organizations of the United Nations system (including the Bretton Woods institutions), regional organizations, national governments who choose to contribute or pledge support, and non-governmental organizations. The Facility would have dedicated funds available for its own analytical tasks, as well as a standing trust fund or a pre-negotiated standby funding arrangement to jump-start recovery activities. It would serve as the convening authority to initiate action in particular cases, providing the integrated support needed to enhance each partner's individual response capacity until such time as the country team and local actors have taken over that role.

## **INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF RECONSTRUCTION**

The end of the Cold War raised hopes that the international community might employ an anticipated "peace dividend" for social and economic development in many impoverished and war-torn societies. In fact, some ninety new conflicts, largely intrastate in nature, erupted between 1989 and 1996, demanding huge financial outlays for both humanitarian relief and peace-building. The United Nations system quickly found its capacities taxed by complex humanitarian emergencies characterized by recurrent violence, the breakdown of governing institutions, the destruction of physical infrastructure, the displacement of populations, and massive human suffering. The initial international response was focused on humanitarian emergencies, so that by 1996 ten percent of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and one half of the UN aid budget were devoted to relief.

As the humanitarian tide crested and the prospects for peace reemerged in many areas, the focus of international aid turned to laying the foundation for durable peace and recovery. There were many candidates for such assistance. By 1999 some forty countries were struggling to emerge from protracted civil violence. (See Appendix 2). Most of these ranked among the poorest in the world -- and the furthest from international development objectives. Just as grinding poverty helped to ignite conflict, so it promised to complicate subsequent recovery.

Given the magnitude of the problem, no single donor state or international organization could, by itself, address the multiple needs or bear the tremendous costs associated with reconstructing war-torn states as scattered and diverse as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Guatemala. Successful recovery in these cases demands multilateral cooperation among bilateral donors, UN agencies, international financial institutions (IFIs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as a central role for local actors. At the same time, the heterogeneity of these countries and divergent political interests among donors make it difficult to formulate consistent, harmonized policies to assist recovery efforts.

### *Multiple Transitions*

International efforts to reconstruct societies torn by protracted violence fall under the rubric of "post-conflict peace-building." This concept was introduced in *An Agenda for Peace* (1991), Boutros Boutros-Ghali's vision for post-Cold War security. The UN Secretary-General defined the phrase as collective "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict." Post-conflict recovery is an integral element of peace-building. Indeed, most of the peace accords ending internal conflicts during the 1990s have been accompanied by ambitious reconstruction schemes addressing multiple and sometimes conflicting political, social, and economic objectives.

Of course, the label "post-conflict" may be misleading when applied to countries where formerly warring parties have signed peace agreements. The conflicts of power, interest, or identity that

spawn civil violence do not disappear after the cessation of formal hostilities. Instead, the parties to peace accords simply consent to resolve their differences in a non-violent manner through new procedures and institutions that may possess fragile legitimacy. In practice, violence may persist at lower levels within the society, continue unabated in certain regions, or flare sporadically. Moreover, refugees and internally displaced persons may begin to return to their homes or communities, even as conflict continues, thereby triggering the need for international aid. Consolidating fragile settlements remains a long-term process, one driven by internal dynamics and susceptible to reversals. The goal for donors is to design assistance packages that provide incentives for the non-violent expression, management, and resolution of conflicts, even while attending to the pressing needs of their civilian victims.

Although each conflict situation has unique attributes, successful recovery often involves a "triple transition": a *security* transition from war to peace; a *political* transition from authoritarianism (or totalitarianism) to a more participatory form of government; and a *socio-economic* transition, including the rebuilding of economic capacities and, frequently, the movement from a controlled to a market economy. The sequence and duration of these transitions can vary significantly, even as some level of conflict persists. Thus, the aid profile of societies emerging from conflict often contains simultaneous needs for emergency and reconstruction aid, as well as development assistance. Appendix 4 presents a matrix of transitional needs in societies emerging from conflict.

Sustainable recovery from conflict requires laying new foundations for social peace, political stability, and economic growth in beleaguered countries. To advance these war-to-peace, political, and socioeconomic transitions, donors have supported an awesome array of essential activities. They have helped to draft and implement peace accords, plan and monitor disarmament, demobilize and reintegrate combatants, train local police, and restore human security. They have promoted efforts to re-establish the rule of law, conduct democratic elections, draft new constitutions, reform judicial systems, rebuild state structures, improve local governance, and monitor human rights. And they have provided assistance to reintegrate refugees and displaced persons, provide essential services, restore transportation and communication links, rebuild social capital, repair infrastructure, jump-start industrial and agricultural production, reconstitute financial institutions, and revive commercial activity. These undertakings are complex, costly, and involve some risk. Their scope and complexity are pressing donors to adapt their institutional, financial, and operational procedures and to explore new mechanisms to establish priorities, coordinate their separate initiatives, share costs, and develop effective divisions of labor and responsibility.

Unfortunately, coordination does not come easily, and bilateral donors and international agencies are still struggling to adjust their ample humanitarian and development capacities to meet both the immediate and transitional needs of societies emerging from conflict. Moreover, the resources available to support recovery from conflict have been restricted by budgetary retrenchment and growing disillusionment about foreign aid in donor countries.

In the following sections we analyze these several challenges, ones that the international aid community must address if it is to maximize its support for sustainable peace and reconstruction.

## **I ORGANIZING ASSISTANCE TO SOCIETIES EMERGING FROM CONFLICT**

Despite the centrality of external assistance for sustainable recovery from conflict, the framework to design, coordinate, and deliver such aid remains woefully fragmented. Essentially, the donor community improvises a new aid response for each situation. Such initiatives are carried out by a host of autonomous actors, including donor states, international financial institutions, United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, and local actors. The resulting amalgam of interests, mandates, and capacities can stymie collective action, delaying early donor engagement and thwarting agreement on common approaches essential to success.

Recently, donors and development agencies have taken tentative steps to formulate common principles and best practices to inform their interventions. These include the OECD/DAC guidelines on *Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation*, the UN's "Strategic Framework Approach for Response to and Recovery from Crisis," and the World Bank's official guidelines, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank*. In addition, there have been some efforts at internal reform, particularly within the United Nations system.

Nevertheless, external support for post-conflict recovery remains a voluntary and essentially ad hoc enterprise. To begin with, bilateral donors, UN agencies, international financial institutions, and regional organizations are selective in their involvement in particular countries. Beyond the uncertainty of donor financing, the effectiveness of recovery aid is marred by inadequate coordination among multiple external actors pursuing different goals through independent aid efforts. Unfortunate results include incoherent strategies, incompatible projects, redundant initiatives, gaps in assistance, insufficient accountability, and minimal organizational learning. To make optimal use of scarce resources, post-conflict reconstruction needs to be under-girded by more reliable institutional and financial arrangements.

#### *Essential Needs of Recovery from Conflict*

There is by now broad agreement that the sustainable movement to social, economic, and political stability in societies emerging from conflict cannot occur unless donors and local partners invest in a set of urgent, essential activities. These time-sensitive needs, which often go unmet, reflect the widespread destruction of the social, economic and political fabric of societies following prolonged conflict. While the actual priorities and their sequencing will vary from case to case, the following elements are indicative of the range of needs that must be addressed early on if the ground is to be secured for sustainable peace and economic development.

#### ***Essential Elements in Post-Conflict Recovery***

- repatriation, reintegration and reconciliation
- human rights, including property and identity
- public safety and security, including demobilization and policing
- infrastructure recovery, including water, sanitation, shelter, transportation
- food security and agricultural rehabilitation, including land tenure designation and registration
- basic health, education and social welfare requirements, including employment and income generation
- operative governance structures, including rule of law and other civil society institutions
- elections, including voter education
- (Appendix 4 provides a detailed matrix of essential elements of post-conflict recovery).

A cross-cutting theme underlying most of these elements is a focus on the special needs of women, children and the elderly, as these vulnerable groups invariably comprise a majority of the affected population.

