

3.2 Mission Reviews

West Africa

INTRODUCTION

West Africa has witnessed a relative decline in violent conflict and growing stability in recent years. Sierra Leone and Liberia, in particular, have made great headway in peace consolidation. Nonetheless, the region continues to face numerous challenges to peace in the form of political instability, poor governance, predatory security services, mismanaged natural resources, poverty and unemployment, and unconstitutional changes of government – all of which contribute to the region's volatility. Porous borders and weak state institutions make West African states especially vulnerable to infiltration by transnational criminal and terrorist networks that often have intimate links with ruling elites. The “Arab Spring” has presented further challenges for the region as tens of thousands of migrant workers returned to their home countries in West Africa in 2011, placing increased burden on the states.

The UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) aims to address these and other emerging threats on a regional basis, while the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) work on a country-specific level. The presence of an active and assertive Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also encouraged pro-active efforts at combating criminality and conflict. The region also hosts two active UN peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA)


Authorization Date	26 November 2001 (UNSC Letter S/2001/1128)
Start Date	1 January 2002
SRSB	Said Djinnit (Algeria)
First SRSB	Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)
Budget	\$7.7 million (1 January 2011-31 December 2011)
Strength as of 30 April 2011	International Civilian: 21 National Civilian: 16 Military Experts on Mission: 3

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UNOWA

Background

In November 2001 then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote to the Security Council declaring his intent to establish UNOWA to promote an integrated sub-regional approach to peace and security challenges in the West African region. A few months later in January 2002, UNOWA – the first ever regional UN political mission – was established. UNOWA covers ECOWAS's fifteen member states and Mauritania, and its first mandate focused on coordinating and enhancing the UN's and its partners' work in the region; assisting ECOWAS, the Mano River Union and other regional and international partners; and carrying out the good



offices of the Secretary-General. While technically responsible for all of West Africa, UNOWA has tended to take the lead on countries with no other UN political presence. Said Djinnit was appointed as SRSG to UNOWA in February 2008.

Since 2002, UNOWA's mandate has been renewed three times (2005, 2007 and 2010) for three-year periods. With each mandate renewal, the functions and activities of the Office have increased and expanded. By 2007, its mandate involved thirty-three activities¹ – a broad scope, given that in 2010 UNOWA had fewer than thirty staff.² While good offices and support to ECOWAS remain central, UNOWA has transformed as the strategic context in West Africa has changed. Over time, cross-border and cross-cutting challenges to peace, security and stability have become a part of UNOWA's core activities.

In December 2010, in acknowledgement of the inordinate expectations and multitude of tasks the Office was responsible for, the Security Council

revised UNOWA's mandate to focus on three core objectives: (i) monitoring political developments, carrying out good offices and enhancing regional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; (ii) enhancing sub-regional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security, including election-related instability, challenges to the security sector, organized crime, illicit trafficking and terrorism; (iii) promoting good governance and rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention and management initiatives.³

While the new mandate better reflects the changing nature of the security landscape in West Africa, it places a strong emphasis on good offices function to defuse and resolve crises in the region. Indeed, UNOWA's SRSG Djinnit has increasingly been called upon in the context of regional mediation and prevention efforts. Yet these activities can hamper planning for long-term engagement on other mandated tasks, especially since UNOWA



remains the smallest political mission in West Africa despite its vast geographic area of focus and thematic scope.

Key Developments

On 27 June 2010, Guinea, for the first time in its history, organized and conducted a multiparty presidential election, in which two leading candidates emerged: Cellou Dalein Diallo and Alpha Condé. After disagreements between the two candidates over modalities delayed the scheduled run-off, ECOWAS, supported by UNOWA, took on a lead role in keeping the peaceful transition process on course and on 7 November 2010 a run-off presidential election was held. Violence erupted in the days that followed, and SRSG Djinnit, in collaboration with the AU and other regional and international partners, helped manage the tensions. On 3 December 2010, the Supreme Court declared Condé the winner and Diallo accepted the ruling, enabling the

formation of a new government. Guinea was added to the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission on 23 February 2011 following a request from the authorities,

Guinea's young democracy was threatened by a failed assassination attempt on President Condé on 19 July 2011. While it is unclear who orchestrated the attack, the army chief of staff in the government of former military dictator Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, was arrested along with a former member of the presidential guard. The UN strongly condemned the attack and reiterated its support for Guinea's democratic transition. On 21 July, SRSG Djinnit traveled to Conakry to urge President Condé to continue dialogue with political parties, including the opposition, and to seek resolution of outstanding issues regarding the preparation of legislative elections scheduled for November 2011.