### *The Nature of the Gap*

Many of these essential needs tend to go unattended or suffer serious time delays as humanitarian assistance begins to taper off and longer-term reconstruction aid remains in the planning stage. For example, refugees and internally displaced persons often return without the assurance of longer-term support for their effective reintegration into the economic and social life of their communities. Human rights monitoring, policing, and other measures required to build public confidence in the governing authority's capacity to maintain order and to settle disputes peacefully are far less likely to be funded and may suffer far greater delays in aid disbursement than the rebuilding of infrastructure or the provision of food. Food distribution itself takes precedence over registration of land titled and rehabilitation of agricultural production. Local NGOs suffer in the competition for resources with public sector authorities, even though donors remain reluctant to finance recurrent costs.

A variety of political, institutional and financial factors create these gaps, including the distinct mandates and funding windows of humanitarian relief and development agencies. In addition, the diverse political interests of donor countries contribute to sectoral gaps in funding and, even more critically, to the uneven distribution of resources across countries emerging from conflict. Even in countries of high donor interest, substantial gaps may occur in the timing, allocation, and actual dollar amounts pledged, committed and disbursed because of political and administrative problems within donor countries, lack of donor confidence, limited absorptive capacity of recipients, debt arrears, and/or unmet conditionality. Still, the most significant gaps may result simply from a lack of effective coordination in planning and implementing programs.

### *An Effective Response: Moving From Coordination to Integration*

There is an unmistakable need to address the problems of societies emerging from conflict in a timely and coherent manner in order to ensure a greater likelihood that they will move toward sustainable peace and development rather than return to conflict. The elements of an effective response are now largely agreed, albeit stated in an increasing number of separate "framework" documents developed to guide the activities of individual bilateral and multilateral agencies. The most comprehensive and inclusive rendering, and one which provides the basis for an effective operational response, is to be found in the OECD DAC publication, *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century*.

"The challenge is to overcome the functional distinctions of the various agencies involved and to integrate, rather than merely co-ordinate, relief, rehabilitation and development objectives within the framework of a long-term strategy."

--OECD/DAC, *Conflict, Peace and Development* (p. 48).

The following paragraphs clarify the elements of an effective response to immediate recovery needs in the context of longer-term reconstruction and development aims.

- It is essential to establish a **common vision** based on agreed principles, shared points of reference and a common agenda for recovery and reconstruction. This framework should articulate the rationale for action and establish general policy guidelines for a comprehensive and coordinated political and assistance response within which donors can exercise their own interests and preferences. It should identify and prioritize common objectives and ensure adherence by international and local partners to agreed policies and program goals.

- A recognized **convening authority**, consisting of representatives of partnering agencies, needs to be identified at headquarters and in the field to kick-start and organize the aid process, to ensure consistency between the principles and goals articulated in the agreed framework and agencies' actions, to resolve differences, and to encourage complementarity.
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- A **common needs assessment** is essential for effective and efficient program design and implementation. The assessment should begin even as the conflict is underway, should highlight the essential economic, social and political reintegration elements noted above and should consider the linkages between them and longer-term reconstruction and development needs. It should be sensitive to variations and contingencies in conflict settlement. Situation-specific strategic analyses, based on a clear understanding of local conditions, are essential to setting priorities and sequencing response activities.
- Even as a long-term reconstruction strategy is being developed, a **joint action plan** for immediate recovery must be designed and implemented quickly by donors, intergovernmental agencies, NGOs and — to the greatest extent possible — by local actors. It should include elements of scenario planning and should be flexible enough to allow partners to adjust quickly in an uncertain environment. To allow for critical evaluation of efforts to assist recovery, the joint action plan should include stipulated benchmarks, specific and measurable objectives, monitoring mechanisms, and a timetable for periodic evaluations of progress in the field. Establishment of an independent evaluation mechanism should be considered.
- A productive **division of labor** based on capacity, comparative advantage and complementarity needs to be devised in order to minimize duplication and competition. Joint action plans should stipulate the relationship between humanitarian and development actors, including their specific roles, the linkages between their activities, and their entry and exit strategies, based upon a well-defined work plan and a reasonable timeframe. Special attention should be paid to the identification of local partners who can begin to build the legitimate public and civil society structures necessary for longer-term reconstruction and development.
- A **strategic financing mechanism** must be in place to enable funds for essential activities to flow in a timely manner, even as donors assist in the creation of longer-term development plans and multi-year country funds. These start-up funds should be pooled in order to ensure institutional coordination and program coherence and should be flexible enough to meet a variety of contingencies that may arise. Funding should follow substance and be based on stipulated needs and well-developed country plans. It should be applied in ways that entice contending parties to invest in peace.
- Donors should create a mechanism to **track aid flows and evaluate their effectiveness**. A comprehensive, transparent database should be designed to carefully monitor pledges, commitments and disbursements. In order to minimize any "reinvention of the wheel," aid officials should attempt to extract lessons about program implementation and agency division of labor that might be applied to subsequent cases.

## II. MOBILIZING ADEQUATE, APPROPRIATE RESOURCES

Societies emerging from conflict require flexible, quick-disbursing funds designed to meet the special tasks of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Unfortunately, unlike funding for the UN's peace-making and peacekeeping missions, which is based on regular budget assessments, contributions for recovery activities are entirely voluntary. Consequently, they tend to be unpredictable and subject to lengthy, competitive fundraising campaigns. Furthermore, few donors possess budgetary windows designed specifically for transitional needs falling between humanitarian and traditional development assistance.

Over the past decade, donors have realized that there is no simple "continuum" linking relief, recovery, and development. Rather, these spheres of activity overlap temporally and spatially in crisis environments. The challenge is to build complementarity into the efforts of different donors by recognizing the forward and backward linkages between different types of aid interventions.

Unfortunately, budgetary, institutional, and operational divisions limit cooperation between humanitarian and development actors in planning interventions, mobilizing resources, and implementing projects. As a rule, relief and development activities are designed by different departments or agencies; funded through distinct windows; approved through dissimilar procedures; shaped by disparate political considerations; subject to divergent timetables; and implemented by diverse actors. Relief funds usually need to be disbursed within one year, a time horizon too short to launch sustainable recovery. Recovery is thus forced to rely on slower-disbursing development aid that is often conditioned on macroeconomic or political criteria and does not flow seamlessly when relief funding ends — exacerbating the so-called relief-to-development gap.

Several multilateral agencies, international financial institutions, and bilateral donors have recently created new functional units, budget lines, or financing windows to meet transitional needs that fall between relief and development. In 1998, some two dozen post-conflict units began to hold semi-annual meetings to share information and resources, to establish common standards and principles, to learn the lessons of experience and enumerate "best practices," and to explore joint initiatives in high-priority countries. For example, UNDP, UNHCR, the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, and CIDA now possess financial instruments dedicated to post-conflict recovery. Some of these specialized units have shown themselves capable of flexible and innovative programming, of disbursing funds quickly, and of collaborating with one another. Still, most possess modest budgets and staffs and remain marginal within their respective organizations or governments. While such units offer valuable "venture capital," their limited resources restrict them to responding to targets of opportunity rather than developing comprehensive relief, recovery, and reconstruction plans.

### *Expand the Consolidated Appeals Process?*

At the global level the international community lacks a "third funding window" between humanitarian assistance and conventional development aid to address essential recovery needs. In complex emergencies, resources dry up when the crisis moves into the less acute recovery phase. Hoping to close this financing gap, the United Nations experimented with an Expanded Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (or ECAP). The ECAP was designed to mobilize resources for urgent recovery activities like the reintegration of demobilized soldiers or the organization of post-conflict elections, but at a much faster pace than conventional pledging conferences. Currently, both Consultative Group (CG) and Roundtable meetings occur too late to address priority rehabilitation. Moreover, the CG process requires a legitimate recipient government, sometimes lacking in conflict environments. In response to such transitional needs, the UN has incorporated some activities to support recovery from conflict into its humanitarian appeals process. However, the CAP is seriously constrained, realizing only 30% of its overall requests in 1999 and only 5% in some specific country cases.

### *Reform the Pledging Process*

Given the paucity of flexible, fast-disbursing resources, serious external assistance for recovery typically arrives only after the donor community convenes a multilateral pledging conference. In these gatherings, which include Roundtables and Consultative Group meetings, donor countries, UN agencies, and IFIs meet with local representatives to evaluate proposed reconstruction plans and to offer pledges to finance them.

Pledging forums provide donors with a setting to consult with one another, to shape the recovery plans and aid priorities of war-torn states, to offer incentives that may deepen local commitments to peace, and to establish, publicize and enforce aid conditions. From the perspective of the recipient country and the implementing agencies, these conferences offer high-profile occasions to concentrate the minds of donor governments, to mobilize international resources, and to gain public assurances that at least some of their needs will be met.

Unfortunately, pledging conferences suffer from institutional and procedural flaws. Donors frequently exaggerate the generosity of their aid packages by double-counting aid previously promised or already delivered to an implementing agency that will subsequently report the same amount. Alternatively, donors may pledge large amounts they cannot deliver soon (or ever). While this tendency to "dress up" modest pledges may create a sense of momentum in the peace process and meet a number of political and bureaucratic needs, it may also raise unrealistic expectations.

Apart from the problem of pledge inflation, the composition of aid packages is often driven not by objective needs but by the priorities of foreign governments or international agencies pursuing national or institutional objectives -- or hoping for a leadership role in the recovery effort. When pledging aid, donors "pick and choose" among geographic regions and sectoral initiatives. Seeking credit for their efforts, they prefer to fund grand, eye-catching infrastructure projects like public buildings, bridges, or utilities, whereas more modest, less visible reconciliation and peace-building projects might be more appropriate and sustainable. Because donors tend to be risk averse, they generally avoid funding potentially controversial activities such as security sector reform. Certain other sectors, including education and agriculture, are chronically under-funded. In addition, donors often earmark aid to target groups like demobilized soldiers at the expense of other vulnerable populations. Likewise, donors tend to focus heavily on urban initiatives rather than rural ones, creating "islands" of assistance. Lastly, their frequent insistence on bilateral aid tied to their own national service providers creates a fragmented assistance regime and places administrative burdens on recovering countries.

To strengthen pledging conferences, the donor community should create a monitoring system to guarantee that pledges are honest, realistic, and transparent. Second, donors should develop procedures to ensure that aid corresponds to objective needs and capacities, including close consultation with recipient representatives. Third, donors should draft formal guidelines to govern pledging forums. These would define relations between donors and development partners (including a role for NGOs and other civil society actors), outline mechanisms to reach collective agreement on recovery plans, and create robust mechanisms to coordinate and track aid delivery.

### *Alternative Funding Mechanisms*

In the absence of a dedicated facility, the international community will continue to create special *ad hoc* mechanisms for each recovering country. Within the UN System, several tools exist to facilitate collaborative financing, including trust funds, cost-sharing, and parallel financing. Each instrument can involve a variety of multilateral organizations, governments, financial institutions, NGOs, and private sector actors. Each has its own advantages and constraints. In order to facilitate collaboration among the UN system organizations and their governmental and non-governmental partners, however, a thorough analysis of these various financial mechanisms is needed. It would be useful to identify procedural obstacles such as cumbersome pre-implementation approval requirements, as well as opportunities for harmonization, and to propose revisions that allow for a further delegation from headquarters to the country level, including increased accountability and strengthened auditing, as is done in the private sector. This could then lead to an integrated and commonly accepted "options catalogue" of streamlined, simplified instruments for use by the practitioners at the country level, where most of the recovery work is done.

### *Mobilize Local Resources*

Even as they provide assistance and lessen debt burdens, donors cannot afford to ignore local resources. Too often in conflict environments, foreign aid agencies and international NGOs overwhelm indigenous coping mechanisms and displace local human, financial, and material capacities. At the same time, they often underestimate the value of local, "in-kind" resources, including staff, premises, facilities, transportation, and communication. To avoid fostering dependency, external actors should use explicit conditionality and policy dialogue to leverage the available and potential assets of societies emerging from conflict.

The contrasting experiences of El Salvador and Guatemala may be instructive. In El Salvador, the donor community failed to press the government to devote sufficient national resources to peace-related programs. The government's attitude was that international actors should fund these activities. In Guatemala, in contrast, the widespread impression that external aid would be meager led to the inclusion of a provision in the peace accords to raise the country's fiscal revenue. At the conceptual level, at least, the government accepted the principle that recovery from conflict is a joint venture. Whether or not the Guatemalan government is willing or able to live up to its commitment to raise revenue, the precedent is important and should be encouraged.

## **III. DEEPENING INSTITUTIONAL REFORM**

Putting these mobilization among the leading international actors involved in recovery from conflict. Over the past decade, the donor community has taken some initial, tentative steps to adapt existing institutions to transitional activities falling between conventional relief and development assistance. However, the United Nations, the international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donor agencies must work more diligently to coordinate their responses in conflict environments.

### *Strengthen UN Coordination*

The Secretary-General's reform program of July 1997 elevated post-conflict peace-building to the top of the UN's agenda. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was designated the "focal point" for these activities within the UN System, an assignment that reflected the political nature of the undertaking and DPA's institutional role as chair of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security. Unfortunately, DPA's authority and capacity to coordinate UN interventions are limited by the department's lack of operational responsibilities and the injunction that it "fully respect existing

mandates, lines of authority, and funding arrangements" within the UN system. <sup>1</sup> Moreover, when peacekeeping is at the core of a mission, lead responsibility shifts to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

The funds and programs of the United Nations, such as UNDP, UNICEF, and UNHCR have been prominent actors in their respective domains in supporting recovery from conflict. Operationally, UNDP has taken a lead role. Its Emergency Response Division (ERD) monitors countries in "special development circumstances," assists the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in elaborating and reviewing Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals (CAPs) that include rehabilitation, and supports UN Resident Coordinators in crisis countries. Besides administering trust funds to which donors may contribute, UNDP employs fast disbursing "TRAC 1.1.3" resources to develop strategic approaches and to launch special program initiatives in crisis settings. However, these funds remain modest (\$50 million in 1998). For its part, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has long spearheaded the resettlement of refugees. To finance its operations, UNHCR depends upon core financing from donor governments and CAP appeals for emergency situations. It also administers a \$20 million Voluntary Repatriation Fund. The World Food Program (WFP) conducts extensive relief, recovery and development programs in conflict situations. Other agencies, such as WHO and FAO, also have specialized units in place to address the needs of recovery from conflict.

Several efforts are underway to promote joint planning and coordination efforts within the UN and the extended multilateral family to respond to conflict, complex emergencies, and peace-building. Recent initiatives have been launched, for example, by the Executive Committees on Peace and Security (ECPS) and Humanitarian Assistance (ECHA), by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration, by the ECOSOC humanitarian segment, and by the Deputy Secretary General. The Executive Heads of the UN System organizations, meeting in the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), have similarly tried to harmonize their actions at the country level through the Resident Coordinator system. These are all encouraging initiatives. Additional welcome developments include letters of understanding between the UN Secretary General and the President of the World Bank and the Brookings Roundtable process initiated by the High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Bank President. The opportunity now exists to link these various efforts in a coordinated strategy for humanitarian relief, post-conflict recovery, and development.

Despite these and other initiatives, the United Nations remains a fragmented system of competing organizations. The departments, programs, and agencies of the UN system spend inordinate time and energy jockeying for responsibilities and resources, rather than judiciously assessing their relative capacities and comparative advantages and exploring fruitful divisions of labor on the basis of these strengths. To harmonize UN responses to recovery from conflict, the Deputy Secretary-General has taken responsibility for developing the Strategic Framework approach, setting out common principles for collaboration within the UN system. Unfortunately, the latter remains stronger on broad concepts than concrete operational measures. Moreover, by placing the UN at the middle of several concentric circles of actors concerned with recovery from conflict, the Strategic Framework automatically relegates other players, such as key bilateral donors and NGOs, to a secondary role. In reality, the UN system may sometimes be only peripheral to large-scale operations conducted by others.