The incident underlines the importance of reforming the country's security sector. UNOWA has been working closely with other UN partners,

Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)

Authorization and Start Date	17 March 2004 (UNSC Letter S/2004/298)
Chairman	Said Djinnit (Algeria)
First Chairman	Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)
Budget	\$8.7 million (1 January 2011-31 December 2011)
Strength as of 30 April 2011	International Civilian: 8 National Civilian: 2

For detailed mission information see p. 173

including the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), to help create a national dialogue on security and defense sector reform in Guinea. A seminar held in March and April 2011 and the subsequent establishment of a national security sector reform (SSR) steering committee was a positive step. UNOWA also continues to cooperate with ECOWAS in implementing a sub-regional political framework and plan of action on security sector governance and reform.

Electoral and political crises in Niger, Mauritania, Benin and Togo also dominated much of the good offices function of UNOWA in 2010 and 2011. Recognizing the pattern of violent electoral contestation, often involving national armed forces, UNOWA organized, in partnership with Cape Verde, ECOWAS, UNDP, the UN Department of Political Affairs, the AU, the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie and the EU, a conference on elections and stability in West Africa in Praia, Cape Verde from 18 to 20 May 2011. The conference resulted in the adoption of the “Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa,” a sign that states in the region are serious in their calls for democratic societies with a strong opposition, an active civil society, free media, professional security forces and informed citizens.

In addition to the threats posed by election-related instability, drug trafficking and organized crime remain areas of concern for UNOWA. While the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has noted a decrease in the number of drug trafficking seizures in the region over the past few

years, there are indications that traffickers are conducting more sophisticated operations, rather than abandoning trafficking; in fact, heroin trafficking through West Africa increased during the first five months of 2011.⁴ Drug trafficking and organized crime threaten to undermine already weak governance structures, can finance and instigate coups, and can have a dramatic impact on local economies.

UNOWA supports ECOWAS in efforts to combat drug trafficking and organized crime through the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI). On 20 June 2011, SRSG Djinnit chaired the inaugural session of the High-Level Policy Committee of the WACI, aiming to set the strategic direction of the joint initiative supporting the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan to address the growing problem of illicit trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse in West Africa. The first priority of the WACI has been to assist four pilot countries (Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire) in the establishment of transnational organized crime units, and to provide specialized training.

Conclusion

West Africa is likely to continue to be afflicted by transnational threats of trafficking, organized crime and cross-border violence, while facing tremendous socio-economic challenges. There are reasons for optimism, however. Guinea’s successful transition and the restoration of constitutional rule in Niger and Côte d’Ivoire have been encouraging signs. Indeed, unconstitutional changes of government are lessening and regional bodies like ECOWAS are swift to act when they do happen.

UNOWA has been able to provide added value in preventing various conflicts in the region including in acting as a complement to ECOWAS. Yet, UNOWA has struggled to fulfill its role to harmonize UN activities and facilitate further collaboration in the region. Given its current staffing configuration – even taking into account the Office’s newly focused mandate around three core areas – UNOWA’s ability to undertake this role is likely to be limited. Striking a balance between ad hoc diplomacy led by the SRSG and more systematic, long-term efforts aimed at better governance and a responsible security sector will remain a priority in the years ahead.

UNIPSIL

Background

The UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established in December 2005, succeeding the UN peacekeeping mission in the country, to assist national peace consolidation efforts and help prepare for presidential and legislative elections in 2007. In October 2008 under Security Council Resolution 1829, UNIOSIL transformed into one of the first fully integrated political missions, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), tasked with supporting the

government in resolving tensions and addressing areas of conflict; monitoring and promoting human rights and rule of law; strengthening good governance; assisting with the constitutional review; and supporting coordination between the mission, the PBC and the UNCT.