### *Mobilize the Bretton Woods Institutions*

The Bretton Woods Institutions have become important actors in supporting recovery from war and preventing the re-emergence of violent conflict. By spring 1998, the World Bank had committed \$6.2 billion in loans to support reconstruction operations in 18 countries and provided post-conflict grants worth \$400 million. One quarter of its concessional lending now goes to nations emerging from conflict. In summer 1997, the Bank created an internal Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) to collect and monitor information on crisis countries, organize missions to post-conflict countries, develop "best practices" for donors, and coordinate with international partners. The unit has authority over an \$8 million Post-Conflict Fund and acts as a custodian for a \$16 million Japanese Post-Conflict Trust Fund. The Bank has an important role to play in post-conflict situations by advising parties on the economic dimensions of peace accords; assisting the assessment of local needs; mobilizing resources through the CG process; arranging the clearance of arrears; assisting governments in coordinating macroeconomic policy; restoring physical infrastructure; and monitoring aid flows.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been more tentative than the Bank in adapting its procedures to the needs of countries emerging from conflict. Still, the Fund has expanded the scope of its existing policies on disaster assistance to include "carefully defined post-conflict situations." Henceforth, the IMF will consider assisting a post-conflict country experiencing severe balance of payments difficulties if the recipient government demonstrates sufficient capacity and commitment to plan and implement an acceptable economic program and if IMF assistance is provided in the context of a "concerted international effort." Access to Fund resources -- recently raised to 50% of the country's quota -- is contingent on the recipient's presentation of a compelling economic policy and an intention to move as soon as possible to a normal borrowing arrangement. Under new terms introduced in April 1999, the IMF's post-conflict loans may be made retroactively concessional after one year.

Although the recent innovations by the Bretton Woods institutions are to be welcomed, these institutional reforms need to be deepened. First, the Bank has not yet given sufficient operational content to its institutional guidelines on post-conflict activities nor revised its current operational policy for disaster assistance to address such contexts. Second, the Bank's procurement and disbursement procedures often create stumbling blocks to recovery, including untimely aid delivery. Third, the Bank's Board has yet to agree on several problematic questions, such as: when to re-engage crisis countries; what to do if hostilities resume; which sectors call for a leading Bank role; when and how to apply of debt relief; and whether to create a global trust fund or rely on country-specific trust funds to meet post-conflict situations. Similarly, the IMF's recent policy shifts remain inadequate. Not only do the Fund's criteria for distinguishing among aid candidates remain vague, but the new facility also fails to address the clearance of arrears, a crushing burden for many post-conflict states.

### *Strengthen and Support Regional Organizations*

A number of regional organizations and international financial institutions have begun to take on greater responsibilities for assisting recovery from violent conflict. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was the leading donor to finance the recovery of El Salvador. Among regional entities, the Commission of the European Union has become the most important actor in supporting recovery from conflict. It addresses these contingencies through its development directorate, which has recently merged with the former European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO). By and large, however, the mandates of regional multilateral development banks and regional organizations remain geared toward either conventional development situations or humanitarian relief. Few have budget windows to facilitate the rapid disbursement of reconstruction aid.

Many recent conflicts, although defined as intra-state, possess important international dimensions, including the flows of refugees and arms across borders and the destabilization of neighboring economies. Recognizing that internal violence has implications for broader peace and security, a number of regional and sub-regional organizations, such as the OAS and ECOWAS in Africa, have begun to develop mechanisms and instruments to respond to nearby conflict and its aftermath. While this assumption of increased responsibility by regional actors is to be welcomed, the capacity of such entities to act effectively is often limited by financial and material constraints. The donor community must not use the shared desire for burden sharing as an excuse for burden shifting to regional and sub-regional institutions that lack sufficient resources to accomplish vital tasks of supporting recovery from conflict.

#### *Improve Coordination among Bilateral Donors*

In parallel with these initiatives by the UN, the IFIs, and regional organizations, bilateral donors have used the OECD/DAC forum to formulate a set of guidelines on *Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation*. In the words of the DAC, the objective of development cooperation is to achieve an environment of "structural stability," characterized by social peace, the rule of law, human rights, social and economic development, and representative political institutions capable of resolving change and resolving disputes in a non-violent manner.

Since the OECD has a development policy secretariat but no operational arm, the DAC guidelines contain little operational content about how to achieve the espoused objective of creating responses that are "more coordinated, coherent, and integrated." In addition, they offer conflicting advice about the appropriate form that coordination should take. On the one hand, they ask development partners to designate "an independent coordinating authority to monitor the donors' adherence to agreed principles." Yet elsewhere, they distinguish the "voluntary character" of aid coordination from "the concept of 'management,' which implies substantial control of the various elements present." <sup>2</sup> In addition, the guidelines are essentially silent on the topic of aid conditionality.

In sum, there is a pattern of poor coordination and integration that characterizes global, regional, and national efforts to advance recovery from conflict. The international community needs an overarching framework to coordinate the efforts of multilateral organizations, bilateral actors, regional entities, and NGOs, as well as to mainstream the transitional activities of these various entities into their overall development and humanitarian responses.

## **IV. HARMONIZING AND HUMANIZING AID CONDITIONALITY**

As a result of their diverse mandates and interests, different sets of external actors are apt to place conditions on their assistance that are incompatible, or at least exist in tension. Since recovery from conflict is a political as well as an economic undertaking, donors must harmonize their political strategy for peace implementation with their assistance strategy for reconstruction and self-sustaining growth. In practice, this does not always occur. Rather, the two strategies may be designed, pursued, and supervised along two independent tracks. One result has been a clash between an "economic" approach to aid conditionality, which makes aid contingent on economic performance, and a "political" approach, which makes it contingent on peace-building objectives.

The most troubling inconsistencies have arisen from the competing priorities of international financial institutions (IFIs), which generally focus on macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment in isolation of wider considerations, and other external actors concerned with preventing the resumption of armed conflict. For example, peace-building imperatives collided with concerns about economic rigor in Mozambique and El Salvador. In both cases, the World Bank and the IMF pursued neoliberal economic orthodoxy, failing to use their leverage to assure the fulfillment of peace accords, and imposing conditions that according to some observers aggravated social inequality and undermined political reconciliation.

Donors need to harmonize aid interventions to advance both economic recovery and peace. Aid to assist recovery must be embedded in the political reality of the transition process: donors cannot afford to design aid conditions as if a conflict had never occurred. Rather than implementing conventional structural adjustment, donors should advance peace-building goals by showing greater tolerance for public sector expenditures and budget deficits; by funding programs mandated by peace accords; by considering the distributional implications of their economic and political conditions; and by employing performance criteria and informal dialogue to ensure compliance with peace-related commitments.

Recognizing the primacy of the peace-building imperative, the Carnegie Commission report, *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1997) calls on the World Bank and the IMF to cooperate with the United Nations, "so that economic inducements can play a more central role in early prevention and in post-conflict reconstruction." Similarly, the Secretary-General's 1998 report on Africa [3](#) insists that structural adjustment be "people-friendly," so as not to re-ignite conflict. As the document notes, the IMF's "policies of austerity have sometimes hindered reconciliation."

Despite their self-described "apolitical" status, the Bank and the Fund now condition lending on politically sensitive criteria like "financial transparency," "good governance," and "unproductive expenditures" like high defense spending. They do so on the grounds of economic efficiency and sustainable development. The IFIs have also begun to incorporate social impact analyses into their lending practices and safety nets into their stabilization and structural adjustment packages. In similar fashion, they might shape their lending and non-lending activities according to country-specific analyses of the potential implications of their aid for mitigating social conflict.

The World Bank has taken tentative steps to introduce peace-building considerations into its operations. It now realizes that structural adjustment programs must be "peace-friendly" and that the actual sequence of economic policy and governance reforms should be "tailored to avoid threatening the sustainability of peace agreements." Moreover, a recent internal review concedes great difficulty in "drawing the line" between economic and political issues in situations of recovery from conflict. In the past, the Bank's "conventional wisdoms" have sometimes threatened sustainable recovery from conflict. When confronting "deeply divided societies," the Bank may wish to use "policy and economic conditionality" to encourage "economic and distributional policies and programs that can avoid a slide into conflict." [4](#)

Within the donor community more broadly, the past decade has witnessed the emergence of a "second generation" of aid conditionality focused on democratic governance, human rights, administrative accountability, and curtailed military expenditures. The DAC, for example, cites the "vital connection between open democratic and accountable political systems, individual rights, and the effective and equitable operation of economic systems." Bilateral donors recently commissioned a task force to study "Development Cooperation Incentives for Peace."

Unfortunately OECD member states rarely speak with one voice in designing or enforcing the terms of aid. Instead, they tend to stipulate irreconcilable conditions and react disjointedly when recipients fail to meet these terms. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, donors conditioned delivery of aid on progress towards a single multi-ethnic state, support for refugee return, and cooperation with the international war crimes tribunal. But they did not impose these terms equally on the parties to the conflict and, indeed, used bilateral aid channels to evade their application. Likewise, in Cambodia donors responded inconsistently following Hun Sen's coup of July 1997, and the divided donor community enjoyed little leverage over the new government.

If peace conditionality is to be effective, it must rest on a firmer multilateral foundation. Donors must consult among themselves to formulate clear and credible aid conditions, pursue coordinated policies towards the recipient, create mechanisms to monitor conditions, and avoid the tendency to enforce conditions selectively. A more rigorous approach to peace conditionality may create uncomfortable dilemmas. For example, donors may confront short-term trade-offs between the requirements of political stability and their interest in promoting early elections as part of an early exit strategy. Similarly, donors will need to weigh the human and political costs of denying assistance to authorities who fail to meet their commitments to the peace process against the human and political costs of a failure to consolidate the peace.

## V. IMPROVING LOCAL COORDINATION

As a matter of principle, aid coordination is a task that belongs squarely in the mandate of recipient governments. They alone have the responsibility for deciding what aid to request, from whom to request it, and how to weave external assistance into their own development strategies. However, governance structures are often fragmentary following conflict, and the international community will by default often need to take on a disproportionate role in the coordination process, while over time orchestrating a hand-over of these tasks.

Under such circumstances, the sheer number of international actors involved in efforts to support recovery has required donors, generally in consultation with recipient authorities, to create complex structures of local aid coordination. Inevitably, these mechanisms vary with the peculiarities of the specific context, including the nature of the conflict and the degree to which peace has been consolidated; the identity, weight, and interests of the leading donors; the political status and capacities of the local authorities; and the recipient country's dependence on external assistance.

Because each bilateral donor, international agency, and IFI has its own mandate and autonomy, it is inherently difficult to formulate a common strategy for reconstruction and peace-building. These tensions and inconsistencies are exacerbated by the simultaneity or overlap of several different transitions. The recovering country may be moving all at once from war to peace, from a command to a market economy, from an authoritarian to a pluralistic political system, and from a complex emergency to a more conventional development situation. Moreover, the machinery to coordinate foreign aid often coexists with a framework for peace implementation. Although these twin tracks of external involvement are ostensibly complementary, the coordinating bodies established to oversee delivery of aid and compliance with peace accords often have different members, mandates, and priorities.

On the basis of findings from the Pledges of Aid country studies, we urge donors to implement the following recommendations:

### *Create Coordination Mechanisms Promptly*

To begin with, and notwithstanding the principle of national ownership set out earlier, donors should establish structures of local aid coordination as soon as possible in cases where local authorities lack sufficient capacity to do so on their own. Failure to do so can delay essential recovery tasks. For example, the Paris Accords of October 1991 insisted that the priorities for Cambodia's national reconstruction await the formation of that country's first democratically elected government. This postponed for two years both Cambodia's first comprehensive recovery plan and the initial meeting of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia. Moreover, the peace agreements neglected to clarify donor roles, to specify aid targets, or to create a timetable for assistance. Donors themselves failed to create an integrated system to plan, integrate, manage, and monitor their various aid programs.

Experience in several conflict environments, including the West Bank and Gaza, suggests that there is value in creating multi-tiered coordination mechanisms, with inclusive and exclusive memberships. These might include high-level political forums to oversee progress towards peace-building goals, a committee to coordinate overall assistance, and working groups to supervise aid implementation in particular sectors. Recipients, if not already fully in control of these mechanisms, should enjoy representation within them from the outset and assume increasing responsibilities for setting the agenda within them.

### *Delegate Authority to the Field*

Past experience suggest that donors should establish field-based management structures immediately. Local coordination has been particularly effective when agencies have delegated significant administrative and financial authority, including control over budgetary matters, to representatives in the field. Donors need to be able to respond flexibly in fluid situations, to act decisively, and to move funds quickly. This implies efficient institutional channels and implementation capacities and the presence of knowledgeable staff. Too often, donors apply standard procedures that create delays and gaps in assistance. The World Bank's efforts in Cambodia, for example, were hindered by its lack of an early field presence and its application of cumbersome procurement rules. The Bank learned from this and similar experiences, however, and has moved toward greater reliance on Resident Representatives. This delegation of authority paid dividends both in the West Bank and Gaza and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### *Anticipate -- and Ameliorate — Donor Rivalries*

Political rivalry among donors for leadership of the aid effort and/or disagreements over the application of aid conditions can impair smooth coordination. In the West Bank and Gaza, for example, the European Union sought a coordinating role commensurate with its status as the leading donor to the Occupied Territories. The United States, the leading diplomatic actor in the Middle East peace process, favored assigning this role to the World Bank. The American position ultimately prevailed. Donor rivalry also occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the United States clashed with the World Bank over peace conditionality and the role of the High Representative (OHR) in aid coordination. Although some clashes are inevitable, particularly in politically charged environments, donors need to take steps to anticipate and ameliorate these.

Individual bilateral donors must also improve the internal coherence of their national approaches toward each war-torn country. Too often, national governments fail to harmonize their political and assistance strategies. Thus, a donor's development -- or humanitarian -- agency may be operating according to principles of "neutrality," whereas its foreign ministry will view decisions relating to recovery aid or peace implementation through a political lens, often favoring one faction over another.

### *Strengthen the SRSG and RC/HC Functions*

In addition, the United Nations should redouble its current efforts to strengthen and harmonize those offices critical for effective field coordination: the position of Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the function of the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator.

Post-conflict recovery often begins in the context of multidimensional peace operations under UN command. For example, UN-led peacekeeping or observer missions were in place when international reconstruction efforts began in Cambodia (UNTAC), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Guatemala (MINUGUA), Mozambique (UNOMOZ), and Tajikistan (UNMOT). In cases where the UN has been given a lead role, an SRSG is generally appointed to coordinate the activities of UN agencies on the ground and to help reconcile the UN's strategies for peace implementation and recovery assistance.

While the SRSG plays an indispensable function in societies emerging from conflict, the position requires several urgent reforms. As pointed out in a study by the Peace Implementation Network of the Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, the UN Secretariat must provide the SRSG with a clear mandate and terms of reference, stronger administrative and policy support, and more generous and flexible financial instruments. To improve coordination within the crisis country, each SRSG should be given clear authority to speak on behalf of the various programs, departments, and agencies of the UN family. Most importantly, the SRSG should be granted direct access and supervision over the resources of these entities.

Simultaneously, the United Nations should strengthen its Resident Coordinator (RC) system by delineating the appropriate responsibilities of different UN agencies. Several of the case studies that we commissioned for this project cited damaging rivalries among field-based UN actors reporting to different masters at headquarters and resistant to firm management by one of their number. On the other hand, it should be recognized that the operations covered in these case studies date from the early 1990s, during which the UN reform process has been ongoing. The Secretary-General's recent innovation of a single "UN House" containing all agencies should improve local coordination. In addition, the UN's Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has made progress in reconciling the roles of the RC and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). The UN should clarify further the relationship between the RC/HC function and the role of the SRSG.

Finally, the case studies underline that effective donor coordination depends on the quality of the officials chosen to fill these positions. The selection process for these positions often lacks transparency. If appointments are made through recruitment, this is often done without advertising. A wider net should be cast to broaden the pool of candidates. When appointments are made from within, a broader internal review process might dampen the forces of patronage that can often exert a heavy price on the mission's prospects for success. Only such incisive reforms will ensure that the SRSG and RC/HC roles are occupied by individuals possessing strong managerial skills and field experience and attuned to local political realities.

## VI. BUILDING ON LOCAL CAPACITIES

Post-conflict countries vary enormously in their ability to manage and absorb foreign assistance. Following extensive violence, recipients may lack the human, technical, and administrative capacities required to make use of large quantities of aid or to coordinate the multiple donors and NGOs that arrive to assist their recovery. The donor community should design interventions that enable recipients to acquire these capacities as quickly as possible. Efforts to build state capacity ought to be measurable, with clear benchmarks to gauge progress in different spheres of activity.