UNIPSIL is led by an Executive Representative of the Secretary General (ERSG), Michael von der Schulenburg, who is “double hatted,” as he also serves as the Resident UN Coordinator. UNIPSIL also has a mandate that provides a political platform, aid coordination and support – through a multi-donor trust fund – and technical advice to

Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

In 2004, the UN established the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC), following a request by Cameroon and Nigeria to assist in implementing a 2002 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on the disputed land border between the two countries. The demarcation process involved four separate sections: the Lake Chad basin, the land boundary, the maritime boundary and the highly contested Bakassi Peninsula, which has rich offshore oil deposits and fish stocks. In June 2006, the parties agreed on the withdrawal of Nigerian forces and the transfer of authority in the peninsula to Cameroon under the Greentree Agreement.

The CNMC, collocated with UNOWA with the same SRSG, is mandated to complete technical aspects such as border demarcation, delineation and demilitarization, but also provides monitoring and early warning mechanisms to ensure the protection of rights for those in the area of transition and encourages cooperative economic and environmental arrangements between the two populations. UNOWA's SRSG also serves as both the Chairman of the CNMC and the Follow-up Committee for the Greentree Agreement, which is in place until 2013.

Demarcation of the land boundary is the remaining technical aspect of CNMC's mandate. At the time of writing, the parties have agreed on more than 1,600 kilometers of the 1,950 kilometer-long land border. To encourage agreement on the remaining 350 kilometers, the CNMC held a two-day meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in July 2011. In a communiqué at the end of the meeting, both countries reiterated their commitment to complete the demarcation by the end of 2012.

In the past, a number of technical and political issues have caused significant delays in the completion of the process, including faulty estimations of timelines, lack of funding, and omissions in the ICJ ruling of important details that pertain to the exact location of villages and roads along the border, affecting its delineation. Political stalemates have centered on the access to resources, particularly around the Bakassi peninsula, but also included issues of nationality of the affected populations.

Confidence-building measures supported by SRSG Djinnit have played an important role in re-establishing a degree of trust between the two countries, even to the extent that several related issues are now dealt with on an entirely bilateral basis. However, progress could not have been achieved without the commitment by the countries' respective heads of states.

In moving forward implementation of the agreements on the disputed territory between Nigeria and Cameroon, the CNMC has been successful in utilizing its impartiality, technical expertise and facilitation role – and observers view the commission as a success in conflict prevention. In order to ensure to completion of its mandated tasks and enable exit of the Commission, the CNMC has to continue working with the parties on outstanding issues around the remaining land border areas. One challenge to overcome in the process is mobilizing the financial resources necessary to sustain the CNMC. While UNOWA in 2010 strengthened managerial and project management capacity in support of the CNMC trust fund, the capacity of the Commission to cover its mandate remains somewhat constrained.

assist the government. The UN system works under the 2009-2012 Joint Vision of the UN Family for Sierra Leone, which was developed in response to the government's peacebuilding priorities articulated in its 2008 Agenda for Change. The Joint Vision articulates, behind the overall priority of furthering peace consolidation, one common strategy that promotes integration at the program planning, evaluation and operational levels in four programmatic priorities: (i) integrating rural areas into the national economy; (ii) economic and social integration of the youth; (iii) equitable and affordable access to health; and (iv) accessible and credible public services.

Sierra Leone has experienced relative stability since the end of the civil war ten years ago, though elections in 2009 did ignite violence throughout the country. Preceding local elections in March 2009, politically-motivated violence quickly spread, pitting governing party supporters of the All People's Congress (APC) and the opposition Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). UNIPSIL worked actively to calm the situation and through a series of dialogues the parties signed a joint communiqué on 2 April 2009, which encouraged political tolerance, multiparty respect for institutions and the political process, and the need to focus on the youth groups associated with the parties.

Key Developments

While Sierra Leone has made marked progress, the political situation remains tense. The upcoming 2012 elections are seen by many as a landmark moment, when results of investments made and progress observed will be put to the test. Challenges persist in addressing corruption, drug trafficking, youth unemployment, as well as the worsening of local economic conditions which have caused an increase in commodity prices (particularly fuel), a fall in remittances and unemployment, all which are potential sources of instability. Observers agree that the capacity of the Sierra Leonean state to absorb these shocks remains limited and is a sign of fragility.