Donors can nurture recipient capacities in several ways: by acknowledging and supporting the recipient government's central role in planning and coordinating aid; by financing important public sector expenditures; by providing appropriate technical assistance and training; by adjusting pressure for macroeconomic stabilization; by facilitating the early clearance of arrears; and by prolonging their engagement in the country. The following paragraphs address these points.

### *Acknowledge the Central Role of Domestic Actors*

The donor community is often torn by its impulse to deliver assistance as quickly as possible and its desire to rely on local capacities to shape, supervise, and implement reconstruction efforts. At a rhetorical level, donors concede that "donor-driven" aid must yield to true "partnership" and local "ownership." In practice, donors preoccupied with speed frequently surrender to the temptation to design recovery programs with little recipient input — and to deliver aid through their own implementing agencies and service providers rather than through local actors who alone can ensure the sustainability of the effort.

Donors must engage governments and local stakeholders in broad consultations throughout the recovery effort. Initially, the local governing authority may lack the capacity to design a workable recovery plan on its own, so that a leading donor (or donors) may need to draft the first blueprint for reconstruction in consultation with local officials. As early as practicable, though, the local governing authority should assume responsibility for coordinating assistance. In the West Bank and Gaza, for example, the World Bank and the United Nations Special Commission for the Occupied Territories (UNSCO) assisted the Palestinian Authority in 1995 in drafting its initial Core Investment Program. By 1996, the PA was able to formulate and propose to donors its own Public Investment Program.

To foster healthy political development, donor agencies need to balance their efforts to rebuild state capacities with support for private groups and institutions. Particularly in the early period of recovery from conflict, the legitimacy of a new government may be contested by broad segments of society. To foster political reconciliation, local ownership, and indigenous capacities for recovery, donors must bolster the constructive involvement of opposition parties and civil society actors in the political and economic life of the country. Aid interventions should possess a gender dimension to take advantage of the potential role of women as a force for social peace.

### *Finance Key Public Sector Expenditures*

One obvious way for donors to build local capacities is to channel aid directly through the national budgets of countries emerging from conflict. Bilateral donors generally resist doing this, preferring to finance projects reflecting their own priorities, to fund service providers of their own nationality, and to procure goods from their own country. The result may be programs reflecting donor political

agendas and economic interests rather than those of the local actors. On the other hand, donors often argue that there are insufficient checks and balances to justify direct budgetary support to governments whose internal standards of accountability are often considered inadequate. As a result of these tendencies, the World Bank has found it difficult to mobilize co-financing for budgetary support in several settings, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador and Rwanda. This has delayed the provision of essential public services and risked undermining popular commitments to peace.

When donors agree to provide budgetary support, the benefits can be dramatic. Perhaps the most promising precedent is the Holst Peace Trust Fund, created in 1994 to support the recurrent costs of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Managed by the World Bank, this revolving fund received contributions of more than two dozen bilateral donors. Because these deposits were not earmarked for particular purposes, the fund was inherently flexible. Over five years, the Fund disbursed some \$250 million, much to support the PA's recurrent costs and employment-generation schemes.

#### *Adjust Pressure for Macroeconomic Rigor*

Although macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment are preconditions for sustainable growth and government revenues, in the short term they may run counter to capacity building objectives. War-to-peace transitions are costly. Besides making "normal" expenditures, recovering governments must deliver on specific peace commitments, finance reconstruction initiatives, and fund projects which reward loyalists and reintegrate enemies. It may be impossible to maintain strict budgetary balance in the face of these competing demands. Precipitate emphasis on fiscal rigor, trade liberalization, and privatization may reduce the states capacity to rebuild and deliver basic services and to achieve the promise of peace accords, threatening reconciliation and undermining social peace. Thus pressure for economic reform must be embedded in the political reality of the transition. This may imply tolerating larger deficits or sequencing structural adjustment differently.

Similarly, donors need to sharpen their analyses of state budgets, including "excessive" military expenditures. Typically, aid agencies and IFIs press post-conflict governments to shift spending from security to the social sector. Public order, however, is a prerequisite for peace-building and sustainable recovery. A reasonable level of defense spending may be necessary, for example, for ongoing pacification efforts. In all situations, however, donors must insist upon full civilian control of national security forces.

#### *Facilitate the Clearance of Arrears*

One of the most valuable steps that the international community could take to build the capacities of countries emerging from conflict is to provide them with significant debt relief. Many such states find themselves strapped with huge financial obligations to international financial institutions, often incurred by former regimes. Without the early arrears clearance, they cannot receive new resources from either the IDA or the IMF, nor can they hope to attract significant foreign investment. In current practice, the IFIs often arrange "bridging" loans from third parties, typically donor governments. Such arrangements do not affect the actual debt burden, however, changing only the identity of the creditor. The IFIs need to re-examine the wisdom of extending aid to these states in the form of non-concessional loans rather than grants.

In response to public pressure to reduce debt burdens on the world's poorest countries, in 1996 the World Bank and the IMF sponsored the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (or HIPC) initiative. Two years later, the Fund and the Bank extended this program, partly in recognition of the challenge

facing war-torn countries. Nevertheless, the HIPC remains inadequate on several counts. To qualify, applicants must first complete two successful IMF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) arrangements, which may take six years. Second, the IMF's definition of a "sustainable" debt burden ignores that many war-torn countries cannot raise sufficient revenues or amass export earnings to service their debts. Third, current HIPC resources are too modest to contribute fundamentally to the reduction of poverty in these countries, and the emphasis on debt repayment often forces these countries to produce for export while still being unable to meet internal needs.

Acknowledging the inadequacy of current efforts, the G-7 governments announced an ambitious debt relief proposal at their June 1999 summit in Cologne, Germany. This relief, directed mainly at African countries, could amount to a \$71 billion reduction in the stock of poor country debt. While the large scale of this initiative is promising, it remains to be seen whether the donors will follow through on their pledges, particularly once they address the contentious issue of burden sharing. Moreover, early projections suggest that its impact on the debt positions of highly indebted war-torn countries is likely to be variable. The preconditions for relief remain inappropriately onerous for those countries only beginning to emerge from conflict.

The G-7 has indicated that it would like the Bank and the Fund to be active partners in reconstruction efforts, but without donor money being diverted to debt relief or arrears clearance. One possibility under consideration would be to suspend loan repayment requirements for countries that show good faith in developing good governance and rule of law structures, making them eligible for IDA grants and turning negative cash flows into positive ones for a sustained period of time. During this transition period, a longer-term arrears clearance program could be worked out between the international financial institutions and the debtor country.

Even while the HIPC and other arrangements are being worked out for eligible countries, special arrangements are needed to lift the burden of external debt payments in the early period of recovery from conflict. One possibility would be to provide some interim relief in the form of debt-for-reconstruction swaps in those instances in which local currency is available. While marginal in relation to overall debt, these resources could be used as a form of cost-sharing for recovery activities, rather than converting them into hard currency for debt repayments. In addition to demonstrating good faith on the part of local authorities, such debt-for-reconstruction swaps could contribute to budgetary discipline in meeting certain recurrent costs that donors are reluctant to fund.

#### *Adopt Realistic Time Frames*

Finally, in view of these formidable challenges, donors need to be realistic about the length of their engagement. The sustainable transition from conflict requires a commitment significantly longer than the two to three years donors typically allot to reconstruction programs — and perhaps as long as 6-10 years. Where donors confront an essentially settled conflict, they may wish to negotiate an explicit timetable with the government. In cases where the "peace" is more of an uncertain truce, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, setting firm deadlines for withdrawal may be impractical.

## VII. ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY

### *Unfulfilled Pledges or Delayed Disbursement*

Peace accords, and the aid commitments that accompany them, generate tremendous expectations within societies torn by conflict. By promising to launch economic recovery, pledges of aid can help consolidate fragile peace agreements. Generous promises mean little, however, unless they can be translated promptly into accessible, flexible resources that make tangible improvements in the daily lives of long-suffering populations.