UNIPSIL is supporting the technical aspects of election preparation, including the electoral budget, a voter registration system, reform of the electoral law, and assists the National Electoral Commission

UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)

Authorization Date	4 August 2008 (UNSC Res. 1829)
Start Date	1 October 2008
ERSG	Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)
First ERSG	Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)
Budget	\$16.6 million (1 January 2011-31 December 2011)
Strength as of 30 April 2011	International Civilian: 35 National Civilian: 30 Police: 7 UN Volunteers: 7

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AU Liaison Office in Côte d'Ivoire

First Mandate	10 January 2005 (PSC/AHG/Comm. (XXIII))
Head of Office	Ambassador Ambroise Niyonsaba (Burundi)
Budget	\$1.1 million (1 January 2011-31 December 2011)
	\$1.2 million (1 January 2012-31 December 2012)
Staff Strength	14

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(NEC) and the Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC) as needed. Mindful of the experience in 2009, the Office has been prioritizing preparations for the 2012 elections by ensuring that relations between and within political parties remain peaceful and within the constitutional process. Sustaining an emphasis on national reconciliation has been difficult in light of a series of disturbing incidents in November 2010.

On 13 November 2010, the offices of the SLPP and the residence of a SLPP youth leader in Koidu City were splashed with human excrement, with SLPP staff accusing the APC of responsibility for the attacks. Two days later a similar incident occurred when residences of two APC leaders and a school were similarly defiled in Kono District. The

Mediation Initiatives in Côte d'Ivoire

Following the second round of presidential elections on 28 November 2010, the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire sharply deteriorated when the incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo refused to abdicate power to the internationally recognized election winner Alassane Ouattara. The contested electoral results precipitated a four-month civil war.

While the final solution to this conflict was achieved by the military intervention of the pro-Ouattara rebel forces, the Forces Nouvelles, with the support of UNOCI, the UN peacekeeping mission in the country, and the French Armed Forces peacekeeping operation, Licorne, at the onset of this dispute various high-level mediation initiatives were undertaken by the UN, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to find a political solution to the conflict.

Immediately following the electoral stalemate, ECOWAS, in firm support of Alassane Ouattara held an extraordinary summit in Abuja on 7 December, attended by heads of state, ministers, ambassadors and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Côte d'Ivoire and head of UNOCI, Y.J. Choi. The summit concluded with the decision to suspend Côte d'Ivoire from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies.¹ A follow up summit on 24 December was attended by representatives of every ECOWAS member state and the SRSG of the UN Office for West Africa, Said Djinnit – who was mandated to focus on the regional dimension of the conflict, complementing the role of UNOCI SRSG Choi. Participants backed the imposition of sanctions against Gbagbo, and further warned of the possibility of forceful intervention if the incumbent refused to cede the presidency. This threat soon caused divisions between those willing to support a military action, and those wary of its regional implications – a tension that ultimately limited ECOWAS's ability to effectively mediate between the two parties.

Concurrently, the AU appointed former South African President Thabo Mbeki to help resolve the dispute on 4 December 2010. Although Mbeki had met with both Ouattara and Gbagbo separately, he had little success in securing a joint-meeting with the two parties. Following Mbeki's mediation attempt, the AU announced that Côte d'Ivoire was to be suspended from the union until "the democratically elected president effectively assumes state power."² Meanwhile, Jean Ping, the Chair of the AU Commission, and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra, along with Nigerian President Jonathan Goodluck, the ECOWAS chair, and Victor Gbeho the President of the ECOWAS Commission in a joint mediation effort met with Ouattara and Gbagbo in Abidjan.

On 28 December, ECOWAS sent a mission to Abidjan comprised of the presidents of three impartial non-bordering states (Benin, Cape Verde and Sierra Leone), but soon left unsuccessful. A second visit by the delegation included Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the AU's new envoy, who arrived with the intent of negotiating Gbagbo's departure. However, Odinga's outwardly expressed support for a military intervention as a solution to the conflict somewhat limited his mediation capacity. Still, on 4 January the delegation issued a statement reporting the willingness of Gbagbo to support a peaceful negotiated end to the conflict without preconditions. Ouattara accepted this position provided Gbagbo abided by the results of election as announced by the Independent Electoral Commission – terms ultimately not accepted by Gbagbo.

The next major initiative culminated on 28 January as the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) called for the establishment of a High Level Panel composed of five current heads of state. With the support of designated experts, the Panel once more recognized Ouattara as the winner of the 28 November elections. Furthermore, the Panel suggested that Ouattara form and lead a national unity government pending Gbagbo's honorable withdraw, change the system of parliamentary elections, establish a new military structure and establish a high council aimed to promote social reconciliation. The PSC, endorsing the Panel's findings, thus called on the AU to appoint a High Commissioner to oversee the implementation of its recommendations.