It is thus of concern that much of the aid pledged by the international community arrives only after considerable delays, or never at all. Donors make pledges, but there is typically a lag before these are translated into commitments, and still further into disbursements. Unsustainable and unpredictable disbursements can wreak havoc on reconstruction and peace-building efforts and shatter local expectations.

Two examples will help to illustrate a broader pattern of problems. Consider the case of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In October 1993, donors responded to the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles by pledging some \$2.4 billion over five years to lay the economic foundation for self-rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By the end of 1994, below ten percent of this had been provided. By June 1997, the top ten donors to the Palestinian Authority (PA) had pledged more than \$3.4 billion and committed nearly \$2.8 billion, but less than half of the latter amount had been disbursed. The United States, ostensibly the largest donor, had delivered on only two-fifths of its initial pledge.

Cambodia experienced similar difficulties with the uneven disbursement of approximately \$3 billion promised to support its postwar recovery. The donor community pledged \$880 million at the June 1992 Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia. Only \$200 million had been disbursed by September 1993 (when the new government was formed), and only \$460 million by the end of 1995. Moreover, many donor-driven projects were inappropriate for Cambodia's priority needs and barely touched rural areas outside the capital.

### *Track Aid Delivery*

To ensure the efficacy and legitimacy of its efforts, the donor community must improve its capacities to monitor the delivery and implementation of post-conflict assistance. Donors urgently need a standardized accounting system for reporting aid flows, one that can be applied in every circumstance. Such a comprehensive database, broken down by pledges, commitments, and disbursements, should be updated quarterly and be readily accessible to all stakeholders and interested observers.

Despite efforts to harmonize donor reporting, it remains difficult for third parties to establish firm data on aid flows in many country settings. Although bilateral and multilateral donors alike insist that aid recipients maintain high standards of accountability and transparency, their application of these principles to their own conduct is uneven at best. Too often, donors resist releasing data on the status of their pledges.

Interpreting those matrices of aid flows that are made public is problematic, moreover, since it is donors themselves that usually provide the relevant data. Where parallel tracking systems exist, discrepancies sometimes arise. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where three different actors maintain separate databases, rival estimates for aggregate aid delivery show tremendous variation -- on the order of \$500 million to \$1 billion!

Unfortunately, global mechanisms for reporting aid flows provide no easy verification of aid delivery. The best sources available, the *Quarterly Report on Individual Aid Commitments* and the *Geographical Distribution of Aid Flows*, are published by the DAC, whose twenty-two members are responsible (ultimately) for some 99% of global ODA. Both tracking systems are muddled by the respondents' use of different reporting methods and idiosyncratic classification schemes. Donors differ, for instance, about what counts as "relief," "reconstruction," or "development" aid. It is also difficult to aggregate the recorded flows according to their specific purpose, to link them to individual recovery efforts, or to connect them to the relevant United Nations appeal or multilateral pledging conference. Moreover, donors tend to report their share of contributions to UN implementing agencies, which may report the same disbursement. Finally, neither the OECD nor multilateral agencies treat "pledges" as an official aid category. Given the role pledges play in generating expectations, it seems essential to track them as well.

Both bilateral and multilateral donors acknowledge that current practices must change. As the OECD/DAC notes, "The large volume of resources mobilized for relief and rehabilitation makes it essential to establish an up-to-date, systematic means of tracking aid flows." Such a tracking system would require donors to standardize their definitions of the "related nomenclature," including the meaning of terms like "statement of intent, pledge, commitment, obligation and disbursement." As UNDP's Emergency Response Division (ERD) observes, such terms are generally "confusing and so often used for political effect." [5](#)

Ideally, such a system would be maintained electronically on the World Wide Web. A useful template might be the ReliefWeb maintained by UN OCHA, particularly its Financial Tracking Database for Complex Emergencies ([www.reliefweb.int/fts/index.html](http://www.reliefweb.int/fts/index.html)). The new tracking system could be housed and managed within the OECD secretariat, the UNDP's Emergency Response Division, or the World Bank's Post-Conflict Unit.

Making aid flows transparent would allow all stakeholders to assess progress and encourage donors to meet their obligations in a timely fashion. This has certainly been the experience in the West Bank and Gaza. The accurate, accessible database maintained by the World Bank and the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation has spurred donors to make good on their commitments and the Palestinian Authority to improve the implementation of delivered aid.

#### *Encourage Local Transparency and Accountability*

Reports of corruption within countries emerging from conflict can have devastating consequences for continued donor support for their recovery. Donors should thus design aid interventions in ways that maximize transparency in the use of internal and external funds and that hold local officials accountable. At the same time, donors will need to be attentive to the political realities of recovering societies and the requirements of stability. In the past, peace-building concerns have sometimes led donors to tolerate non-conventional economic instruments and to accept policies by aid recipients that depart from normal standards of transparency. This is obviously a delicate issue that creates quandaries for external actors. In the West Bank and Gaza, for example, Yasir Arafat and the Fateh party have stabilized the post-Oslo political situation partly through a massive system of political patronage that rewards loyalists with employment in a bloated civil service and generates income through quasi-official monopolies. The problem, of course, is that such short-term expedients may prevent a stable macroeconomic framework and -- if unsustainable -- ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority. The dilemma for donors is how long to tolerate convenient departures from economic efficiency and political accountability.

At times, donors too have relied on unorthodox contrivances departing from "normal" accountability standards. For example, Mozambique's smooth transition to peace was lubricated by the SRSG's creation of a \$20 million discretionary fund to support Renamo's transformation from a fighting force to a political party.

By injecting large amounts of assistance into war-torn countries, donors unwittingly but inevitably distort local systems of production and exchange. Such an aid-driven economy alters social power balances, and rival political elites and factions may exploit foreign assistance to gain leverage over national resources (e.g., lumber in Cambodia, diamonds in Sierra Leone). Donors must be attuned to the political economy of conflict and the criminalized nature of many conflict economies, and they should try to direct external resources to local actors who support peace-building goals.

### *Assess the Impact of Aid*

Beyond creating mechanisms to gauge the delivery of promised assistance, the international community needs to develop tools to evaluate its *impact*. Within aid agencies, incentive structures generally reward the ability to "move money," rather than virtuosity in designing assistance appropriately. Consequently, societies emerging from conflict may receive aid that is redundant, harmful or squandered. The predictable result can be too much of the wrong type of aid. There are three general reasons for the current inattention to issues of impact.

First, agencies simply lack methodologies to assess the results of recovery aid. It is difficult to apply data-hungry econometric models in many conflict-ridden environments, where even baseline data may be lacking. The donor community needs to develop benchmarks and indicators appropriate to war-torn settings.

#### ***Develop Benchmarks to Assess Progress***

In order to make capacity building a measurable activity, donors should devise benchmarks -- appropriate to each country context that will allow them to gauge progress towards economic recovery, human security, and participatory governance. In the economic sphere, these indicators would measure the reconstruction of physical infrastructure and utilities, the composition of public spending, the degree of macroeconomic balance, the appropriateness of fiscal instruments, the country's debt position, the distribution of national wealth, the reintegration of refugees and IDPs, the provision of basic social services, the rehabilitation of agriculture, and the reactivation of critical industries. In the security realm, benchmarks should assess the demobilization of combatants, their reintegration into productive life, the reconstitution of armed forces, the creation of civilian police, the disarmament of the population, and the provision of personal security from crime. In the political arena, they should assess the strength of the rule of law and the judiciary, the protection of human rights, the progress of reconciliation panels and truth commissions, the conduct of democratic elections, the transparency of political institutions, the reestablishment of public administration, and the vigor of civil society.

At present, neither the donor community nor independent scholars possess sophisticated analytical tools to conduct longitudinal evaluations of recovery assistance. To assess the impact of recovery assistance, analysts will need to develop benchmarks for "success" (defined in terms of sustainable economic recovery and the preservation of peace) and tools to evaluate the role that aid plays in producing such outcomes. This in turn has implications for program design, since such benchmarks need to be defined at the outset of a venture, rather than after the fact. Only a rigorous process of goal setting with measurable landmarks at the design stage will allow for corrective action at the stage of implementation — and the avoidance of bitter audit observations after resources have been squandered.