However, the president of Gbagbo's political party rejected the findings of the Panel at AU headquarters in Addis Abba on 10 March. Despite final calls for a political solution throughout March and early April, a destabilizing security climate and enhanced military campaigns by domestic forces predetermined the ultimate military outcome. On 30 March, the UN Security Council in its resolution 1975 (2011) imposed financial and travel restrictions on targeted members of Gbagbo's inner circle and on 11 April after heavy shelling, Laurent Gbagbo was arrested and transferred to the north of Côte d'Ivoire, where at the time of writing he remains under house-arrest under the protection of UNOCI forces.

1 The decision was made in accordance with Article 45 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.

2 African Union, Communiqué of the 252nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCLII) (9 December 2010).

AU Liaison Office in Liberia

First Mandate	6 April 2004 (PSC/PR/3(IV))
Head of Office	Ambassador Akin O. Fayomi (Nigeria)
Budget	\$0.8 million (1 January 2011-31 December 2011)
	\$0.9 million (1 January 2012-31 December 2012)
Staff Strength	International: 5 National: 8

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PPRC investigated the events and concluded that there was no evidence that the leadership of the respective parties prompted the attacks.

On 4 December 2010, the President of Sierra Leone shuffled his Cabinet and appointed two members of the opposition SLPP. Underscoring the volatility of the political climate, the SLPP leadership suspended the two appointees from the party. Nevertheless, both appointments were approved by parliament. This episode highlighted tensions in the SLPP, which were furthered by the campaign to nominate the party's contender to the 2012 Presidential elections. After several postponements, the party eventually held a national conference that elected on 1 August 2011 retired Brigadier Maada Bio as the SLPP candidate.

Local Council elections were held in the Kono District on 11 December 2010, and were marked by violence and incidents of intolerance by the two major parties, given the district's importance in deciding the outcome of the 2012 election. Buildings were vandalized and SLPP officials were attacked. The ERSG consulted with the parties and stakeholders, including the PPRC and the NEC, and as a result these bodies monitored developments and maintained a strong presence in the district during the election.

UNIPSIL continued to implement the 2009 joint communiqué. In December 2010, the All Political Parties Youth Association was established with support from UNIPSIL and the Peacebuilding Fund, with the goal of fostering cooperation among youths of different political backgrounds and to

promote non-violence. In January 2011, the All Political Parties Women's Association was founded to promote gender equality and women's political participation. While these achievements represent real progress, other aspects of the joint communiqué have not yet been implemented, including a government investigation into the March 2009 violence and the creation of an independent police complaints committee. In the run-up to the 2012 elections, a number of contentious issues between the APC and the SLPP will need to be addressed. Paramount among these is the legitimacy of the National Electoral Commission.

During the past year the Office has also been working to support the government's anti-corruption efforts, which impact the country's ability to manage natural resources, by strengthening the National Anti-Corruption Commission Secretariat. Sierra Leone was also the first of the four WACI pilot countries to establish a transnational crime unit, with the support of UNIPSIL, UNDOC and INTERPOL.

With the World Bank, the ERSG co-chairs a donor coordination committee, which supports the government's Agenda for Change. Nevertheless, the donor community in Sierra Leone remains relatively small, and somewhat fatigued. The PBC has played an important role in aligning the international community's strategies and tools, and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has filled crucial financial gaps for timely peacebuilding initiatives, but mobilization of resources has not met needs in the country. Beyond the 2012 elections there is indication that predictable funding will drop further. As Sierra Leone is dependent on Official Development Assistance for 70 percent of its budget, the current funding shortfall for the Multi Donor Trust Fund threatens to negatively affect implementation of the UN Joint Vision and the Agenda for Change.

Conclusion

Achieving unity within government, at political levels and in society at large, will be Sierra Leone's main challenge. The risks associated with ethnic polarization and identity-based allegiances continue to be used as a political mobilization tool. Corruption and poor management of natural resources also represent key challenges for stability in Sierra Leone.

UNIPSIL is well placed to provide critical political support for stabilization and peace consolidation in Sierra Leone. The mission has made important advancements on its mandated tasks. This progress led the Security Council to encourage UNIPSIL to start preparations for an eventual drawdown and exit of the mission, currently scheduled to start in 2013 on the assumption that the 2012 elections are successfully conducted. UNIPSIL's clear and focused mandate has made articulation of benchmarks, according to which exit can be planned, straightforward.

Nevertheless, UNIPSIL still struggles with a number of operational challenges. The most pressing is the lack of sufficient resource mobilization for Sierra Leone. That will require continued attention and support from the international community to ensure that progress made to date is sustainable.

UNIOGBIS

Background

Less than a year after the government of Guinea-Bissau and a self-proclaimed military junta signed the Abuja agreement, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) was established in April 1999 to support its implementation. In 2004, the Security Council extended UNOGBIS's mandate as a special political mission. With continuing peace consolidation and stability needs, Guinea-Bissau was placed on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in December 2007 at the request of the government.

In January 2010, UNOGBIS was replaced by the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), to draw on the strengths of various actors in the UN system for a holistic approach to tackling challenges and instability. The Office's mandated tasks include support to the PBC and the PBF, the coordination of SSR efforts, and addressing national reconciliation issues. The integrated mission model allowed more resources to be allocated to these objectives and aimed to improve coordination with the UN Country Team (UNCT).

On 23 November 2010, the Security Council renewed the mandate of UNIOGBIS until 31 December 2011, citing concern at the continuing instability in the country and underscoring the

lack of civilian oversight and control of the armed forces, rule of law and human rights. The mission's mandate includes a set of benchmarks to monitor progress on governance, democracy and political dialogue; economic growth and poverty reduction; social protection and human development; and security sector reform and the rule of law.

Although Guinea-Bissau has made significant strides toward a more stable political and security situation, the country still suffers from the impact of the events of March 2009 when the President and the Army Chief of Staff were assassinated, and April 2010 when the Chief of the Army and the Prime Minister were temporarily detained by a military faction and the Navy Admiral sought refuge in the UN compound. The events demonstrate the continued fragility of state institutions and underscore UNIOGBIS's focus on improving civilian oversight of the military as part of its SSR activities.

Key Developments

Since September 2010, UNIOGBIS has achieved notable results in its mandated tasks, including strengthening national engagement for dialogue processes both at the level of national leadership and the population, enhancing international coordination on SSR and streamlining of the army,⁵ and advocating for human rights legislation, such as on female genital mutilation and human trafficking. The mission has also taken a lead role in supporting the efforts of national authorities by assembling UN and international partners around a common set of priorities related to building stable civilian state institutions.

In moving forward the national dialogue process, UNIOGBIS' support was mainly focused on preparing for a national conference for dialogue and reconciliation planned for November or December 2011. In preparation for the national conference, UNIOGBIS has assisted in organizing conferences in Dakar and Lisbon in May for the diaspora and has, along with UNDP, assisted the national organizing commission for the conference in launching regional conferences in June in the south of Guinea-Bissau. By including the country's political leadership, and by gathering input from society at large, the preparatory conferences are held with a view to advancing ongoing institutional reform processes – they may, for example

UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)

Authorization Date	26 February 1999 (UNSC Letter S/1999/232 (as UNOGBIS))
	26 June 2009 (UNSC Res. 1876 (as UNIOGBIS succeeding UNOGBIS))
Start Date	1 January 2010
SRSB	Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)
First SRSB	Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)
Budget	\$18.4 million (1 January 2011-31 December 2011)
Strength as of 30 April 2011	International Civilian: 57 National Civilian: 39 Military Experts on Mission: 1 Police: 14

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AU Liaison Office in Guinea-Bissau

First Mandate	29 March 2010 (PSC/PR/COMM.(CCXXII))
Head of Office	Vacant
Budget	\$0.8 million (1 January 2011-31 December 2011)
	\$0.8 million (1 January 2012-31 December 2012)
Staff Strength	7

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discuss consensual revision of the constitution, which the parliament plans to undertake before the next legislative election in 2012.⁶ UNIOGBIS also works with the national organizing commission on follow-up mechanisms to ensure that outcomes are acted upon.

In supporting the political dialogue at the level of the country's leadership, UNIOGBIS has used its good offices role to ensure improved dialogue between President Malam Bacai Sanhá and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior, who are long-standing political rivals. The relationship between the president and the prime minister has reportedly improved in recent months. However, it is unclear if the level of trust allows for progress in issues critical

to the country's stability, such as fighting impunity and finding agreement on how to address the 2009 political assassinations.