Second, evaluation efforts are generally assumed to be not only time-consuming but also expensive. In fact, recent experience suggests that evaluation can be done rapidly and in a cost-effective manner. For example, the path-breaking multi-donor evaluation of assistance to Rwanda, involving four teams and fifty-two people, lasted just a year and cost only \$1.8 million dollars — a fairly modest sum given the important lessons derived from the study. <sup>6</sup> Moreover, the hidden costs of ineffective program management due to the lack of evaluations can far exceed even the most thorough evaluation project and have an impact that is often not only monetary but also economic and political.

A final, more difficult obstacle is that there are few incentives within aid agencies to conduct self-critical evaluations of aid impact. As in most bureaucracies, officials in these institutions are likely to be constrained by concerns of self-preservation. Honest appraisals may bring unwelcome publicity, jeopardizing external credibility and funding. Moreover, they may at times offend the recipient government.

These impediments are real but not insurmountable. One approach to reduce the fear of honest appraisals would be to "multilateralize" the undertaking. Using the model of the Rwanda evaluation (in which the Danish government took the lead), one donor might convene a joint task force, including bilateral donors, IFIs, UN agencies, and prominent NGOs. In the end, the feasibility of a sincere evaluation is likely to depend on the organizational culture of the institutions involved, particularly their openness to learning. Earnest evaluations will be more likely if aid agencies (and their political masters) adopt outcome-based program planning and hold management accountable less for the problems exposed than for the corrective actions taken in response to these appraisals.

## **THE WAY FORWARD: A STRATEGIC RECOVERY FACILITY**

Each of the recommendations made above stands as an important, critical adjustment to the current methods of designing and delivering aid to societies emerging from conflict. Their impact will be limited, however, unless they are linked into a coherent whole. Rather than making improvements at the margins and recreating a new approach in response to each conflict situation, donors should adopt a more holistic approach to coordination. To bring new vigor to the slow and incoherent response capacities of the international community, we call for the creation of a full-fledged Strategic Recovery Facility. This would be open for participation to the core organizations of the United Nations system (including the Bretton Woods institutions), to regional organizations, to governments who choose to contribute or to pledge a set minimum, and to NGO representatives. It would have dedicated funds available for its own analytical and preparatory tasks as well as a standing trust fund or a pre-negotiated stand-by funding arrangement to jump-start recovery activities. The World Bank could serve as fiduciary agent for any trust fund arrangement, while UNOPS could provide administrative and substantive support to the Facility's secretariat.

The governing Board of the Facility would have to be kept small: for example, two UN representatives, one World Bank representative, two representatives of governments designated by the contributing Member States, and two representatives designated by the NGO community, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Under the guidance of the Board, the Facility would be tasked to:

1. establish a shared conceptual framework and integrated approach to the early stages of recovery from conflict;
2. mobilize resources for an ongoing response capacity either through a standing Trust Fund or a pre-negotiated stand-by funding arrangement;

3. develop a database and a "preparedness capacity", i.e., the capacity to analyze information available to its participating partners, to identify and develop various scenarios, to weigh risks and opportunities, and to prepare contingency plans for a wide range of responses to ongoing conflicts involving a broad array of state and non-state actors;
4. identify "trigger events" that justify the beginning of recovery assistance;
5. act as the convening authority to initiate action;
6. promote and underwrite joint needs assessments and local development of a strategic plan for sustainable peace and development;
7. prioritize and maximize the allocation of start-up funding, based on agreed principles, whenever different post-conflict situations compete for attention and resources;
8. identify on a case-by-case basis those elements that require immediate support, say for a period of one year or more, and ensure their backward and forward linkages to humanitarian relief and development objectives;
9. facilitate the establishment of working public/private partnerships at the country level;
10. enhance each partner's individual response capacity by providing an overarching common structure that maximizes program synergy;
11. provide financial and operational support to the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator or SRSG and the country-level UN administrative authority while local capacity is being identified and assumes its responsibilities;
12. ensure a common approach to evaluation and learning;
13. initiate country-level funding mechanisms for on-going and longer-term activities, with a view to gradually phasing out as the country team and local capacity take over.

Funds for these activities could be mobilized in several ways. Co-operating agencies could share the costs of the Secretariat with donors. Preparatory and program costs could be met through a standing Trust Fund established with initial, one-time deposits that could be replenished through annual or multi-year appeals on an as-needed basis. Alternatively, should donors shy away from a standing depository fund, money for programs could be obtained rapidly on a case-by-case basis by calling in pre-negotiated contributions through an agreed triggering mechanism. In either case, the Facility should be seen as a mechanism to jump-start and synchronize the international community's response. It would be used on a time-limited basis in each case, while a longer-term country plan is developed, dedicated country trust funds are established (possibly as sub-trust funds), and multilateral and bilateral aid agencies as well as NGOs become operational on the ground.

While at first glance this Facility may seem ambitious, the modest investment required to achieve a sufficient level of preparedness for early intervention will assuredly outweigh the costs in lives and opportunities lost -- as well as in dollar terms -- that the international community will continue to bear in the absence of timely action to support recovery from conflict.

## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: Project Participants

#### CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

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**Stewart Patrick**, Research Associate  
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#### COUNTRY RESEARCH TEAMS

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**Michael Foley**, Associate Professor of Politics, The Catholic University of America  
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**Shijuro Ogata**, former Deputy Director of the Japan Development Bank and Co-Chair of the Independent Working Group on UN Financing.

**Volker Rittberger**, Director of the Center for International Politics -- Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Tuebingen.

### Appendix 2: Countries in Violent Conflict or Emerging From it, 1989-1999 7

AFRICA	AFRICA (cont.)	EUROPE	AMERICAS	MIDDLE EAST	ASIA
Angola	Liberia	Armenia	Columbia	Algeria	Afghanistan
Burundi	Mali	Azerbaijan	El Salvador	Lebanon	Burma
C. A. Republic	Mozambique	Bosnia-	Guatemala	West Bank and	Cambodia
Chad	Namibia	Herzgovina	Haiti	Gaza Strip	Indonesia
Congo	Niger	Croatia	Nicaragua	Yemen	(East Timor)
D. Rep. Congo	Rwanda	Georgia	Peru	Iraq	Sri Lanka
Djibouti	Sierra Leone	Yugoslavia			Tajikistan
Eritrea	Somalia				
Ethiopia	South Africa				
Ghana	Sudan				
Guinea-Bissau	Uganda				

*Sources: United Nations, World Bank, OECD*

### Appendix 3: Definitions

#### *Pledges, Commitments, and Disbursements*

A pledge denotes a public expression of donor intent to mobilize funds for which an approximate sum is given. Although aid pledges shape public and official expectations in both recipient and donor countries, donors themselves do not treat pledges as an official aid category. (Indeed, they often fail to keep track of them). Rather, donors begin tracking aid flows at the stage of commitment, defined as a firm obligation by a bilateral donor government or international organization, expressed in a contract or agreement, to furnish a recipient country with a specified amount of public assistance, under agreed financial terms and for specific purposes. Finally, a disbursement represents the actual international transfer of financial resources.

### Appendix 4: Matrix of Essential Activities for Recovery from Conflict

#### ENDNOTES

1 United Nations, "Comments of the Secretary General and the ACC on the Report of the Joint Inspection Union" 9July 30, 1998).

2 OECD/DAC, Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation, 29-35.

3 United Nations, "Africa: Secretary-Generals Report to the United Nations Security Council" (April 16, 1998). World Bank, world Development Report 1997 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), 161.

4 World Bank, The World Bank's Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction (In Five Volumes) Volume I: Synthesis Report, Report No. 17769 (May 4, 1998), x, 24-6.

5 OECD/DAC, Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation, 36. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Emergency Response Division (ERD), "Building Bridges Between Relief and Development: A Compendium of the UNDP Record in Crisis Countries" ([www.undp.org/~erdweb/bridges.htm](http://www.undp.org/~erdweb/bridges.htm)).

6 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience (in four volumes) Study 4: Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996).

7 Other countries have obviously experienced localized violence, including India (Kashmir), Mexico (Chiapas), Russia (Chechnya), Turkey (Kurdistan), and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland). For a classification of internal conflict in the 1990s, see Brown, "Internal Conflict: Causes and Implications," pp. 4-7.