Tensions surrounding the unresolved 2009 assassinations remained high in Guinea-Bissau. On 14 and 19 July, and 5 August 2011, opposition parties led thousands in protests calling for Prime Minister Gomes Júnior to step down, primarily over his failure to investigate the assassinations. On 28 July President Sanhá met with members of civil society and the opposition and a few days later with representatives of the EU, AU and ECOWAS to discuss possible ways forward. The prime minister, meanwhile, said he would be "open for debate" on his future if the opposition parties took their proposals to parliament. At the time of writing it remains uncertain whether opposition parties will take this course of action.

Several important developments have taken place in regard to SSR and efforts to stabilize state institutions. In March 2011, the government of Guinea-Bissau and ECOWAS leaders agreed to implement an ECOWAS-Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) road map for security sector reform. The road map entails prioritized key activities to restructure and modernize Guinea-Bissau's defense and security institutions, including technical assistance, training for national protection units, and the preparation of a battalion for peacekeeping operations. In addition, ECOWAS has committed \$63 million for the SSR road map, including for an armed forces and police pension fund – a key part of the security sector reform process. Portugal, Brazil and Angola are providing complementary initiatives, such as police and armed forces training, the rebuilding of military barracks, technical assistance and the launching of a police academy. The African Union has also deployed SSR and conflict prevention officers to the country. In April, the UN Secretary-General deployed a technical assessment mission, which was undertaken in close consultation with national authorities, the AU, EU, ECOWAS, CPLP member states and other relevant bilateral partners, to gauge the requirements necessary to implement the ECOWAS-CPLP road map.

UNIOGBIS works to ensure proper coordination of the various efforts in the area of SSR and supports the strengthening of capacities of national partners. In particular, the mission works in the

area of police reform, through, for example, the establishment of 12 model police stations, the first of which is expected to be inaugurated in August 2011. UNIOGBIS also continues its efforts in selecting and training police personnel in order to support national efforts to restore state authority and re-establish public security.

Drug trafficking remains a serious concern in Guinea-Bissau, especially in the light of the relationship between the country's army and drug cartels – in 2010 the US classified the former Navy Rear Admiral, José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto and the Air Force Chief of Staff, Ibraima Papa Camara as drug kingpins. To this end, the upgrading of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Guinea-Bissau, the recent adoption of a number of legal frameworks (including a revised penal code), the launch of a transnational crime unit and the adoption of the 2011-2014 National Operational Plan to Combat Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in Guinea-Bissau are important steps toward strengthening the country's capacity to combat illicit trafficking activities. In support of WACI, UNIOGBIS also works closely with DPKO and UNODC and the UN missions in the other three WACI pilot countries. The mission also provides resources, advice, mentoring and training in support of national efforts. Still, the issue of drug trafficking has escaped serious commitment by national, regional and international

actors, particularly in strengthening the regional approach by addressing issues such as border security and establishing a shared system of intelligence.

Conclusion

Progress on a number of fronts, notably on national dialogue processes and movement on the SSR agenda, are positive developments in Guinea-Bissau. UNIOGBIS must increasingly interact and consult with national authorities and the population to rebuild trust as a basis for the development of a stable state and society. The repercussions of events in 2009 and 2010 – including the recent mass demonstrations demanding investigations into the incidents – make it clear that stability is still fragile and underline the need for a functioning justice system. Yet, it remains to be seen if the government has the necessary political will to move forward with strengthening the capacity of national institutions, pursuing national reconciliation, combating drug trafficking, and implementing the security sector reform strategy in Guinea Bissau.

Progress in these areas is vital for continued donor support. The EU, which suspended part of its development funding – including on security sector reform – after the 2010 events, made a gradual assumption of EU development assistance depended on advances by the authorities in reform processes.

NOTES

- 1 United Nations, Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/2007/753, 21 December 2007.
- 2 United Nations, Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/2010/693, 31 December 2010.
- 3 United Nations, Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/2010/660, 20 December 2010. See also S/2010/614 and S/2010/693
- 4 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the United Nations Office in West Africa, S/2011/388 (20 June 2011) para. 8, available at <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1137970.pdf>.
- 5 A 2008 census concluded that Guinea-Bissau's Armed Forces has an inverted hierarchical pyramid, and has a ratio of 2.73 military personnel per 1000 inhabitants, compared to the sub-region's average of 1.23 military personnel per 1000 inhabitants.
- 6 United Nations, Briefing to the Security Council on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau, S/PV.6569 (28 June 2011).